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 “The church must speak with words and deeds . . . In times past this has meant leading 
the fight against child labor, slavery  . . . and for prison reform, for the right of the 
working man to form unions   . . . for complete racial equality, for the elimination of 
poverty and hunger . . . . Sometimes the church is wrong . . . but there is no way [it] can 
play it safe and be true to the Gospel . . . Whose job is it to cause society to „repent‟ if not 
the church‟s?  The role of prophet is active, often disruptive and always painful.  I know 
this, because, if the church today were to do its full duty, I would be among those called 
to repent.” 
--- J. Irwin Miller, CEO, Cummins Engine Co., Reader‘s 
Digest, April 1972, pp. 207.  
PART 1:  INTRODUCTION 
According to the founders of sociology, the forms of religious activism observed 
in the 20
th
 century should not have emerged.  Marx conceived of religion as little more
than a transcendent means of social control, a product of capitalist relations of production 
designed to prevent the revolt of the oppressed masses. Weber‘s master narrative of 
rationalization predicted the inevitable conquest of the sacred by the secular, as science 
and reason gradually ―disenchanted‖ the social world to make way for bureaucratic 
capitalism. Durkheim, though more charitable to religion, still foresaw its transformation 
into a largely egoistic, hyper-privatized phenomena with few effects on collective life – 
―the cult of the self.‖  Though glimpses of each of these have certainly been observed 
since their original writing, the preponderance of evidence from the field of contentious 
politics suggests that religion is far from fading, and very far from dead.  On the contrary, 
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the political story of the 20
th
 century can scarcely be told without referring to the
centrality of religion. Imagine any type of contention – war, revolution, movement, 
―culture war,‖ terrorism, policy debate, etc. – and religion will be found in its midst.  
The United States of America stands anomalously as at the same time the most 
developed yet most religious nation on the planet. In terms of economic wealth and 
power, the success of its secular democracy, and its techno-scientific level of advance, 
the U.S., for better or worse, has no peer. Yet, contrary to all sociological and political 
predictions, America is also the home of more religious diversity and faithful citizens 
than any place in the world. Though recent years have shown a slight decline in 
religiosity, for the vast majority of its 230-year history, the United States has 
demonstrated both ―worldliness‖ and ―godliness,‖ a fact unmatched in scope by any other 
nation. As a result, a significant swath of U.S social features bears the imprint of these 
two interwoven facts.  Historically, the most influential manifestation of high religiosity 
amidst high development has been the persistent role of faith, particularly Christianity, in 
politics.  The most obvious sociological examples derive from electoral politics, whether 
in the form of political elites citing scripture or referencing faith in official rhetoric, or 
political parties actively cultivating the favor or religious groups, or vice versa.  Instances 
of this type of interaction are familiar to most Americans and well-documented by social 
scientists and scholars of religion.  The lesser-known story, but arguably more influential 
force, has been that of religiously-motivated social movements, or what I call throughout 
this paper, religious activism.   
Religious activism is here defined as collective action in the political, cultural, or 
economic spheres that is motivated by religious ideals and/or engaged in by people of 
faith. In this dissertation, I restrict the analysis to instances of religious activism 
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connected to Christianity (as defined by adherents), the faith practiced by more than 
three-quarters of Americans.  
Using a novel method cataloging every Christian activist organization existing in 
the United States from 1960-2000, I track the fascinating and powerful force of this 
often-hidden player in America‘s political and social history on events and topics as 
diverse as race, capitalism, gender, war, sexuality, poverty, human rights, traditional 
moral values, and abortion. In light of these data, I argue that religious activism has not 
been only a driving force of political events, but that, at a more tectonic level, religious 
activists – ―prophets‖—have reshaped the very moral schemas and cultural categories 
through which we view social life. Consequently, their influence, when exercised 
optimally, can hardly be exaggerated.   
For the first seven decades of the 20
th
 century, Christian activists were among the
most public and reliable forces on the political left in American civil society. Significant 
numbers from a wide range of denominational and social backgrounds struggled against 
urban poverty, for an expanded welfare state, against war, for civil rights, and 
occasionally against capitalism entirely. Through the Social Gospel movement (roughly 
1880-1920), Protestants mobilized at unprecedented levels through every sector of 
society – social service, education, public policy, health and sanitation, foreign missions 
and more -- to inaugurate a just ―Kingdom of God.‖  Later, the moral theology of the 
Social Gospel would find new life in the message and vision of the Rev. Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement.  Similarly, American Roman Catholics, 
whose numbers were swelling due to historic European immigration, were inspired by a 
series of papal encyclicals, which established both magisterial positions and the proper 
duties for the faithful on social questions. These included the rights of workers, the 
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authority and role of government, the use of violence, responsibility to the poor, religious 
freedom, and care of the environment.  Lay movements, such as the Catholic Worker and 
Pax Christi, as well as individual clergy, such as the ―labor priests,‖ the Berrigan 
brothers, and Msgr. John Ryan buttressed these hierarchical efforts through their 
grassroots work. Despite their near-total marginalization from positions of societal 
power, American Catholics vigorously pursued their own vision of the just society, 
sometimes in tandem with progressive Protestants; at other times in icy antagonism.  
The progressive, sometimes radical agenda of the Social Gospel and Catholic 
social teaching (and particularly Vatican II) had a divisive effect on both traditions, 
generating vocal, conservative counter-movements.  In general, traditionalist, and 
fundamentalist movements were considerably weaker and barely visible within the 
national public sphere throughout the early 20
th
 century, particularly after being culturally
discredited during the infamous 1925 Scopes evolution trial.  Yet neither the Protestant 
nor Catholic blocs were able to convert their discontent into mobilization at the level of 
their progressive counterparts. Traditionalist factions from the 1920s through the 1970s 
could best be described as ―latent groups‖ (Olson, 1968), loosely connected through 
―submerged networks‖ (Melucci, 1989) and bounded through shared identity, values, and 
very often, social vision. Though it is now obvious that the anti-progressive Christian 
bloc is and was quite formidable in size and potential resources, for the majority of the 
20
th
 century this giant remained sleeping.
The last 30 years of the 20
th
 century appeared to show a dramatic reversal of
fortune in religious activism, as progressive movements retreated from dominance and 
conservative counter-movements rose to ascendancy, gaining unprecedented strength in 
the spheres of culture and institutional politics.  Beginning in the 1970s, historians agree, 
a conjuncture of factors led to the swift conservative conquest of the political and cultural 
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space which progressive and mainline Christians had long dominated.  First, networks of 
churches and parallel institutions, particularly through the South began to take advantage 
of advances in communication technology, particularly broadcast mass media, to extend 
their message and vision to an ever-larger audience (Diamond, 1998).  Second, hubs of 
these networks became the focus of political entrepreneurial strategies from the state and 
non-profit sector, namely Nixon‘s famous ―Southern Strategy‖ and the infusion of 
financial resources from sympathetic, though often, secular conservatives. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, the 1973 Roe vs. Wade Supreme Court decision, which struck 
down state laws banning abortion, galvanized traditionalist Christians nearly overnight 
and spawned hundreds of ―pro-life‖ organizations. It also exacerbated deep residual 
tensions in American culture regarding the ―moral well-being‖ of the republic, which 
were first brought to the surface during the tumultuous 1960s. Since then, autonomous 
but allied groups have emerged to oppose sex education, combat secularization, protect 
the traditional family and its values, and fight for limited government, among other 
issues. Long-standing animosities between Protestants and Catholics lost saliency in 
deference to common moral visions found between the two faiths. Conservative Catholics 
and Protestants, in contrast to their counterparts only 30 years prior, are now strong allies 
on matters related to the family, sexuality, and gender.  In fact, they often find more 
resonance and solidarity across these religious boundaries than within their own 
traditions (Hunter, 1991). The ―Religious Right,‖ as they have been dubbed in the 
popular press, or ―New Christian Right‖ by academics, has also been remarkably 
successful in the realm of institutional politics. It has been argued that Presidents Jimmy 
Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush have all benefited from their activism in the 
last 25 years (Green & Guth, 1993; Rozell & Wilcox, 1996; Jacobs, 2006). 
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The specific internal dynamics of this sector of activism – which organizations 
were dominant or recessive in certain periods—as well as probable mechanisms 
underlying these changes are poorly understood by social scientists. Within the U.S. 
context alone, the national frame to which I confine the following analysis, religio-
political activism is characterized by a dizzying degree of dynamism and diversity. As 
suggested above, it has featured prominently in movements to preserve the status quo and 
in struggles to create a new society. It has motivated radical innovations in social policy 
as well as the most fervent appeals for military intervention.  And various interpretations 
of religious tradition have stood on both sides of heated debates regarding poverty, race, 
violence, abortion, and sexuality.  Given such variation and inconsistency, it is not 
surprising that scholarly consensus in the sub-field is likewise sparse and generally 
incoherent.   
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Chapter 1:  Objectives and Main Arguments 
“It is one of the oldest of sociological generalizations that any coherent and viable 
society rests on a common set of moral understandings about good and bad, right and 
wrong, in the realm of individual and social action. It is almost as widely held that these, 
moral understandings must also in turn rest upon a common set of religious 
understandings that provide a picture of the universe in terms of which the moral 
understandings makes sense.  Such moral and religious understandings produce both 
very basic cultural legitimation for a society which is viewed as at least approximately in 
accord with them, and a standard of judgment for the criticism of a society that is seen as 
deviating too far from them.” 
-- Robert Bellah, The Broken Covenant, 1975 
THE PUZZLE 
The research presented here is an attempt to contribute empirical and theoretical 
clarity to the sociological study of this fascinating and consequential field of political 
action.    This objective consists of three interrelated empirical research questions, the 
first descriptive, the second and third, theoretical:   
 What are the prevailing macro-level patterns and
transformations in U.S. Christian activism in the second half of the 20
th
century? 
 What explains these patterns? Are extant theories from
social movement analysis, the sociology of religion, or political sociology 
generally adequate for making sense of  the dynamics observed over the 
period?   
And as a corollary: 
 What recurrent mechanisms and processes, if any, govern
the outcomes and forms of religious activism across the historical and 
social contexts considered (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001)? 
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Thus, while the first question is primarily concerned with the dynamics of 
movements (emergence, abeyance, and ―waves,‖ for example) within the larger socio-
political environment, the last question concerns the often micro-level processes that 
occur within yet across movements to similar effect, regardless of context. Question one 
is therefore aimed at examining differences; question two, similarities. The combination 
of results generated from these two avenues of investigation offer significant promise for 
general theory-building.  
In this dissertation, I focus exclusively on ―Christian activist groups,‖ which I 
define as discrete organizations founded or containing members who identify themselves 
as Christian, involved in social or political action, and operate as a national 
organization within the borders of the United States. Further detail on methodology and 
definitions are provided in Chapter 3. 
SACREDNESS, SIN, AND THE CYBERNETIC CIVIL SPHERE 
The descriptive portion of the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5 serve as the 
foundation for the postulation of explanations for the variety of phenomena observed.  
Based on these observations, I lay out an extended primary argument which places the 
concept of threat at the center of causal mechanisms observed in the four decades of data.  
Threat in this context is conceived as a real or perceived fear or feeling of anxiety 
regarding one or more external social or ideational entities in relation to a set of highly 
valued internal social or ideational entities.  I argue, based on findings from a 
longitudinal organizational analysis of Christian activist groups, that threat to values or 
institutions held as ―sacred‖ are a sufficient and recurrent mechanism leading to Christian 
activist mobilization. The transgression of sacred moral boundaries is often referred to as 
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―sin‖ in Christian discourse, and the designation of ―sin‖ upon a practice or institution 
reliably indicates the workings of a threatened moral boundary.  More importantly, this 
initial mobilization, --motivated by threatened values or institutions -- occurs within a 
sensitive social system known commonly as the civil sphere, which then frequently 
produces its own counter-mobilization. My findings indicate that despite the seemingly 
chaotic flux within the religious activist sector, an approximate balance or unintentional 
homeostasis between ideologically opposed groups is achieved at the population level at 
nearly year of measurement.  As a result, I argue that a model of the civil sphere as 
cybernetic is both fitting and possibly necessary to account for the variety of phenomena 
observed therein.   
Based on this new understanding of the Christian activist sector, I posit a new 
metaphor for the civil sphere generally; that of a battlefield.  My findings suggest that, 
contrary to many renderings in prevailing literature, many activists enter the civil sphere 
not to calmly and deliberately engage in lively debate with rivals to arrive at optimal 
rational solutions to grievances (a la Habermas or to a lesser degree Alexander), but to 
drive rivals from the civil sphere entirely, to annihilate the opposition. The objective is 
not victory but extermination (Simmel, 1964) Mutual threats to sacred values drive this 
process, which over time ineluctably results in the generation of organizational actors 
competing for shares of sector dominance, members, resources, influence over public and 
elite opinion, access, and material gains. Clashes over these intra-sectoral features as well 
as ideological conflicts require careful strategizing and adaptive flexibility, akin to the 
type exhibited by military planners.  However, unlike conventional battlefields wherein 
the slain are laid to rest never to return, frequently in the civil sphere, bested armies may 
simply retreat or lay in abeyance to fight another day, when advantage is on their side.  
My research documents multiple incidents of this phenomenon, and generally supports 
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the validity of the battlefield metaphor as more adequate for the Christian activist portion 
of the civil sphere, if not beyond.  
At the foundation of this model of religious activism, which attempts to bridge the 
macro- and micro-levels of analysis, is the existence of a set of irreducible core values 
within human persons, arrayed in hierarchical fashion, which I term a ―moral schema.‖  
Building on descriptions of the moral composition of persons from analysts such as 
Durkheim, Parsons, Christian Smith, Bourdieu, and Geertz, I posit that these schemas 
serve as indispensable socialized frameworks of evaluative meaning and orientation with 
respect to entities coded as ―right‖ or ―wrong.‖  In agreement with such thinkers as 
Schopenhauer, Frankl, Maslow, Rogers, Blumer, Giddens, and Goffman, I contend that 
human beings have an inherent and irrepressible ―need for orientation,‖ a basic drive to 
map reality, reduce uncertainty, abate anxiety, and produce ontological security.  This 
innate drive underlies the creation of moral schemas, which address the evaluative 
dimension of ontological security by dividing reality into simple binary categories, often 
unconsciously.  I further posit that entities, practices, or persons located at the top of 
moral schema hierarchies are equivalent to ―sacred‖ status, regardless of the individual or 
group‘s religious orientation.  
Finally, I argue that for the largest proportion of Americans, the values at the top 
of these moral schemas are irreducibly religious in character; in a phrase, their faith is 
their life.  As a source of ultimate meaning and orientation in the world, Christianity 
faces no trump.  As a result, threats to their Christian identity and core values generate 
powerful and sustained aggregated responses, often in the civil sphere.  At stake are the 
basic moral visions which structure the Christian life, and which many feel should 
structure social life as well.  
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“CHANGING THE WIND” 
At a finer level of analysis, I advance the argument that religious actors play a 
unique, even indispensable role through their capacity as prophets. I define prophets here 
akin to the use of the term by Melucci (1996), Yoder (1994), and McLoughlin (1980):  
those cultural agents who frequently herald –and actively work toward – the dawn of new 
social orders by calling attention to the gap between utopian visions and temporal 
realities.  The linkage to the macro-processes described above regarding threats to sacred 
values occurs through the prophet‘s unique ability to identify, label, and publicize 
incidents of moral transgression – ―sin.‖  Prophets also ―speak before,‖ in Melucci‘s 
terms, often dedicating their lives in service of causes others have long deemed lost. 
Prophets demonstrate congenital lack of regard for social norms and appear remarkably 
unconstrained by ―instrumental rationality.‖ They habitually put themselves at great 
material and social risk to achieve their aims.  As a result, they represent enormous 
human stockpiles of political leverage for social movements, since a healthy 
concentration of just a few among the rank and file of a movement will work to resolve 
traditional collective action problems.  
Perhaps more importantly, though, are the cultural – specifically the moral – 
consequences that prophets have on social movements. The findings and narratives 
detailed here illustrate time and again the significant power of committed moral actors – 
in this case those dedicated to interpretations of American Christianity – to shape the very 
cultural categories and moral boundaries upon which secular political activity is based. It 
has frequently been argued that American politicians and institutions are like weather-
vanes, responding to prevailing currents of public opinion in order to ensure election or 
re-election.  An apt illustration of this type of politician would be the official who steps 
outside onto his office porch each morning, wets his finger, puts it into the air to ascertain 
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the political winds of the day, and prepares to speak and act accordingly, guided by little 
if any internal conviction.  If this metaphor obtains for U.S. politics in the last half of the 
20
th
 century, and it appears to do so at least partially, then the role of prophet as I outline
them here is the one who, as Rev. Jim Wallis puts it, attempts to ―change the wind.‖  
Prophets work at a rather deep symbolic, emotional, and moral level to subtly, gradually, 
but powerfully remold what is regarded in the society as permissible, taboo, sinful, 
encouraged, mandatory, and the like. When they are successful, the winds of political 
change begin to shift as well, often bringing with them full-scale tempests of social 
transformation.  This dissertation demonstrates how prophets armed with Christian 
values, narratives, motivation, and institutions have been pivotal in bringing about these 
types of transformations, which have often, oddly, manifested in secular forms.  Upon 
this basis, I argue that what begins in religion frequently ends in politics.  
In what follows, I sketch the story of Christian activist groups in the United States 
from 1960 to 2000 from general to specific and back again.  Chapter 2 thoroughly 
reviews the major scholarly literature on religious social activism, with a separate and 
closer focus on conservative and progressive Christian movements.  Chapters 3 describes 
the analytical procedures utilized for the examination of the activist dynamics of the 
population from 1960-2000, including detailed description of the construction of the 
dataset and the methods employed.  In Chapter 4, I present the quantitative findings from 
the longitudinal analysis, including results regarding changes in population dynamics, 
organizational mortality, membership dynamics, geographic distribution of organizations, 
and organizational resources such as budget, staffing, and federated branches.  Chapter 5 
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summarizes findings of a more qualitative nature, including significant features of 
Christian activist organizations‘ ideological orientation, religious tradition, issues 
engaged, tactics used, and how these changed over time.  Careful attention to possible 
exogenous causal factors, such as demographic, macro-economic, political, and religious 
changes, is provided as well in this chapter.  Chapters 6 and 7 present the possible 
implications of these findings for sociological theory generally, with a focus on the 
recurrent mechanisms observed, specifically the mechanism of value-threat, and recurrent 
dynamics discovered, such as the shrinking of the Christian ideological ―middle,‖ and the 
proliferation of Christian activist groups committed to electoral political change, 
particularly on the ideological right. Chapter 7 elaborates the key theoretical ideas of 
moral schemas, and specifically the role of religion in their workings, as well as the idea 
of the cybernetic civil sphere, a term I used to describe the responsive, quasi-dialectic 
process that appears to govern the macro-level of the activist sector. Finally, in Chapter 8, 
I conclude with a discussion of the larger ramifications of these findings for the study of 
religion and politics specifically, as well as sociology generally. I close with a brief 
speculation on what the future of Christian activism might look like, given the findings of 
this research and current trends. 
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PART 2:  THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM 
Chapter 2:  Review of Literature on Religious Social Movements 
“Religion is the soul of culture and culture the form of religion. Every religious act, not 
only in organized religion, but also in the most intimate movement of the soul, is 
culturally formed.  Religion as ultimate concern is the meaning-giving substance of 
culture, and culture is the totality of forms in which the basic concern of religion 
expresses. “ 
--- Paul Tillich, 1959 
The majority view within the larger community of social movement scholarship 
appears to be that the religious character of faith-based movements is epiphenomenal to 
the ―real‖ causes and outcomes of the effort. Religion, to paraphrase, may just as well be 
another form of movement ideology, tool for collective manipulation, identity exploiter, 
or means for legitimating political objectives.  If this view is correct – and there are many 
who believe it is – religious social movements may be analyzed alongside and using the 
same theoretical perspectives as nationalist, fascist, Marxist, and racial/ethnic movements 
(as Blumer surprisingly did in New Outline of the Principles of Sociology). According to 
this school, ―interests‖ should be the primary object of the analyst’s investigation, these 
defined as the (typically material) demands of challengers and the various (typically 
resistant) configurations of members (Tilly, 1978; Skocpol, 1979). Thus, ―contentious 
politics‖ may safely bracket out religious motives, discourse, feelings, narratives, and 
identity because, in the final analysis, what determines their emergence or outcomes are 
the results of history, political arrangements, and resource access. As a result, there is 
little need for the dedicated study of religious social movements. Likewise, it is implied 
that faith-based activism is susceptible to the assumptions and implications of accepted 
theories of contentious politics.  
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It should come as no surprise, therefore, that scholarship in the sub-field of 
religious social movements has been heavily influenced by prevailing models from its 
parent field.  In his otherwise brilliant introduction to Disruptive Religion: The Force of 
Faith in Social Movement Activism, arguably the most comprehensive scholarly book on 
the subject, Christian Smith outlines the many ―religious resources for activism.‖  
Showing the imprint of the Tilly-Tarrow-McCarthy hegemony, only three of the 21 
resources he identifies are unique to religion; the rest are readily found in many secular 
movements of size and import, particularly the role of networks, resources, and 
charismatic leadership. Smith’s own book on the rise and fall of liberation theology in 
Latin America is based on McAdam’s political process model. Because the now-
ubiquitous framing perspective was in its infancy when The Emergence of Liberation 
Theology was published, the book unfortunately relegated virtually all of the aspects of 
religious culture to the limited category of ―cognitive liberation‖ (Smith, 1991).  Such an 
approach seriously distorts the experiential and empirical reality of most faith-based 
activism by minimizing human agency and eliminating emotion and meaning (which, we 
are reminded, are doggedly ―non-cognitive‖). Similarly, most accounts of the ascendancy 
of the Religious Right in the U.S. are based either implicitly or overtly on a resource 
mobilization perspective – to the exclusion of other possibilities (Diamond, 1995; 
Goldberg, 2006).  
What I term the ―conventional model,‖ consisting of political opportunity, 
resource mobilization, and some form of cognitive liberation, enjoys impressive 
intellectual dominance in some of the most cited and influential texts in religious social 
movement research. Smith’s (1996) widely-read and methodologically innovative study 
of the U.S Central America peace movement is essentially an application of the political 
process model to a new empirical context. Not surprisingly, resource mobilization co-
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founder Mayer Zald’s (1982) consideration of religious social movements marginalizes 
religion to the point of insignificance. McAdam’s classic study of black insurgency in the 
civil rights movement focuses on churches as a network base and producer of insurgent 
consciousness; little serious elaboration of the role of the sacred is attempted.  The 
exception to this class, to some degree, is Morris’ (1984) elegant and insightful work on 
the organizational foundations of the civil rights movement. While certainly informed by 
the conventional model, Morris’ compelling interviews and sensitivity to the lived 
experience of the black church produces a more satisfying subjective grounding.  
One example of recent scholarship that takes seriously the role of religious 
dynamics over time (yet with a clear eye toward religion-as-institution) is Billings & 
Scott’s (1994) analysis of general trends in the study of religio-politics. Informed by 
religious history, denominational membership changes, and an interest in generating 
general theory, the authors place into debate the relevant works of Wuthnow (1988), 
Ammerman (1987), Hunter (1991) and Roof & McKinney (1987). Billings and Scott 
consider a question very similar to the one posed by this dissertation:  the differential 
politicization of Christian factions since the 1970s, namely the largely effective 
mobilization of religious conservatives alongside the noticeable quiescence and de-
politicization of religious progressives. Hunter’s view is characterized by the authors as 
―culturalist,‖ relying on essentialized and mutually exclusive moral visions (―orthodox‖ 
and ―progressive‖) within American culture at large, irreducible to socioeconomic or 
other factors. In the same general category, Roof and McKinney stress changes in large-
scale American values, namely a move toward post-materialism and a hyper-
individualism which manifested in both religious affiliations and political engagement. 
Ammerman, on the other hand, explains the divergent politicization as a function of 
resource access and their activation, citing the successful mobilization of lower-education 
17 
and culturally threatened Southern Baptists as an example. Wuthnow seconds aspects of 
this analysis by pointing to the expansion of the state into the private realm as a catalyst 
for resistance, especially among Southern Protestants. This pattern of ―lifeworld 
colonization/modernization‖ leading to traditionalist religious mobilization has also been 
confirmed by Keddie (1998) and Casanova (1994) in their cross-cultural work.  I also 
foreground this mechanism as central to understanding the emergence and dynamics of 
Christian activist groups at the population level.  In summary, Billings and Scott’s 
treatment is praiseworthy and thorough, but lacks detailed longitudinal empirical 
evidence.  This dissertation builds on their claims, filling in the evidentiary gaps.   
Jacobs (2006) presents an alternative but equally outstanding historical 
examination of religious movement dynamics. In it, he ultimately explains the 
phenomenon through the decline of mainline Protestant denominations combined with 
religious conservatives and Republicans seeking each other out for mutually beneficial 
cultural and political gain. Such analyses, while satisfying at a superficial level, leave 
unanswered deeper questions regarding causes of mainline decline and bases for elective 
affinity between Republicans and religious conservatives, which has not been a historical 
constant. More importantly, it ignores the fact that much U.S. religious activism in the 
20
th
 century has not been directly tied to denominations or churches, but rather the work
of para-church and semi-professional SMOs. Thus, though essential, denominational-
based explanations are limited in their ability to explain the full range of activism and its 
dynamics. This explanation is engaged and countered in Chapter 5. 
Similar analyses have been conducted in recent years to answer questions such as 
―Which traditions are most likely to generate activists?‖ (Regnerus & Smith, 1998; 
McVeigh & Smith, 1999) and ―In what contexts will religious social movements 
emerge?‖ (Chaves, 1994). While employing very different methodologies and levels of 
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analysis, this cluster of research has generated a set of consensus findings: 1) variations 
in region, cultural tradition, and historical legacies have significant impacts on the 
probability of religious activism, even within the same country; 2) to the extent that a 
given region or denomination has experienced high levels of educational attainment and 
secularization, the probability of its involvement in religio-politics is decreased; 3)  
supporting the findings of Casanova, Keddie, Smith, and others, the most ―stable‖ 
societies with respect to religio-politics are those in which the political and cultural 
leadership of the society matches the religious composition of the mass public. Similar to 
findings from the study of revolutions, large and persistent gaps between the elite and 
public on this measure invariably lead to widespread disenchantment, felt first usually in 
the lifeworld dimension, but quickly spreading to the political and economic. Such 
grievances may manifest themselves as anti-clericalism, a demand for return to 
―traditional values,‖ or simply greater representation and recognition of the sacred in 
national life. These findings have been validated multiple times in contexts around the 
world, and figure prominently as well in my analysis of differential movement emergence 
in the 20
th
 century U.S.
EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURE IN RELIGIOUS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
In recent years, an emerging generation of scholars has begun to challenge the 
adequacy of the ―conventional model‖ for religious activism. In the mold of Michael 
Walzer’s influential Revolution of the Saints in 1965, this paradigm envisions the 
cultural, social, psychological, and even spiritual facets of religion as topics worthy of 
sociological investigation in their own right. Beyond that, they describe the myriad, 
peculiar ways in which religion impacts the political realm. In so doing, such work 
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sketches a theoretical framework which maintains the incommensurability of religio-
political action with other, conventional forms of contentious politics.  
Walzer provocatively pioneered the ideational and organizational study of 
collective action with his highly influential 1965 work. In it, he argues that modern 
radical politics has its roots in the transcendentally motivated, disciplined, and highly 
independent ―saints‖ of Puritan Calvinism. Despite having shed most of their religious 
regalia, Walzer further claimed that the Bolsheviks and Jacobins were successors of this 
general lineage and tradition. The ―saint‖ can be seen as analogous to Weber’s economic 
entrepreneur, but in the realm of politics and morality. The term is also conceptually 
equivalent to the ―prophet‖ I use prevalently in this dissertation. According to Walzer, 
politics was re-imagined as an arena to be purified and populated by godly men for the 
glory of God.  It was another realm of life in which the faithful were called to distinguish 
themselves from the sinful and prove their salvation, as Weber detailed in his analysis of 
the Protestant ethic.  This expansion of the zone of legitimated moral action is 
reminiscent of the patterns observed by Social Gospel ministers in the 1890s, the Vatican 
in the 1960s, and the New Christian Right in the mid-1970s, as detailed below. A master 
work that deftly shows the connections between religious culture, ideology, and 
regimented organizations in historically significant insurgency, Walzer’s early analysis 
stands as a model for any serious analyst of faith-based activism. 
In fairness, Smith and his Disruptive Religion contributors, too, are quick to 
emphasize that faith-based social movements comprise a unique species of collective 
action, with exclusive claim to sectors of social and cultural life inaccessible to most 
others.  These include sacred ritual, transcendent moral authority, and ―culturally 
protected‖ civil space. It could also be argued that religious-based identities are as 
fundamental to many human beings as gender, sexual orientation, or nationality. 
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Furthermore, despite the onward march of Western secularization, religion – particularly 
members of the clergy –has always been afforded high degrees of legitimacy in civil 
society, especially politics. 
 Since the mid-1990s, one of the most prominent exponents of the unique 
contributions of religious culture to the political sphere has been Rhys Williams. In his 
excellent 1996 article, he dissects religion as a political resource, both as culture and as 
ideology, according to the Geertzian distinction. While both are ―cultural systems,‖ 
religion as culture is understood as a ―web of meaning,‖ consisting of symbolic worlds 
and the operant code system, which functions under normal conditions of stasis. Religion 
as ideology, on the other hand, (a la Swidler) is the ordered, explicit political 
understandings that emerge in times of system crisis. These, when examined alongside 
the previous hypotheses of religio-political movements vis a vis secularization patterns, 
provide a fairly detailed and falsifiable theory of religious activism emergence, along 
both structural and ideational dimensions.  Williams also marshals Gramsci’s rarely cited 
but rich writing on popular versus elite religion, and the significant role of ―organic 
intellectuals.‖ Billings (1990) likewise makes extensive use of the Gramscian framework 
in his analysis of oppositional versus quiescent religion among Appalachian mine 
workers, concluding that ―Religion shapes the identity, the sense of solidarity, and the 
moral outrage that are central to social movement cultures.‖ 
A sizable literature has developed in the last decade centered on religious culture 
as a source of ―repertoires,‖ ―tool-kits,‖ or ―schemas‖ for collective action. At the most 
macro level, studies have investigated various broad ―styles‖ of engagement employed by 
movement actors (Hart, 2001; Wuthnow, 2002) In general, findings suggest that ―elite‖ 
style of engagement correspond to religious cultures and denominations from 
comparatively higher socio-economic status, low levels of emotionality in worship, and 
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classical forms of liturgy. These include the mainline Protestant denominations and the 
majority of non-Hispanic Roman Catholic parishes. In contrast, the ―populist‖ style of 
engagement is common found among marginalized socio-economic classes, particularly 
racial and ethnic minorities, as well as more charismatic and ―subcultural‖ (Smith, 2000) 
evangelical Protestant traditions. My findings indicate that activism employing populist 
styles have more regularly experienced both political and cultural success than their elite 
counterpart (see Chapter 5).   
Similarly, but at a finer level of analysis, researchers have begun to more 
precisely map the contours of various forms of religious culture, specifying and 
identifying its enabling and constraining properties. Using participant observation of four 
faith-based activist groups in California, Wood (2002) found that the worship style, 
emotional norms, and cultural stock available to congregations variously influenced their 
ability to organize for economic justice activism. In this fascinating study, though high-
emotion, ―gospel‖ churches readily produced the collective energy necessary for 
activism, their focus on personal salvation and ―therapeutic‖ Christianity did not provide 
cultural anchors for the message of higher wages and better working conditions; it was 
not seen as an authentic, relevant extension of the scriptures. Whooley (2004) likewise 
investigated the boundaries of religiously-based frames, this time in the context of 
abolition. According to Whooley, a religiously-sponsored ―good vs. evil‖ master-frame 
successfully mobilized thousands against abolition prior to the Civil War. During and 
after Reconstruction, however, the political and cultural context had grown excessively 
complex for this simple master-frame, and lost its ability to stimulate activism. The 
subsequent secular rights-based master-frame compromised the internal integrity of the 
movement, leading to abeyance. A very similar approach was undertaken by Mirola 
(2003) in his look at the role of religious frames in the 19
th
 century Chicago labor
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movement. Such outstanding research further underscores the significance of 
historicizing social movement analysis in order to tease out the variable outcomes 
possible under a variety of political and cultural contexts.  
One of the finest examples of bringing together the insights of political sociology 
and cultural sociology in service of building theory is the recent work of Young (2002, 
2006). In his impressive analysis of the origins, growth, and spread of the abolition and 
temperance movements, Young identifies the ways in which an intensive, resonant, and 
longstanding cultural schema – confession—was successfully employed by movement 
leaders to bridge religious, cultural, and regional differences and build the first national 
social movements in the United States.  Apart from this significant contribution to 
recognizing the often-overlooked micro-mechanisms that are actually essential to 
movement outcomes, Young upsets conventional understandings of political action by 
arguing that this mode of engagement was a form of ―life politics,‖ typically 
conceptualized as a uniquely 20
th
 century or post-materialist phenomena. For the
purposes of this dissertation, a key insight here is Young’s extensive attention to the 
notion of ―sin‖ in religious activism and its unique capacity to motivate action and endow 
it with transcendent authority.  
Delving even deeper into the micro-level, Sherkat and Ellison (1997) innovatively 
employed survey research to understand how actors construct meanings and connect 
them into semi-coherent beliefs and strategies of action. The authors impressively map 
the cognitive sub-stratum of cultural schemas, in their case, activist opposition to 
pornography among conservative Protestants. This avenue of research reinforces Sewell 
and Swidler’s insistence that culture has a ―dual citizenship.‖ First, culture exists in the 
minds of actors, the particular forms of which are likely to be highly idiosyncratic based 
on its interaction with the actor’s biography and biology. Second, culture also exists in 
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the external social world, from which culture ultimately originates and is shaped by 
history, agency, and to some extent, social structure.  
In summary, the dedicated cultural analysis of religion and social movements has 
progressed significantly since the mid-1990s, motivated by the overall ―cultural turn‖ in 
the social sciences.  Many of the empirical and theoretical insights produced by this 
research have not only expanded our collective knowledge of this important strain of 
contentious politics, but have also substantially contributed to a more precise 
understanding of religious culture for the sociology of religion. What is needed, in my 
view, are more studies that bring together the insights from both perspectives, 
contextualizes them in specific historical periods, and earnestly attempts to explain 
tantalizing and difficult puzzles through the comparative method.  
LITERATURE ON PROGRESSIVE CHRISTIAN ACTIVISM 
The body of academic research on the Christian left per se is significantly smaller 
and less coherent than that of the Christian right, likely due to the latter’s more visible 
entry into and effect on institutional politics, which has drawn the interest of political 
scientists, journalists, and scholars of religion, among many others. Another probable 
reason is the particular way in which progressive Christian activism has manifested itself 
in real movement settings. In the main, activist efforts typically identified in the literature 
as connected with progressive Christianity (Civil Rights, the peace movement, sanctuary 
movement, anti-nuclear groups, etc.) are understood to be secondarily Christian and 
primarily aimed at some specific social change. For example, the Civil Rights movement 
is inescapably steeped in Christian ritual, belief, and institutions, but few will argue that 
its main objectives were religious. Secular and non-religious people could and did 
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participate in the movement for African-American equality. As opposed to the Christian 
right, research on the Christian left is frequently characterized by carefully pinpointing 
and tracing Christian influence on movements which superficially may have very civil 
aims. The Christian left, for a variety of reasons, has never boasted the organizational and 
ideological coherence of the Christian right, particularly in its contemporary forms. 
Compelling proof of this fact is found in simple language usage; ―the New Christian 
Right‖ (all capital initials, indicating a proper noun) is the most common identifying 
phrase, while ―Christian left‖ or ―Christian liberals‖ is typical for its counterpart.  
An appropriate place to begin in mapping the progressive Christian terrain of 
activism is to ask, ―Who are they?‖; ―How many are there?‖ and ―What are their 
characteristics?‖ Using precisely targeted survey data Hall (1997) investigated how 
religious liberals differ from religious conservatives both demographically and 
psychographically. He found, similar to Hunter (1992) and Luker (1984) that these 
groups hold polar opposite worldviews despite similar positions in social structure. Hall 
concludes that these positions derive from divergent interpretations of scripture, although 
it is unclear how and why these opposite interpretations happen.  
Stenger’s (2005) regrettably under-noticed study on the potential size of a 
religious liberal socio-political movement found that despite the fact that most Protestants 
and Catholics do not readily adopt the ―liberal‖ label (as the larger population does not), 
their actual positions on issues are far more liberal than they are conservative (26% vs. 
6%, respectively). More importantly, though, she found that liberal religious interest 
groups were far less effective at connecting with constituents and mobilizing for policy 
action than conservative groups. In social capital terms, Christian left groups were adept 
only at ―bonding‖ ties, while Christian right groups were skilled at both bonding and 
―bridging‖ ties (Putnam, 2000). As a result, Stenger concludes that, ―there is a significant 
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population of Christians with liberal ideologies that could potentially be mobilized by 
liberal Christian interest groups‖ (p.399). Hall’s and Stenger’s methods and claims are 
validated and their ramifications elaborated in Chapter 9.   
Certainly the largest corpus of research on the Christian left exists on the 
organizational manifestations of religious mobilization. Chronologically, the first (and 
largest) of these is the extensive historical literature on the Protestant Social Gospel 
movement of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. A series of excellent texts published
mid-20
th
 century (Hopkins, 1967; Handy, 1966; Carter, 1956; White and Hopkins, 1976)
set the standard for historiography for this movement, and few contemporary works have 
improved upon them. One notable exception is Gorrell’s (1988) work on the subtle 
interconnections between the Social Gospel and the greater Progressive Era political 
project. Though many of his predecessors hinted at such linkages in passing, Gorrell’s 
analysis makes clear that the unprecedented torrent of reforms and policy innovations 
which famously characterize Progressivism was the ―secular face‖ of a moral and 
ideological transformation flowing out of Social Gospel theology and disseminated by 
congregants and ministers incidentally located in socially powerful positions.  
Some of the most exemplary research, not merely on the Christian left but on 20
th
century American social movements generally, has been conducted on the Civil Rights 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s. The aforementioned work of McAdam and Morris has 
been widely influential, both as history and social movement analysis. Both stress the 
role of indigenous organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
and the Congress on Racial Equality, most sponsored or coordinated by black churches, 
as essential to the movement’s success. Morris (1986) and Garrow (2004) also explore 
the powerful force of faith, specifically the compelling scriptural tradition of Old 
Testament Christianity as a source of ―liberation narratives,‖ and the identity-forging and 
26 
emotional energy of African-American ritual culture, particularly song and ritual. The 
commanding influence of charismatic leadership, in this case Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and his lieutenants, has been well-documented.  
The institutional representative of mainline Protestants in the political arena since 
the early 1900s has been the National Council of Churches. Founded as the Federal 
Council of Churches in 1908, the organization is a direct genealogical outgrowth of the 
Social Gospel movement. Over its 100 year history, the NCC has taken a variety of 
forms, from central planning, umbrella organization to protest and movement ―midwife‖ 
to public policy lobbying group. As such, it potentially becomes a fascinating subject for 
social movement historical analysis. Unfortunately, to my knowledge there are only two 
studies that approximate this approach: Welch’s (2001) examination of the World 
Council of Church’s involvement in anti-racism and apartheid programs and Findlay’s 
(1993) look at the NCC’s role in the Civil Rights movement. Both reveal a level of 
ecumenical Protestant dedication to social reform far surpassing the academic attention 
the subject has received. Pratt’s (1974) and Jenkins’s (1977) studies of the NCC’s 
organizational adaptation to external stresses complement these studies with a focus on 
internal dynamics.  
On the Roman Catholic side, the academic literature on U.S activism is even less 
developed. Apart from a handful of primarily historical and biographical texts on the 
Catholic Worker (Piehl, 1982) and the impact of Catholic social teaching (Wald, 1992), 
precious little research has been conducted within the social sciences on U.S. Catholic 
social movements. The most prolific and insightful analyst on this topic has been Abell 
(1945; 1949; 1952; 1960). Well before the ―cultural turn‖ and its emphasis on frames, 
discourse, and ideology, Abell wrote passionately and persuasively about the deep moral 
influence of Church teaching on social questions, both for the average lay Catholic and 
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for the formation of social movements. This tradition of research has been carried on and 
extended by Burns (1994), O’Brien (1989), and Mich (1998). These contemporary 
researchers add layers of sophistication to this area by situating social teaching and 
movements within the larger socio-political environment, paying close attention to the 
effects of religious competition, imperatives of organizational survival, and broader 
cultural trends, such as the status of women and ethnic minorities. Still, as with 
Protestants, the literature clearly points to a level of prophetic moral entrepreneurship that 
cannot be explained solely by rational choice or external structural changes.  
LITERATURE ON CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN ACTIVISM 
Sociological studies of the Christian right have been more voluminous and in-
depth than those of the Christian left. Along with analyses of political Islam, this sector 
of research is what most scholars mean when they refer to ―religion and politics,‖ 
particularly in the last 20 years. Because of the high profile and wide influence of the 
Christian right in contemporary American politics, much of the discourse on the subject 
is non-academic, generated by journalists, religious leaders, and pundits, and a great 
proportion of this is scarcely more than diatribe. Therefore, what follows is a careful 
review of the mainstream scholarly literature on conservative Christian activism. 
Consideration of exceptional popular-press inquiry is made where warranted.   
The origins of the Christian right (alternatively referred to here as ―the New 
Christian Right‖) lie, observers agree, in opposition to the counter-culture and student 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Organizing and building infrastructure 
surreptitiously for decades, the political mobilization of the movement did not take place 
until the mid-1970s after the Roe vs. Wade decision, as described above. Since then, 
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various incarnations of Christian right activism, sometimes highly coordinated and 
strategic, at other times maverick and fractious, have been among the most energetic and 
influential forces in American politics. As many have emphasized, the movement’s 
legislative successes are few – virtually none of its core issues have become law—yet in 
every decade since the 1970s, the NCR has proved itself remarkably proficient at 
galvanizing significant proportions of the population (as well as the electorate), and 
altering the direction and agenda of American policy, both foreign and domestic; the very 
definition of a successful movement.  
Who is the Christian right exactly? Central movement organizations within this 
field have included: the Moral Majority, Eagle Forum, Concerned Women for America, 
the Christian Coalition, Operation Rescue, and Religious Roundtable.  Most of these 
were founded in the mid-1970s or early 1980s and their strength has fluctuated over time 
considerably; several no longer exist as of this writing. Furthermore, it is important to 
stress that conservative Protestantism, fundamentalism, or Pentecostalism is not 
synonymous with support for or membership in the NCR, though the movement does 
draw disproportionately from those branches (Hood and Smith, 2002). Studies repeatedly 
confirm that the NCR is above all a socio-political movement, gathering members from 
the full spectrum of Christian sects and denominations, including increasingly, Roman 
Catholics. Similarly, support for the Christian left is not uncommon among members of 
theologically orthodox churches, not just mainline and liberal denominations. Research 
has even found that evangelicals often have more liberal views on economic issues than 
mainline Protestants (Iannaccone, 1993). Thus, the internal composition of the NCR is a 
significantly more heterogeneous than most would expect. Regarding the movement 
itself, Wilcox (1987) found that NCR activists tend to be Republicans with higher socio-
economic status and higher than average political awareness. This is in contrast to the 
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self-descriptions offered by movement leaders such as Rev. Jerry Falwell, who have 
contended the New Christian Right is the modern successor to the early 20
th
 century
initiatives of Dwight Moody or Billy Sunday, known for their working-class appeal.  
Less is known about the size of the Christian right, in large part due to differences 
in measurement technique. A growing consensus of scholars argues that the number who 
actually identifies as members of the NCR and could be expected to participate in social 
action is exaggerated (Mueller, 1983; Chandler, 1982; Atwood, 1990; Billings & Scott, 
1994). Specifically, Kiecolt and Nelson (1988) report that leaders of the movement 
regularly overstate its following, confusing ―subscribers‖ or ―viewers‖ with mobilized 
members. They also found little ideological coherency among religious conservatives 
compared to religious liberals, bringing into question the degree to which the movement 
has been successful in advancing a collective vision and shifting cultural values. 
Notwithstanding these likely true measurement problems, it is beyond dispute that the 
current incarnations of the Christian right have an overwhelming human resource 
advantage over the Christian left. Findings presented in Chapter 5 provide further 
evidence of this disparity.   
Finally, in an intriguing comparative study of movement tactics, Deckman (2001) 
found that the Christian Right employed a radically different collective action repertoire 
than did the Christian left, focused at changing outcomes in electoral politics rather than 
protests, boycotts, and sit-ins. Though intuitive at first glance, Deckman’s contribution, 
echoed by other scholars below, is that this repertoire was not only a natural outgrowth of 
member’s socio-economic position and sense of ―proper democratic engagement,‖ but a 
conscious strategic choice based on calculation of how to most efficiently achieve the 
social changes they seek. This finding, too, is considered and assessed in Chapters 5 and 
6.
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A thriving cottage industry has developed in the sociology of religion regarding 
the rise and emergence of the Christian right. Three main explanations divide the 
literature. The first, which I term ―strictness,‖ holds that, in keeping with the influential 
insights of Dean Kelley in his Why Conservative Churches are Growing, that in times of 
social anxiety and turmoil, institutions which offer uncompromising ideology and strict 
demands attract new members and resources as individuals seek simple, strong solutions 
to their chaotic surroundings. An exemplar of this research is Jacobs (2006), who 
combines this perspective with the declining membership of mainline Protestant churches 
during the period, as well as the proliferation of liberal theology, some of which was 
perceived as ―heresy‖ by ordinary lay Protestants. This growing tension ―between pulpit 
and pew,‖ consistent with my findings, drove many families to conservative churches – 
and movements -- which offered not only relief from ideological dissonance, but social 
and cultural ―tools‖ for managing real-life problems, almost entirely within the personal 
life-world sphere. The mainline churches, according to this view, were seen as morally 
nebulous and culturally irrelevant. In this sense, the ―religious market‖ metaphor 
becomes very useful, and may be extended to politics as well.  
The second, and most developed explanation of the rise of the Christian right is 
that of ―status politics.‖  Research on this theory is abundant, yet mixed in its findings. 
Status politics theory argues that the NCR largely attracted members from groups who 
were afraid of losing social position and their cherished lifestyles. A modified form of 
anti-modernism, this thesis paints the Christian right as a defensive movement, guarding 
against the juggernaut of secular, scientistic, and counter-traditional features of the post-
1960s era. In its rawest form, this perspective holds that the NCR arose to protect 
privileged economic and social status. In its more nuanced form, culture and values play 
a more significant role. Unfortunately, status politics has been confirmed (Burris, 2001; 
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Wald, Owen, & Hill, 1989; Miller, 1989) as many times as it has been invalidated 
(Harper & Leicht, 1984: Moen, 1988; Billings & Scott, 1994) The most current research, 
however, is casting serious doubt on the perspective, based on evidence that as threatened 
social groups obtain higher social status, their support for the movements has not faded.  
The third set of explanations, and the one with the fewest detractors, is based on 
resource-mobilization theory. This line of research argues that without the infusion of 
money, social networks, and communication technology, the emergence of the Christian 
right into national politics would have been impossible. Wilcox (1988) and Koenig and 
Boyce (1985) adopted a form of resource mobilization theory to track and describe the 
donor patterns of NCR political action committees, finding that donors have become 
more selective and strategic in their investments, focusing primarily on local and 
―winnable‖ elections. Hadden (1987) and Diamond (1995) explain the phenomenon as 
intimately connected with investment in and effective use of mass media and 
broadcasting. Similarly, Miller (1986) studied the establishment of parallel institutions 
and the forging of inter-church networks, particularly during the conservative church 
expansion years, arguing that these provided the ―mobilizing structures‖ essential for 
political action. Again, resource mobilization theory is an essential component for 
understanding movement emergence and spread, yet inherently leaves central questions 
of motive and timing unaddressed.  These concerns figure centrally in the explanations I 
offer in Chapters 6 and 7.  
As conservative Christian activism has evolved and matured over time, another 
sector of research has formed, aimed at understanding its historical trajectory and 
adjustments. The most developed body of this literature compares the movement of the 
1990s and beyond to its 1980s and earlier forms. Scholars agree, it appears, that the 
Christian right after 1992 was characterized by lower degrees of religious particularism – 
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internal doctrinal and denominational battles-- than that of the 1980s, to which leaders 
attributed their limited success in that period (Rozell, Wilcox, & Green, 2001; Wilcox, 
Rozell, & Gunn, 1996) The 1990s saw a noticeable shift in NCR strategy, both in the 
cultural sphere, with a renewed focus on applications of Christianity (in family life for 
example) and not on its doctrinal basis, which could fragment the bloc, as well as in the 
political arena, with greater attention to state initiatives and assisting modest conservative 
agendas at the federal level (Moen, 1994,1995; Atwood, 1990). Sociologically, it 
appeared the movement was becoming more akin to secular, conventional parties. 
Finally, trial and error proved valuable, as Billings and Scott (1994) observe. In their 
analysis of Christian right movement framing over time, they found that the most 
successful movements were those that had defined themselves as a unified whole ---
―culture warriors‖ or ―soldiers for Jesus,‖ for example, thus lending support to collective 
identity and framing theory.  
Perhaps the most fascinating phenomenon in recent years, from a historical point 
of view, is the increasing alliance between the primarily Protestant Christian right and 
Roman Catholics, particularly on the issue of abortion. From the perspective of political 
sociology, this new partnership suggests the higher saliency of political identity and 
values in the late 20
th
 century over religious, doctrinal, and cultural identity, which had
not only divided but generated open hostilities between the groups in previous decades. 
However, recent research suggests that this coalition is perhaps more superficial and 
politically strategic than most observers have implied. For example, Bendyna et al (2000, 
2001) found that Roman Catholics, both individually and organizationally, may 
temporarily ally themselves with NCR groups for mutually beneficial political objectives, 
but few Catholics become members of such groups. Other researchers point to the often-
overlooked fact that most Catholics still differ with the Christian right on an array of 
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other key issues, such as the death penalty, social welfare programs, and foreign policy, 
inhibiting the creation of a long-term, broad-based coalition (Atwood, 1990; Wilcox & 
Gomez, 1990) For me, these empirical findings illustrate the argument of Sewell (1985), 
Dalton (1994), and Zald (2000) that ideology is structured, collective, bounded, and yet 
constitutive of the social order. Thus, ideology must not only be conceived as a motivator 
of mobilization, as it generally is, but also as a constraint, limiting the realistic points of 
engagement and tactics that participants may partake of.  
CONCLUSION:   HOW RELIGION MATTERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Across the array of theories, perspectives, and empirical cases examined above, a 
few points of consensus emerge. First, religion contributes powerful identities and modes 
of solidarity essential for social movement sustenance. These typically emerge from the 
shared experiences, rituals, and beliefs that co-religionists mutually recognize in each 
other. These identities often overlap and cross-pollinate with linguistic, geographic, or 
kin-based groupings, thereby intensifying their salience. Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia 
clashes, as well as the Catholic-based Polish Solidarity movement of 1981 are but two 
clear examples of this force at work in modern political orders (Wimmer, 2003; Osa, 
1996).  Second, religious cultures lend their moral systems to the sense of outrage, threat, 
desecration, or injustice necessary to motivate movement followers. This point is 
elaborated elegantly by Wald et al (2005) in their wide-ranging analysis of religion in 
political movements. Though essential for any movement, be they secular or faith-based, 
religion‘s contribution to motivation is genuinely unique, as the impetuses of religious 
protest are often ―Weberian,‖ in the sense of being value- or ideal-driven, rather than 
based upon raw means-ends rationality or utilitarian drives, a la Olson (Weber, 1968; 
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Olson, 1965. The motives of religiously-based actors by definition proceed from a deeply 
socialized moral habitus grounded in super-empirical or transrational concerns, such as 
eternal salvation, moral duty, divine love, or sacred commandment (Smith, 2003; 
Williams, 1996). Such ultimate values sustain religious actors and their movements 
through daunting obstacles in the political environment when strict rationality would 
dictate their capitulation. I argue this ―transrational motivation‖ is a unique and powerful 
factor and central to religious social movements.  I elaborate on the precise functions and 
contributions of this concept in Chapter 7.  
Significant also are the highly structured and deeply imprinted moral codes 
inherent to most religions. These provide the very raw material out of which outrage, 
injustice, defense, repulsion, frustration and similar collective responses are made. Moral 
codes invariably separate sacred from profane and construct invisible but highly sensitive 
moral boundaries around their contents (Durkheim, 1995; Douglas, 1966; Lamont, 1992.)  
Transgression of these boundaries by in-group members results in sanction or 
banishment; transgression by outsiders can give rise to collective action, which readily 
carries over into public sphere engagement. This mechanism also proves as crucial to 
explaining the emergence, rise, fall, and interactions of Christian activist groups in the 
population analyzed.   
Third, religions provide powerfully coherent ideologies and cognitive frames 
from their doctrines, teachings, and beliefs. These ideational components operate as 
internally logical schemas of interpretation which select, emphasize, diagnose, and 
prescribe action for social phenomena. Distinct from religious motivations and values, 
these cognitive cues guide religious actors in how (and indeed if) to think about given 
social facts by providing the mental boundaries within which perception and evaluation 
occurs (Snow & Benford, 1986; Goffman, 1974; Vaisey, 2008; Lukes, 2005; Steensland, 
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2006).  Framing is well-established as an essential social-psychological task for 
movement recruitment and message-formation. However, religious social movements 
benefit in a distinct way from the rigorous process of ideological formation and 
refinement common to major religions. Faith-based activists generally borrow or directly 
employ existing, familiar, and well-vetted ideological codes and frames from the 
religious tradition (scripture, narratives, mental images, rituals, or invocations) which 
comes to them as relatively ―pre-packaged‖ from generations of exegesis and application 
in diverse actualities (Zald, 2000; Gamson & Modigliani,1989). Such ready access to 
nearly limitless rich cultural stock affords them key strategic advantages in the discursive 
struggles that accompany all collective action.  
Finally, and most peculiar to religious social movements is their ability to justify 
their aims and tactics through appeal to ―transcendent moral authority‖ (Smith, 1996). 
This aspect is distinct from the aforementioned transrational motivation in that 
transcendent moral authority represents the ―ethos‖ of ultimate legitimation for such 
drives as transrational motivation.  The latter rests upon the former cognitively, 
emotionally, and morally.  
The Calvinist ―saints‖ examined so studiously by Weber, Walzer, and Gorski saw 
themselves as ―tools‖ or ―instruments‖ in the hands of God. They recognized no 
boundary between the will of God and their own volition. Similarly, Pentecostalism‘s 
increasing political profile is partly due to that tradition‘s belief that disciples are 
―vessels‖ to be filled with the Holy Spirit, and the work they do in the world is the action 
of that greater divine power (Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997). The struggle, or jihad, 
in Islam is the believer‘s duty to combat the inner foe of selfish evil, the temptations of 
Satan, or the external opponent who offends Allah (Juergensmeyer, 2003). As a result of 
this total subordination of self to the authority of the divine, acts of supreme self-sacrifice 
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for the good of the religious group or larger community are commonplace in faith-based 
politics. Swidler‘s (1986) influential conception of culture as ―tool-kit‖ that equips agents 
with strategies for achieving ends, rather than the source of those ends themselves, runs 
afoul of examples such as these. As Geertz (1973) so convincingly described, religion is a 
quintessential component of culture, and without question it provides strategies, 
solutions, explanations, and lenses with which to understand and engage problems in the 
world. But as Williams (1996) and Vaisey (2008) point out, religion is more than a 
phenomenally useful bag of cultural equipment. It is also a rich, enduring, and – for 
believers -- source of ultimate values which not only justify (as Swidler insists) but also 
motivate and endow meaning to action. More directly, religion is a key factor in 
determining which tools, strategies, and interpretations are chosen from the “toolkit‖ in 
the first place. In this way, at least for the devout, a better metaphor for religion is as 
―operating system;‖ or the master program which sets overall objectives, allocates 
capacities, and evaluates appropriate ―applications‖ (Swidler‘s ―tools‖) for addressing 
problems in the environment.  I elaborate on this idea in Chapter 7.   
Most studies of faith in social movements have regarded religion as a secondary 
feature of movements, an instrument or resource that is used by preexisting movements to 
carry out social change.  Yet in many of the cases examined in this survey, religious 
forces acted as the central motivating cause for an insurgent consciousness.   
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PART 3:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND RATIONALE 
Most previous studies of Christian activism, as in most social movement analysis 
generally, use a ―thick description‖ or ethnographic approach, designed to reveal the rich 
interior life and meaning-making processes of sampled movements (See Erickson 
Nepstad, 2004; Smith, 1996; Wood, 2002). Almost all of the studies described in the 
previous section fall into this category. While strong in detail and peerless for drawing 
our attention to micro-mechanisms which frequently concatenate into larger causal 
structures, such idiographic approaches are of limited theoretical value if not linked to 
other similar or divergent cases with which they can be compared to make broader 
explanatory claims.  
Less frequent but arguably of more significant theoretical contribution are the 
small-n comparative studies, which analyze a sample of movements that diverge along a 
given variable of interest. The researcher’s task is then to determine, generally using a 
variant of Mill’s Method of Agreement or Difference, which factor(s) are critical to 
generating the given outcomes.  Excellent examples of this approach include Rucht, 
(1996), Joppke, (1993), and Della Porta (2006).  From the perspective of theory-building, 
the small-n comparative design offers greater possibilities for identifying and refining 
general causal processes, while also potentially ruling out competing explanations. The 
limitations of this approach are comparatively few, and are related to problems with case 
selection (representativeness) and the tendency to downplay inter-movement dynamics as 
well as movement-environment interactions.   
In order to best address the lack of accurate, comprehensive, longitudinal analysis 
of the entire Christian activist sector in the late 20
th
 century, the research design of this
project was aimed at documenting and understanding the macro-level dynamics of this 
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important field of contention. As a result, both case studies and small-n comparative 
designs were inappropriate.  Instead, this research analyzed the entire population of 
Christian activist organizations as it was constituted each year from 1960 to 2000. In so 
doing, problems of case selection bias are avoided by definition. Second, the design of 
the study permits for the first time observation of the possible effects of internal as well 
as external factors on the religious activist sector as a whole. For example, research 
designs relying upon case studies or a handful of movements as a sample might register 
the effects of the Roe vs. Wade decision, but could not validly extrapolate the possible 
implications of the event beyond the cases examined.  The design of this research avoids 
these limitations and allows observation of both meso- and macro-level processes and 
events originating within the population of organizations, as well as from the general 
socio-historical context..  
The longitudinal design of the research is also novel for the study of U.S. 
Christian activism. Though previous studies have examined the dynamics and 
transformations of specific Christian movements over time, (Moen, 1992; Smith, 1991; 
Zald 1966), seldom are numerous activist organizations analyzed historically, and even 
fewer in a comparative fashion (see Kurzman (1996) and Wood (1994) for exceptional 
studies of this type). A longitudinal perspective allows analysis not only of Christian 
activist transformation over four decades, but period-specific and period-period 
comparisons. For example, we may wish to examine the common tactical repertoires of 
Christian peace activists in the 1970s, or compare the average membership size of all 
groups in the 1960s versus the 1980s, both of which are possible via the research design 
used here.  
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Chapter 3:  Data and Methodology 
DATA 
Raw data for this study were compiled from volumes of the Encyclopedia of 
Associations: National Organizations of the U.S. (henceforth EoA) in alternating years 
from 1961 (the earliest year available) through 2000. The EoA is the most systematic and 
exhaustive source of basic organizational data on all American non-profit membership 
groups of national scope, containing detailed entries on over 22,000 organizations. Each 
EoA entry lists information regarding the organization’s founding year, membership, 
budget, geographic location, professional staff, publications, and a brief description of its 
mission, history, and activities. Since nearly identical entry categories were used each 
year, and the volume has been published continuously for more than four decades, the use 
of longitudinal data analysis becomes a method of choice. Using the EoA as a dataset to 
study macro-level organizational phenomena is well-established in sociology. Analysis of 
women’s rights and racial activism (Minkoff,1995), labor unions (Hannan & Freeman, 
1987; Martin et al, 2006), lobbying organizations (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), and the 
peace movement (Edwards & Marullo, 1995) have all employed sampling from the EoA 
to great effect.  
Beginning in 1975, the Encyclopedia of Associations collected data from 
organizations annually, through prior to this data, publication and data collection was 
irregular.  However, data was sufficiently complete to obtain nearly annual observations 
for the period 1961-1975, with only a gap between 1965 and 1967 remaining unobserved.  
Subsequent analysis revealed no reduction in data robustness as a result of these missing 
years.  
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Each year of publication, the EoA staff contacts organizations listed in the volume 
in the previous year, registers as defunct those organizations which have ceased activity, 
and also identifies and locates new organizations for entry. Because of the rapid 
expansion of this sector of activism, and the limited resources of the EoA staff, a lag of 
several months to two years between the actual founding of organizations and their entry 
in the Encyclopedia was commonly observed. As the original and accurate founding date 
of organizations is included in all entries, this lag did not significantly affect the validity 
of data analysis.  
Three categories of organizations in the EoA were included for analysis: those 
coded as ―Religious Organizations,‖ ―Public Affairs Organizations,‖ and ―Social Welfare 
Organizations.‖  These categories were surveyed for appropriate entries due to the 
notable absence of key organizations in the Religious Organizations category. For 
example, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the most significant 
organization for African-Americans during the Civil Rights Movement, is not listed as a 
―Religious Association,‖ but instead as a ―Public Affairs‖ organization.  Furthermore, 
only associations that were clearly identified by name or self-description as ―Christian‖ 
were included. Next, religious associations which do not engage in some form of public, 
political, or social action was excluded; for example, organizations which engage 
primarily in charity, direct service, proselytizing, or religious instruction such as the 
Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and Salvation Army would not be 
included.  Finally, to be selected for the population, organizations had to have national 
reach and identity. Community, local, and state-based organizations, which also number 
in the thousands, were excluded from the analysis as not directly germane to the core 
research objectives.    
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 The total population examined numbered 484 unique organizations, constituting 
3,143 distinct data points over the 40 year time period.    
EXOGENOUS FACTORS 
Longitudinal data on an array of variables deemed in the literature to be 
commonly connected to activist dynamics and outcomes were collected as well. These 
included factors related to the external political environment, (such as party of the 
president; party of the majority in the House of Representatives, and voter turnout,) 
macro-economic factors (per capita income, unemployment rate, or period of recession), 
demographic changes (percent of the population with college education) and 
characteristics of the state (social welfare spending in constant dollars, public sector 
employment, and total government spending as a percent of gross domestic product.) 
Factors unique to the religious sphere were examined as well to determine their potential 
role in religious activist dynamics.   
These data were compiled from conventional sources, such as government 
agencies or major research organizations, depending on the variable.  Specific data 
sources are listed beneath respective tables and graphs plotting such exogenous factors.  
METHODOLOGY 
Electronic versions of the Encyclopedia of Associations data do not exist for the 
majority of the decades examined. Therefore, manual identification, selection, and entry 
of organizational records was necessary. A multi-stage procedure, after the entry of the 
initial year of data (1961) was implemented: 1) determining if entries from the previous 
year of observation appeared in the current year of the EoA; 2) updating of existing 
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entries with new data from current year of publication, if applicable; 3) Marking as 
defunct or inactive any organizations which disbanded in the current year of observation; 
4) changing the name of the organization to match its name in the current year of
observation, if applicable, and noting the name change event in the appropriate field; 5) 
identifying new organizations from the current year of observation and entering them into 
the electronic database.  
The following data were collected directly from the EoA volumes for each year: 
 Name of organization
 Headquarters (city and state)
 Date of founding
 Number of members
 Number of staff
 Number of regional branches
 Number of state branches
 Number of local branches
 Annual budget (collected after 1985)
 Description of organization
 Names and types of publications (newsletters, magazines,
books,       etc.)
 Frequency of publications
In addition to these data, I also coded each organization by three additional 
variables, each derived from the organizational description:  
 Issues or causes that the organization in involved in (top
five); 
43 
 Tactics used by the organization (top five);
 Ideological orientation of the organization.
Issues codes were generated inductively from the organizational database itself.  
A total of 82 possible issues were identified.  Each organization was assigned up to five 
issue codes, corresponding to the five dominant causes they were involved in.  Similarly, 
each group was assigned up to five codes describing the main activist tactics they 
employed.  A total of 30 possible tactics were identified.  
Ideological orientation of the organization was ascertained through a composite 
process consisting of close reading of the organizational mission /description provided by 
the group itself, examination of the issues engaged by the group, and attention to 
―keywords‖ often connected with a particular orientation (e.g. ―social justice‖ among 
progressive groups, or ―patriotic values‖ among conservative groups).  Organizations 
were coded using a ―fuzzy set‖ design (Ragin, 2000).  Each group was assigned a 
numerical scale code ranging from 0.0 (most progressive) to. 1.0 (most conservative.)  
The precise coding rubric is as follows:   
 Progressive:  (0.0 -.30)
 Moderate to Progressive: (.35 - .45)
 Moderate: (.46 - .55)
 Moderate to Conservative: (.56 -.70)
 Conservative: (.75-1.0)
These custom variables were updated each year in the same manner as the data 
derived directly from the EoA.  
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PART 4:  FINDINGS 
Chapter 4:  Quantitative Findings 
“Our informal social fabric and our romantic notions of the individual‟s sovereignty over 
his environment combined to permit awareness of evil to arouse in the public an 
enormous and unmanageable sense of guilt . . . thus the perception of injustice becomes a 
highly personal sense of guilt which, if unrelieved, can be intolerable . . . a burst of moral 
energy flares up, then dissipates because it fails to achieve structure or merely 
proliferates ineffectual ones.” 
--- G. Clarke Chapman, Jr., The Christian Century, April 
12, 1972, p. 424 
POPULATION DYNAMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL MORTALITY 
At the aggregate level, the overall population pattern of Christian activist groups 
from 1960 to 2000 is one of sharp linear growth (Figure 1). Though the population in 
1961 consisted of a modest 51 organizations, this number had doubled within a decade 
and doubled again by 1985.  The sharpest increase occurred between 1981 and 1991, 
when the population of Christian activist groups expanded at an average of 12.5 new 
organizations every year.  The population reached its apex in 1993 with close to 300 
active groups, a six-fold increase since the beginning of the time sampling frame.  
Figure 1:  Population of Religious Activist Groups, Actives Only – 1961-2000 
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The ―lifespan‖ of activist groups is typically defined as the difference between 
date of disbanding –organizational ―death‖ – minus the date of founding.  Because the 
population data is right-censored (the timeframe ends at year 2000), calculating lifespan 
using a uniform method for all groups is impossible. For example, consider two groups 
both founded in 1970. The first disbanded in 2000 while the other survived to 2000 and 
perhaps beyond.  Using the conventional calculation, the lifespan of both groups would 
be 30 years, yet this method obscures the death of the first group, thus skewing the 
overall picture of organizational mortality of the population. Therefore, for this measure, 
I use the term ―duration,‖ which permits an analysis of the longevity of organizations 
without necessarily implying any particular ultimate outcome, either disbanding or 
persistence.  
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Organizational Duration 
(All groups, 1960-2000) 
YEARS 
Mean 25.15 
Mode 11.00 
Minimum 4.00 
Maximum 167.00 
The average duration of Christian activist groups was surprisingly long, more than 
25 years, or nearly a generation (Table 1). These findings confirm findings by previous 
research (Weber, Michels, Piven & Cloward) that once founded and a minimum 
bureaucratic structure established, organizations tend to persist and are difficult to 
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dislodge.  Though the initial mobilization of resources necessary to found an organization 
may be challenging and difficult to prosecute, once founding is underway and ultimately 
successful, religious activist groups displayed remarkable staying power. In important 
ways, the most trying times for activism may be in this early period, but after achieving a 
degree of independence and locating a niche in the activist sector, evidence suggests the 
odds of survival are fairly high.  
Figure 2:  Count of Organizations by Status in Year of Data, 1960-2000 
 (active, inactive, or unknown address) 
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As the time frame moved forward, the inevitable decline and disappearance of 
Christian activist groups became a more common phenomenon. Remarkably, few 
organizations disbanded in the first 15 years of the period examined (1961-1976).  
Overall, the most significant pattern from this analysis was the parallel rate of growth and 
disbanding over time.  With the exception of the first decade or so, in any given year of 
data observation, approximately 20 percent of organizations would be inactive, keeping 
apace with the gradual overall increase in the population over time (Figure 2) .  
Figure 3:  Proportion of Christian Activist Groups Surviving to Year 2000 
Confirming the previous finding that once founded, organizations tend to persist, 
Figure 3 suggests that, ceteris paribus, Christian activist groups had nearly a 70 percent 
chance of survival to the year 2000.  
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Table 2:  Lifespan Statistics of Defunct Groups 
Cases 149 
Mean 21.74 years 
Mode  11 years 
Minimum 4 years 
Maximum 167 years 
Even among Christian activist groups that disbanded prior to 2000, most 
experienced at least two decades of activity, again underscoring the durability of 
organizations in this sector of movement activity. 
Figure 4:  Founding and Death Dates of Christian Activist Groups by Decade 
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Figure 4 illustrates the discontinuous character of Christian activist group 
founding and mortality.  The 1960s and 1970s featured the most activity in the religious 
activism sphere, validating previous qualitative social and historical accounts of that 
period. The number of Christian activist groups founded in the 1960s was nearly double 
the number founded in the previous decade, while the 1970s saw another doubling of 
groups founded.  This pattern persisted though at a lower level of intensity through the 
1980s, but then declined precipitously during the 1990s, when organizational disbanding 
far outpaced founding.  
Complementary analysis detailed below indicates that a major contributing factor 
to the explosion of Christian activism in the 1970s is the creation of pro-life/anti-abortion 
and ―traditional family values‖ organizations.  Similar analysis found that a significant 
portion of the groups which disbanded in the 1990s were also pro-life groups, suggesting 
that both founding and death peaks observed in the above graph were due to processes 
within one or two issue sectors.  It is reasonable to conclude that this pattern is the result 
of ―niche-seeking‖ or ―sector-flooding‖ activists seizing a widely recognized opportunity 
structure, then gradually being forced out or having to disband due to the limited carrying 
capacity of that issue sector, in this case pro-life activism.  
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Table 3: Lifespan of Christian Activist Groups by Ideological Orientation 
Lifespan in Years 
(constructed) 
Mean Median Mode 
I Ideological 
Orientation 
. . . 
Conservative 28 22 16 
Moderate/Conservative 40 27 11 
Moderate 34 21 12 
Moderate/Progressive 33 25 11 
Progressive 29 25 13 
A common adage states that ―the brightest flame burns the quickest.‖ Persuasive 
evidence for this axiom is found in Table 3.  Christian activist organizations located 
toward the middle of the ideological spectrum had a significant lifespan advantage over 
those at either the progressive or conservative poles.  Specifically, organizations just right 
of center enjoyed the longest lifespans, with an average of nearly 40 years. Several 
possible reasons emerge for this finding. First, because of their ―safer‖ ideological 
position, moderate organizations may find identifying and tapping long-term resource 
streams easier than their more extreme counterparts. Since many of these organizations 
were involved in fairly noncontroversial issues, such as anti-drug or anti-hunger 
campaigns, the probability of encountering robust opposition that would endanger their 
survival is lower.  Second, because this table presents only cross-sectional data, it is 
possible that organizations incrementally moderated their missions and identity in a 
strategic manner in order to survive longer. It is also reasonable that prospective new 
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organizations ―observed‖ anecdotally the higher mortality of more extreme groups and 
preemptively aimed their niches toward the middle of the spectrum to avoid rapid demise. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Founding Date of Christian Activist Groups by 
Ideological Orientation 
Progressive Organizations Conservative Organizations 
N Valid 151 N Valid 138 
Missing 7 Missing 12 
Median 1973 Median 1975 
Mode(s) 1973, 1975 Mode(s) 1979, 1984 
Minimum 1900 Minimum 1863 
Maximum 1992 Maximum 1996 
Consistent with anecdotal interpretations and the initial hypothesis of this research, the 
data in Table 4 indicate that progressive Christian activist groups enjoyed a peak of 
organizational emergence nearly a decade prior to that of conservative groups.  Given 
that organizational founding is always characterized by a time-lag relative to key 
historical events, it is important to stress that the likely causes for emergence -- to the 
extent that they are related to external events -- derive from conditions present one to 
three years prior to founding.  Thus, in the case of progressive organizations, the 
escalation of the war in Vietnam in the early 1970s served as a general systemic force 
resulting in the mobilization of a significant number of peace, anti-war, and Vietnam-
specific movement organizations. Similarly, the election of conservative icon Ronald 
Reagan to the presidency in 1980 ushered in an unprecedented number of traditionalist 
movements over the next five years, whose mission and agenda matched that of Pres. 
Reagan to a remarkable degree. Evidence of this effect is provided below in Figure 5.  It 
is also essential to note the possibility that the conservative ascendancy of the 1980s was 
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directly related to the earlier surge by progressive groups a decade earlier. The visible 
and aggressive presence of oppositional forces – either progressive or conservative – is 
seen recurrently as a powerful trigger for counter-mobilization.  A similar ―pendulum 
swing‖ of counter-mobilization was observed after the election of Pres. Bill Clinton in 
1992, and, though strictly outside the timeframe of this study, after the invasion of Iraq 
by Pres. Bush in 2003.  
Figure 5:  Founding Date by Ideological Orientation 
MEMBERSHIP 
In Skocpol & Fiorina‘s influential Diminished Democracy (2000), the authors 
observe a general trend among 20
th
 century American voluntary associations toward
declining membership. This change has been accompanied by a related increase in 
―checkbook activism,‖ consisting of advocacy, largely legislative or lobbying in nature, 
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directed by a very small group of leaders often concentrated in Washington, D.C. or New 
York and supported only financially by distant donors flung around the country.  
Skocpol‘s recent research suggests another variant of this trend, with ―organizations‖ 
founded and managed by only one person, but which generate, through effective use of 
mass media and marketing, a sphere of cultural and political influence disproportionate to 
its tiny size (Skocpol, 1994).  A fitting question then emerges: has this phenomenon held 
true for American Christian activism as well? 
Figure 6:  Proportion of Membership/Non-Membership Groups, Overall 
Findings at the aggregate, cross-sectional level indicate that Christian activist 
groups with formal, counted memberships still constitute a numerical majority.  
However, when viewed longitudinally, it is obvious that the trend uncovered by previous 
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scholars was not an aberration.  Between 1960 and 2000, the gap between membership 
and non-membership groups shrank substantially. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
discrepancy was at historic lows, with only a few percentage points separating the 
categories.  Surprisingly, beginning in 1995, the gap widened again to levels 
approximating those of the late 1970s.  Overall, though, the pattern originally described 
by Skocpol and Fiorina (among others) appears to be reflected within the Christian 
activist sector as well.  
Figure 7:  Membership Status of Christian Activist Groups Over Time 
Findings indicating a decrease in the proportion of membership groups have 
important consequences for the scope of theorizing on this subject. A legitimate criticism 
could be levied that only groups with active memberships should be included in a valid 
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study of activism of any sort, on the basis that organizations without members (or at least 
without a listing of members) is not an organization in any meaningful sense. 
Furthermore, goes the argument, the increased ease with which citizens may found non-
profit voluntary activist organizations, obtain tax-exempt status, and begin a modicum of 
socio-political advocacy greatly inflates the number of nominal organizations in the 
sector, and dilutes any analysis attempted on the population by filling it with 
―figurehead‖ and ―checkbook‖ organizations, which are arguably not comparable to 
organizations comprising the majority, and fitting best with traditional social movement 
theory. This criticism is premised on the equation of ―members‖ to ―constituents‖ or 
―audience.‖  Detailed scrutiny reveals this to be a false equivalency.  For example, 
throughout most years of observed data, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 
founded by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and generally regarded as the central 
organizational actor in the Civil Rights Movement, listed only 247 members in EoA. 
Similarly, the Catholic Worker, likely the most significant Catholic activist group until 
the 1980s, listed no members – and quite correctly – for every year of data collected.  In 
both cases, the recruitment and cultivation of ―members‖ per se was not seen as vital to 
the mission and success of the organization. The SCLC‘s approach instead hinged on 
building a strong and far-flung network of African-American churches and community 
groups that could be activated with short notice for coordinated sit-ins, marches, 
demonstrations, or rallies.  The Catholic Worker‘s audience was even more inchoate, 
consisting of hundreds of thousands of newspaper readers, commune workers, Houses of 
Hospitality residents, and ultimately thousands of young urban Catholics reared in the 
teachings and practice of Maurin and Day.   
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Table 5:  Total and Mean Membership of Christian Activist Organizations, 1960-2000 
(Active groups with members only) 
Year of 
Data Members 
Sum Mean 
1961 63,476,910 1,983,653 
1964 74,433,006 1,305,842 
1968 77,563,450 1,292,724 
1970 77,819,159 1,318,969 
1972 67,079,498 1,001,187 
1975 *81,042,675 1,356,749 
1977 69,617,126 980,523 
1979 80,419,185 1,218,473 
1981 77,864,705 1,052,226 
1983 78,228,917 899,183 
1985 79,130,528 753,624 
1987 76,851,655 662,514 
1989 72,673,699 550,558 
1991 76,684,234 491,566 
1993 78,740,557 489,072 
1995 78,122,913 520,819 
1998 98,153,338 672,283 
2000 *101,761,486 669,385 
* Adjusted to reflect probable reporting errors or deliberation exaggerations
Dozens more cases akin to these abound throughout the data.  As a result, it is 
difficult to find compelling merit in the argument that relative increases in non-
membership groups indicates a deterioration in the vitality of the religious activist sector, 
or that the increased presence of unconventional organizational forms such as the kind 
identified by Skocpol and others creates an artificially large and invalid population. 
Rather, these changes merely point to the dynamic and fluid nature of organizational 
forms, which are constantly adapting to intra-sectoral and external pressures to survive 
and thrive.  There is no simply no evidence to support the claim that religious activist 
organizations reporting no members (whether accurate or not) or a small number of 
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members have less influence, fewer opportunities, or greater challenges than 
conventional large membership-based organizations.  
Between 1960 and 2000, membership in Christian activist organizations tended to 
hover around the 75 million mark, with periodic fluctuations of fairly large interval 
(Table 5).  Closer examination reveals that most of these are due to unprecedented 
reporting of large membership by just a handful of organizations. For example, in 1975, 
the Lord‘s Day Alliance of the United States, a group advocating Sabbath protection 
laws, reported membership of 18 million, up from 11,000 in 1972.  Interestingly, the 
LDAUS had disbanded by 1977. As a result, I adjusted membership sums to realistic 
figures in such cases. However, 1975 also witnessed the legitimate entry of a large 
national membership organization, the National Temperance and Prohibition Council, 
reporting 10 million members.  Subsequent membership numbers for NTPC suggest 
accurate counts and expected increases. In 1977, evidence of the opposite occurrence is 
seen, as one large national membership group, the International for Religious Freedom, 
based in Boston and boasting 10 million members, disappeared for a decade from the 
EoA database.  When it returned in 1985, it had undergone significant re-organization of 
mission, scope, and direction, reporting membership of only 450.  The other large 
increase in membership was in 1998.  Deeper analysis established that these spikes 
originated also from valid new membership counts from the National Association of 
Evangelicals, reporting an increase from 15 million to 27 million members from 1995 
and 1998, and the National Council of Churches, who reported a surge from 42 million to 
51 million.  Together, these constitute a 21 million member jump from 1995, completely 
accounting for the observed increase. Therefore, care must be taken to disentangle valid 
spikes in membership via organizational emergence into the population or valid new 
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counts from aberrant reporting by the organization.  Table 5 denotes adjusted 
membership sums (*) where further scrutiny uncovered likely error of the second type.  
The other noteworthy finding from the analysis of overall membership in this 
sector is the gradual decline in the average size of organizations over time.  Though fewer 
organizations existed in the early years, those that did were fairly large, with 
memberships well above the 1 million mark.  By the mid-1980s, a period that saw an 
explosion in the actual number of organizations in the population, particularly from 
conservative Christian corners, the average size of such groups fell to around a half-
million members.  These findings, together with related results on the characteristics and 
mission of groups during this time, indicate a general trend toward proliferation of 
smaller, grassroots-oriented groups with increasingly narrow issue-foci.  
A more precise and insightful method of examining Christian activist membership 
dynamics, however, is to analyze the characteristics of the largest organizations 
synchronically and longitudinally.  A number of valuable findings emerge as a result of 
this approach.  Table 6 illustrates a sample of these.  More importantly, this table 
demonstrates a crucial point for the overall project:  viewing Christian activist dominance 
over time by only examining comparisons in numbers of organizations per ideological 
category or issue niche is essential and fruitful, but partial and potentially misleading if 
left as the only analytical perspective.  When balanced by a look at the largest 
organizations, the primary issue engaged, their religious affiliations, and their ideological 
leanings, a different picture emerges.   
59 
Table 6:  Twenty-Five Largest Christian Activist Groups by Significant Characteristics 
Organization Members Issue Niche Religious Affiliation Ideological 
Orientatio
n Score 
National Council of the 
Churches of Christ in the 
U.S.A.     52,000,000 Gen. Social Justice Non/Multi-Denominational 0.35 
National Association of 
Evangelicals   27,000,000 Traditional theology Unspecified 'Christian' 0.7 
National Temperance and 
Prohibition Council   13,000,000 Temperance Roman Catholic 0.8 
National Right to Life 
Committee  12,000,000 Pro-life Roman Catholic 0.75 
National Council of Catholic 
Women  10,000,000 Gen. Social Justice Roman Catholic 0.4 
United Church Women of the 
NCC   10,000,000 Women's rights Non/Multi-Denominational 0.45 
International Association for 
Liberal Christianity and 
Religious Freedom     10,000,000 Religious freedom Unitarian/Universalist 0.3 
Moral Majority 4,000,000 Moral decline Unspecified 'Christian' 1 
Liberty Federation 4,000,000 Moral decline Unspecified 'Christian' 1 
The Conservative Caucus 2,500,000 Traditional theology Indeterminate 0.85 
American Council of Christian 
Churches 1,508,770 Anti-modernism Unspecified 'Christian' 1 
National Office for Black 
Catholics 1,000,000 Civil Rights Roman Catholic 0.15 
ABW Ministries 750,000 Women's rights Baptist 0.45 
International Temperance 
Association 650,000 Temperance Non/Multi-Denominational 0.7 
Concerned Women for 
America 600,000 Anti-feminism Non/Multi-Denominational 0.85 
Human Life International 500,000 Pro-life Roman Catholic 0.85 
American Temperance 
Society 400,000 Temperance Non/Multi-Denominational 0.7 
Family Research Council 400,000 Moral decline Non/Multi-Denominational 0.9 
Presbyterian Women 400,000 Women's rights Presbyterian 0.3 
Catholic League for Religious 
and Civil Rights 350,000 Religious freedom Roman Catholic 0.65 
Christian Voice 325,000 Moral decline Unspecified 'Christian' 0.9 
Mean 0.668 
Mode 0.7 
First, it should be noted that this type of analysis exemplifies one of the hazards of 
strict reporting of membership data as collected by the organization itself, the method 
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employed by the EofA. Operation: PUSH, the broad-based advocacy organization formed 
by civil rights icon Rev. Jesse Jackson in 1985, reported no members until 1998, when 
the group began reporting 1 billion members. Clearly this is a case of public relations and 
image management; it is not possible that Jackson‘s Chicago-based organization rivals 
the global Roman Catholic Church in membership. Upon closer scrutiny, it is revealed 
that the actual membership of Operation: PUSH was nearer to 80,000-100,000, and the 1 
billion figure was a deliberate rhetorical effort to include all those exploited and 
marginalized in the world (―the bottom billion) (Mjagkij, 2001; Collier, 2007).  
Therefore, in order to keep consistency with the method of only reporting and analyzing 
data as represented in the original source, I have excluded all organizations that 
demonstrate obvious manipulation of membership data for symbolic purposes, and 
adjusted membership data to reflect more realistic levels.  
It is clear from this perspective that the largest groups across this forty year period 
were also among the more conservative ideologically.  The mean ideological orientation 
score of the largest 25 organizations was .668 and the mode score was 7.0 on the .1 to 1.0 
scale, where 1.0 is considered ―totally conservative.‖ Together, these scores would 
classify the overall orientation of the 25 largest organizations as ―moderately 
conservative‖ using the fuzzy-set coding scheme devised for this study.  Moreover, the 
range of primary issues engaged in by the largest groups is surprisingly narrow compared 
to the diversity represented in the population, featuring only 11 discrete issue niches, and 
obvious overlap or ―family resemblance‖ between these (e.g.  traditional theology and 
moral decline).  Primary issues engaged by these largest groups are also decidedly more 
traditionalist in general character than a random sample of the overall organizational 
population would anticipate. Further support along this line is provided by Table 7, 
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displaying the gradual conservative direction of the largest Christian activist groups over 
time.    
Table 7:  Ideological Orientation Scores of Largest Christian Activist Organizations by 
Decade 
Decade Mean Score Modal Score 
1960s 0.584 0.45 
1970s 0.627 0.75 
1980s 0.765 0.9 
1990s 0.666 0.9 
An obvious question central to the core concerns of this study that emerges when 
considering Christian activist membership over time is: approximately how many 
members belonged to progressive, conservative, and other ideological categories of 
Christian activist organizations per year?  Such an analysis would offer needed balance to 
the population-level findings that dominate the organizational ecology literature, and 
which are presented elsewhere in this section. Without such a perspective, it would be 
reasonable to assume an equivalency between the number of organizations of a certain 
type in the population and actual relative dominance of this type in civil society as a 
whole.  While this perspective is a valid – and perhaps even occasionally true – measure 
of the relative direction and tone of civil society at a given historical time, it will always 
only be incomplete if not coupled with data on approximately how many actual people 
were involved in the various organizations at given points in time.  
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Figure 8:  Number of Members by Ideological Orientation (Active organizations only) 
The analysis of membership by ideological orientation offers fascinating insight 
into precisely how different these two measures are.  Figure 8 shows changes in 
membership for each ideological category from 1960-2000.  Most obvious here is the 
startling and heretofore unseen strength of moderately progressive groups throughout the 
period. However, it must stressed the dominant organization in this category 
(contributing no less than 40 million members per year) was the National Council of 
Churches, whose consistent practice was to report as members of the NCC all 
congregants of partner denominations. Therefore, if one was a member of University 
Methodist Church in Austin, TX, for example, one was also counted as a member of the 
NCC, regardless of one‘s own commitment to the NCC mission. This method of counting 
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membership was generally not practiced by other Christian activist organizations, and 
thus should safely be viewed as anomalous. Though the NCC was indubitably one of the 
most influential and far-reaching Christian organizations in the 20
th
 century, its power is
not mainly related to its purported membership, but rather its subtle and gradual effects 
on theological method and prevailing Christian religio-political worldviews. Hence, 
conclusions about the overall relative power of moderate-progressive groups vis-à-vis 
membership must be constrained by these unusual reporting habits of major component 
organizations.  
Looking past the moderate-progressive findings, the truly significant aspects of 
this analysis emerge, however.  As predicted by the major hypothesis of this study, 
progressive organizations enjoyed healthy membership totals and a sizable advantage 
over all other ideological categories until approximately 1975 – the first year of data 
collected after the Roe vs. Wade decision.  In that year, both moderately conservative and 
conservative organizations rocketed past left-leaning Christian groups in membership and 
never relented.  In 1979, the founding of the Moral Majority and colleague organizations 
with large grassroots memberships, pushed the conservative constituent totals to 
unprecedented levels that they would maintain until the early 1990s. Throughout the 
1980s, conservative Christian activist organization membership approached 35 million 
members and for the first time began to rival the NCC and other moderate-progressive 
groups in size.  In contrast, progressive Christian groups shrank to historic lows from 
1979 onward, and never regained their 1960s-70s era strength.   
A useful complement to these findings is to examine the average size of 
organizations per ideological category and compare it to the number of such 
organizations in the population.  This data is summarized in Table 8.  We find, similar to 
the results regarding number of organizations, an approximate parity between 
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conservative and progressive Christian activist average membership.  Most significantly, 
the findings indicate that even though there were fewer unique conservative Christian 
groups in the population, they did not lag far behind progressive Christian groups in 
terms of membership. This was especially true of ―moderate conservative groups,‖ who 
numbered only 28 organizations in the total population, but generated an average 
membership per group of more than 112,000.  In conjunction with the findings from the 
above table on total membership trends over time, this data suggests that a relatively 
modest number of conservative Christian groups were able to generate very large and 
sustained member pools for more than a decade, a feat that was unmatched by their 
ideological rivals.  
Table 8:  Mean Size of Membership vs. Number of Organizations Per Ideological 
Orientation 
 Average 
Size of 
Membership 
# of 
Organizations 
Conservative 114,327 67 
Moderate Conservative 112,461 28 
Moderate 2,023 10 
Moderate Progressive 939,964 64 
Progressive 120,937 88 
In summary, these membership findings provide a valuable contrast to the story 
presented by the analyses below based on number of organizations per ideological 
category or issue niche.  A thorough discussion of these differences is offered in Chapter 
6.  
 Obviously, this type of pattern was also observed by the moderate-progressive category, but should be 
viewed skeptically because of the unusual membership reporting technique of the National Council of 
Churches, as noted in the main text.  
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GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION 
Taken together, the maps below (Illustrations 1-5 and Tables 9-13) of the 
geographic dispersion of Christian activist group headquarters over the four decades 
point to three major findings.  First, activist organizations tend to be concentrated in large 
urban centers, regardless of time period.  The overwhelming majority of groups based 
their operations in a handful of major cities, namely New York City, Washington, DC, 
Chicago, and Boston, all of which are located in the Northeastern quadrant of the US. 
Second, the distribution of headquarters from 1960-2000 was gradually but definitely in a 
westward and southward direction, following geographic trends at the general 
population level. Third, regardless of year, Washington, DC remained among the most 
frequent location for organizational headquarters, indicating the recognition of the 
strategic value of proximity to policy-making power, even for organizations mainly 
focused on cultural change or public awareness. State-centered theorists have long 
emphasized the centrality of state growth and capacity as a crucial factor in 
understanding movement morphology and dynamics. However, this finding suggests that 
activist proximity to state power is a relatively stable feature of late 20
th
 century activism.
Finally, however, and in subtle tension with the previous finding, we observe a slow but 
visible diffusion of organizational headquarters away from Washington, DC over the four 
decades. This findings points instead to the rise of alternative power centers in the South 
(Arlington, VA; Louisville, KY; and Memphis, TN) and West (mainly Los Angeles, CA). 
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Illustration 1:  Location of Christian Activist Group Headquarters, 1960s 
Illustration 2:  Location of Christian Activist Group Headquarters, 1970s 
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Illustration 3:  Location of Christian Activist Group Headquarters, 1980s 
Illustration 4:  Location of Christian Activist Group Headquarters, 1990s 
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Illustration 5:  Location of Christian Activist Organization Headquarters, 2000 
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Table 9:  Location of All Christian Activist Organization Headquarters 
(Cross-sectional) 
LOCATION PERCENT 
Washington, D.C. 19.2 
New York, NY 15.1 
Chicago, IL 4.1 
St. Louis, MO 2.1 
Boston, MA 1.9 
Address unknown 1.7 
Los Angeles, CA 1.7 
Philadelphia, PA 1.4 
San Francisco, CA 1.4 
Atlanta, GA 1.0 
Indianapolis, IN 1.0 
Cincinnati, OH .8 
Milwaukee, WI .8 
Minneapolis, MN .8 
Pittsburgh, PA .8 
San Diego, CA .8 
Seattle, WA .8 
Albany, NY .6 
Arlington, VA .6 
Bronx, NY .6 
Table 10:  Top Ten Christian Activist Headquarters Locations, 1960s 
LOCATION PERCENT 
Washington, D.C.. 27.1 
New York, NY 24.0 
Chicago, IL 9.4 
Boston, MA 3.1 
Philadelphia, PA 3.1 
St. Louis, MO 3.1 
Atlanta, GA 2.1 
Indianapolis, IN 2.1 
Nyack, NY 2.1 
Pittsburgh, PA 2.1 
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Table 12:  Top Ten Christian Activist Headquarters Locations, 1980s 
Table 11:  Top Ten Christian Activist Headquarters Locations, 1970s 
LOCATION PERCENT 
New York, NY 23.7 
Washington, D.C. 19.9 
Chicago, IL 8.3 
Boston, MA 2.6 
St. Louis, MO 2.6 
Atlanta, GA 1.9 
Philadelphia, PA 1.9 
Cincinnati, OH 1.3 
Collingswood, NJ 1.3 
Indianapolis, IN 1.3 
LOCATION PERCENT 
Washington, D.C.  22.6 
New York, NY  12.2 
Chicago, IL 3.8 
Milwaukee, WI 1.7 
Philadelphia, PA 1.7 
St. Louis, MO 1.7 
Boston, MA 1.4 
Indianapolis, IN 1.4 
Los Angeles, CA 1.4 
Atlanta, GA 1.0 
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Table 13:  Top Ten Christian Activist Headquarters Locations, 1990s 
 LOCATION 
PERCENT 
Washington, D.C. 17.0 
New York, NY 11.6 
Chicago, IL 4.7 
Los Angeles, CA 1.7 
Address unknown 1.4 
Boston, MA 1.4 
Arlington, VA 1.1 
Louisville, KY 1.1 
Memphis, TN 1.1 
Philadelphia, PA 1.1 
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BRANCHES AND STAFF 
Organizations may take many forms in the population, from local single-issue 
grassroots activist groups to far-flung federated organizations with dozens of subsidiaries 
around the country. Similarly, organizations may employ hundreds of staff or as few as 
one, as discussed in Ch. 6. These variations are important to consider as they may 
correlate with other significant organizational characteristics, such as ideological 
orientation, religious tradition, or success in promoting their issue agendas.  The spread 
of organizations via regional, state, and local branches is also a valid indicator of the 
scope and reach of the group, as well as another measure of their total resources, a factor 
repeatedly cited in the literature as key to movement mobilization and goal achievement.  
Table 14:  Proportion of Christian Activist Organizations Reporting Personnel and 
Branches 
PERCENT 
Cases reporting "Staff" 12.9% 
Cases reporting "Regional Groups" 2.9% 
Cases reporting "State Groups" 2.4% 
Cases reporting "Local Groups" 4.5% 
Data from the Encyclopedia of Associations on organizational branches and 
personnel are scant, unfortunately, as represented in Table 14.  As with all data from this 
source, it is unknown what proportion of the low yield on such variables reflects the 
reality of the population or simply noncompliance by the organization. For analytical 
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purposes, we can only assume that such errors, if they are errors, occur systematically 
across the population in an unbiased manner and do not skew the results unidirectionally.  
Table 15:  Descriptive Branch Statistics by Ideological Orientation 
IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIENTATION 
STATE 
GROUPS 
LOCAL 
GROUPS 
Conservative Mean 33 464 
N 19 18 
Moderate Mean 1 8,400 
N 1 1 
Moderate-Conservative Mean 63 942 
N 4 7 
Moderate-Progressive Mean 23 439 
N 6 20 
Progressive Mean 35 57 
N 13 34 
Overall Mean 34 426 
N 43 80 
Looking more substantively at these data cross-tabulated with ideological 
orientation, we find that moderate-conservative organizations enjoyed a significant 
advantage over all other ideological orientation groups in terms of the number of state 
groups (Table 15).  This category includes such groups as Women Exploited by Abortion 
and the American Health and Temperance Society.  Moderate organizations, 
interestingly, were the least likely to have state branches, while conservative and 
progressive groups reported near equal numbers of state branches.  The number of local 
groups tended to average in the mid-400s, though one organization, the National Council 
of Catholic Men, was a serious outlier, reporting more than 8,000 local branches.  In this 
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category, moderate-conservative and conservative organizations enjoyed distinct 
advantages over other ideological orientations, indicating an inclination toward 
grassroots-based activism and federated structures.  The ―planting‖ of local and state 
branches suggests, among other things, an interest on the part of the organization to enlist 
sizable numbers of the public in their efforts, and do so in a methodical and bureaucratic 
way, as opposed to conventional movement mobilization.  Branches, then, have the 
ability to act on behalf of the parent organization in a variety of local contexts that strictly 
national groups would not.  As a result, the probability of reaching a larger share of the 
mass public in a rather permanent way is increased dramatically, a fact which accrues 
mainly to the conservative side of the spectrum. To the extent that the outcomes of 
modern politics are increasingly determined electorally or through the action of interest 
groups, the ability of Christian activists to instantly draw on large sectors of the public in 
local communities on issues they are concerned about becomes crucial. Branches 
(organizational networks) provide the skeleton for this process. This data, then, provides 
one more corroborative perspective to illuminate the distinct tactical and organizational 
approaches used by various strains of Christian activists.   
Analysis of organizational networks and personnel by religious tradition reveals 
fascinating findings that further elaborate results found in other pieces of the examination 
(Table 16). For example, non-traditional religious groups, such as non-denominational or 
unspecified ―Christian‖ organizations, have more state, local, and regional branches than 
expected given their very recent entry into the population and the religious field. 
Conversely, mainline and well-known denominations such as the Methodist, 
Presbyterian, and Baptist Churches had virtually no affiliated activist groups with 
branches. The Roman Catholic Church, by contrast, boasted sizable if not very large 
numbers of branches in all three categories.  The strong organizational networks built by 
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Catholics and the non-mainline groups help explain the advantage they have enjoyed in 
membership, population presence, and overall success in the activist, particularly in the 
last 20 years.  
Table 16:  Branches of Christian Activist Groups by Religious Tradition 
RELIGIOUS TRADITION 
LOCAL 
GROUPS 
STATE 
GROUPS 
REGIONAL 
GROUPS 
 Indeterminate/Unknown 331 33 32,053 
 Roman Catholic 9,728 218 8,000,113 
 Lutheran 385 11 26 
 Methodist . . . 
 Presbyterian 20 . 47 
 Episcopalian 117 . 12 
 Latter Day Saints/Mormon 12 23 12 
 Society of Friends/Quaker 10 9 12 
 United Church of Christ . . . 
 Unitarian-Universalist 244 5 8 
 Non/Multi-Denominational 9,993 315 163 
 Mennonite/Church of Brethren . . 5 
 Unspecified 'Christian' 7,203 737 153 
 American Baptist . . . 
 Southern Baptist . . 7 
 Pentecostal 6 . . 
 Other 329 50 34 
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BUDGET 
The Encyclopedia of Associations did not collect data on organizational budgets 
until the 1985 edition. Therefore, trend analysis for this variable will be severely 
truncated. In addition, many organizations (88%) did not report budgetary information, 
further limiting the generalizability of budget-related results. However, as these factors 
were distributed across the population in an unbiased fashion, the cross-sectional and 
interactional analysis remains valid within their inherent limits, and do reveal a number 
of noteworthy findings (Table 17) 
Table 17:  Descriptive Budget Statistics for Christian Activist Organizations, 
(Cross-sectional) 
 N 682  / 12%  
Missing 2461  / 88% 
Mean $4,802,072 
Median $350,000 
Mode $1,000,000 
Maximum $328,000,000. 
First, we find that annual organizational budgets display wide dispersion, 
primarily due to the huge range in organizational size, differential access to church or 
denominational resources, variation in the number of local branches, and the presence or 
absence of paying members.  National, denominational organizations, and especially 
those with international ties such as Roman Catholic groups, had a distinct advantage in 
budget size, as described in detail below.  These were atypical, however.  Most 
organizational budgets, as presented in the below table, were robust in size, with the 
median budget being $350,000 per year, and a typical Christian activist organization 
reported a budget of approximately $1 million. 
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Second, Christian activist groups demonstrated a gradual but steady increase in 
financial capacity over the 40 years examined (see Figure 9).  After a rapid spike in the 
late 1980s, Christian activist median budgets basically plateaued at the $400,000 level for 
the remainder of the period.  These findings suggest not only the rising costs of ―doing 
business‖ in the sector, but also the general ability of activist groups to raise funds to 
match these costs. As demonstrated through other findings, these funds did not mainly 
originate from members, but increasingly through direct contributions from grant-making 
organizations or essentially inactive benefactors. 
Figure 9: Median Budget of Christian Activist Groups, 1985-2000 
(Budget data not collected prior to 1985) 
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Third, examined at the cross-sectional level of all organizations, the financial 
advantage of conservative groups is easily observed (Table 18). Conservative Christian 
activist organizations could expect a five-fold advantage in mean budget size in any 
given year.  Groups contributing to this conservative lead include Focus on the Family 
and the Alliance Defense Fund, both of which are active on traditional morality and 
family issues. This fact indicates the high import family-oriented organizations place on 
fund-raising and resource-enhancement in order to conduct their work and achieve 
organizational and issue-aims.  
Table 18: Descriptive Budget Statistics by Ideological Orientation of Christian Activist 
Organizations 
Ideological 
Orientation of Groups Mean Budget Minimum Budget Maximum Budget 
Cons $5,725,015.00 $27,000 $93,000,000 
Mod $584,400.00 $60,000 $1,200,000 
ModCons $173,333.33 $50,000 $400,000 
ModProg $1,245,085.71 $1,000 $6,500,000 
Prog $1,571,785.71 $20,000 $20,000,000 
Fourth, perhaps contrary to expectation, we find that moderate-progressive 
organizations enjoyed the largest stock of resources among the forty Christian activist 
groups with the largest budgets (Figure 10).  Though the difference was not enormous 
(5%), the financial capacity of the moderate-progressives is disproportionate to their size 
in the population.  In large measure, their budget vitality is drawn from the fact that many 
of the constituent organizations are connected to large denominational structures, such as 
the National Council of Churches and the US Catholic Conference, which greatly 
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augments their ability to raise dollars with relative ease.  Also crucial, as mentioned 
above, is the likely intrinsic appeal of moderate groups in general to donors, as they 
represent a safe and often well-known bureaucratic middle position in contrast to more 
strident and ‗riskier‖ organizations at the poles.   
Figure 10:  Distribution of Ideological Orientation Among Christian Activist 
Organizations with Forty Largest Budgets 
Fifth, non/multi-denominational Christian Activist groups far outpaced all other 
religious traditions in terms of financial capacity (Figure 11).  In part, this finding reflects 
the significant portion of the overall activist population from non/multi-denominational 
backgrounds.  However, there is no necessary equivalency between mere predominance 
and budget size.  These findings suggest that non/multi-denominational Christian activist 
groups operate with real substantial resource leads, irrespective of other factors.  It is 
80 
likely that these greater money supplies are due in part to the large network of subsidiary 
members they may draw from, as in the case of the National Council of Churches, but 
also significantly result from the wider natural pool of constituents available by 
eschewing strict denominational categories.   
Figure 11:  Distribution of Religious Affiliation Among Christian Activist Organizations 
with Forty Largest Budgets 
Greater detail on Christian activist budget dynamics is provided in Table 19, 
which focuses on the twenty-five groups with the largest budgets.  I provide this table 
primarily to specify the organizations responsible for many of the findings seen via other 
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analyses.  The most significant finding here is the high concentration of social welfare 
organizations, groups whose mission focuses on delivery or advocacy of direct services 
such as legal aid, food, clothing, as well as the sponsoring of other local community 
outreach groups. Most probably this finding derives from the significantly higher 
overhead of social welfare organizations, which includes the regular provision of goods 
and services, as well as large staffing requirements and the support of perhaps dozens of 
subsidiary branches. 
Table 19:  Twenty-Five Wealthiest Christian Activist Groups by Significant 
Characteristics 
ORGANIZATION BUDGET 
RELIGIOUS 
AFFILIATION 
IDEOLOGY 
SCORE 
Catholic Relief Services $328,000,000 Roman Catholic 0.3 
Focus on the Family $100,000,000 
Non/Multi-
Denominational 
0.9 
National Council of the Churches of Christ in 
the U.S.A.     
$60,000,000 
Non/Multi-
Denominational 
0.3 
U.S. Catholic Conference Migration and 
Refugee Services     
$32,000,000 Roman Catholic 0.3 
United States Catholic Conference $30,600,000 Roman Catholic 0.3 
American Friends Service Committee $27,661,703 
Society of 
Friends/Quaker 
0.1 
World Concern     $21,000,000 Unspecified 'Christian' 0.3 
Migration and Refugee Services $20,000,000 Indeterminate 0.1 
Family Research Council $14,500,000 
Non/Multi-
Denominational 
0.9 
American Center for Law and Justice $12,000,000 Unspecified 'Christian' 0.9 
Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan 
Community Churches     
$10,000,000 
Non/Multi-
Denominational 
0.1 
Christian Research Institute International $8,000,000 Unspecified 'Christian' 0.9 
Concerned Women for America $8,000,000 
Non/Multi-
Denominational 
0.9 
Rutherford Institute     $8,000,000 Indeterminate 0.9 
Campaign for Human Development $8,000,000 Roman Catholic 0.3 
American Life League     $6,900,000 Unspecified 'Christian' 0.7 
Presbyterian Hunger Program     $6,500,000 Presbyterian 0.3 
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National Ecumenical Coalition $6,000,000 
Non/Multi-
Denominational 
0.3 
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services $5,572,200 Lutheran 0.3 
Christian Research Institute International     $5,500,000 Unspecified 'Christian' 0.9 
Free Congress Research and Education 
Foundation     
$5,500,000 
Non/Multi-
Denominational 
0.9 
National Ecumenical Coalition $5,500,000 
Non/Multi-
Denominational 
0.3 
Concerned Women for America $5,400,000 
Non/Multi-
Denominational 
0.9 
United Presbyterian Women $5,250,000 Presbyterian 0.1 
Mean 0.492 
Mode 0.3 
Finally, we find a similar high concentration of activist groups from the ideological poles, 
rather than those in the middle.  Naturally, this has the effect of producing a mean 
ideological orientation score very close to moderate, but this effect obscures the real 
underlying patterns.  What explains this heavy representation of extremes?  I argue that 
this finding also corroborates the general theory of civil sphere cybernetics which I 
outline in Chapter 7.  In brief, this theory holds that an unintentional degree of 
homeostasis or ideological balance is achieved at nearly time period of measurement due 
to the triggering of delicate boundaries and feedback mechanisms built into the civil 
sphere. In this particular case, Christian activist groups enter and build capacity in 
response to threats directed at deeply held values, issues, or institutions. Often, Christian 
groups appear to emerge and engage in the civil sphere not only in order to protect and 
promote these agendas, but also to directly oppose the action of rival organizations. This 
―dance‖ or modified dialectic process is therefore driven both internally and externally, a 
dynamic heretofore little examined in the literature.   
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ORGANIZATIONAL TYPES 
Though the concentration of Christian activist groups in Washington, D.C. 
declined over time, a substantial plurality of groups maintained and even strengthened 
their involvement in public policy and legislation, regardless of geographic location.  
Figure 12 provides evidence of this pattern. Beginning in the 1980s, roughly 
corresponding to the ascendancy of traditional family values and pro-life advocacy, 
Christian activist groups involved in direct public affairs lobbying increased at a much 
faster rate than organizations with either strictly religious or social welfare missions. 
Within 10 years, the number of groups in this sector had nearly doubled.  This finding 
suggests not only a shift in the tactical repertoires employed by Christian activist groups 
toward the direct legislative process and away from more conventional ―protest‖ oriented 
methods (detailed in the appropriate section below), but a shift in the very organizational 
morphology considered by prospective movement entrepreneurs.  It is reasonable to 
conclude that activists pondering founding an SMO after 1981 perceived greater benefits 
and a higher probability of success through the launching of policy-oriented groups rather 
than through other forms, such as those targeting consciousness-raising, 
demonstrations/marches, or community organizing. Overall, this finding confirms the 
conclusions of state-centered theorists, stressing a gradual isomorphism between 
governmental and civil society structures.  
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Figure 12:  Types of Christian Activist Organizations, 1960-2000 
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Chapter 5:  Qualitative Findings 
“Minds require eco-niches as much as organisms do, and the mind‟s eco-niche is its 
worldview, its sense of the whole of things.” 
--- Huston Smith, Why Religion Matters, 2001, p. 26 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION 
Viewed at the aggregate level irrespective of changes over time, the main pattern 
observed is the rather tight balance negotiated between the number of organizations at the 
poles of the ideological spectrum among Christian activist organizations.  Though during 
any given historical period, one or the other ideological wings may hold relative sway, 
the overarching cross-sectional story is not one of clear dominance by any ideology, but a 
hard-fought equilibrium of sorts (Figure 13).  This relative balance is neither intentional, 
predestined, nor necessarily functional.  
Figure 13:  Distribution of Ideological Orientation Categories (Cross-sectional) 
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Rather, it appears as the result of the aggregation of countless micro-level contests 
occurring in civil society over a myriad of controversial topics; a true emergent 
characteristic that cannot be reduced to the action of any sole actor or collection of actors. 
I do posit, however, a set of recurrent mechanisms which appear to be essential to 
the emergence of this ideological equilibrium, and which indicate the process is not 
entirely random or spontaneous. There is a degree of rationality to the emergence of 
equilibrium, but it does not manifest in the order-dominated form postulated by Parsons 
(1982) and Luhman (1984). Instead, it is a inescapably messy battlefield of clashing 
normative commitments and socio-political resources, whose participants do not engage 
for the production of balance, but for final victory for their worldview.  
Table 20:  Number of Unique Conservative and Progressive Activist Groups by Decade 
YEARS % CONSERVATIVE % PROGRESSIVE DIFFERENCE 
1960-1969 18.8 32.3 13.5 
1970-1979 24.4 39.1 14.7 
1980-1989 29.5 37.8 8.3 
1990-1999 29.9 35.5 5.6 
2000 30.5 34.6 4.0 
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In significant ways, these data paint the richest and most transparent picture of the 
prevailing dynamics in Christian activism since the 1960s.  One of the central research 
questions of this study was to investigate the overall ideological trajectory of this social 
movement sector, specifically, whether the oft-cited but little proved decline of 
progressive activism was based in fact. As is often the case in social science, the actual 
evidence is far more nuanced than popular assessments can do justice to. For example, 
Table 20 provides a mixed picture of ideological outcomes.  From 1960-1979, 
progressive organizations enjoyed a comfortable double-digit advantage over 
conservative groups in terms of raw count in the overall sector population.  However, 
with the election of President Reagan in 1980 and throughout the next two decades, the 
share of progressive Christian groups shrank dramatically. By 2000, conservative groups 
had nearly eliminated the gap, with only a 4 percent disadvantage separating them from 
their ideological rivals.  
Figure 14: Relative Distribution of Christian Activist Organizations by 
Ideological Orientation, 1960-2000 
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Figure 14 presents similar data in a more detailed fashion, focusing on the distribution of 
groups per ideological category by year.  Again, during no year of observation do 
conservative Christian groups hold a numerical advantage (in terms of count of discrete 
organizations) over progressive groups. However, a few findings do suggest significant 
signs of increased Christian conservative power over time. First, progressive Christian 
groups reached their apex in share of the population in 1979 and have not remotely 
approached this high point since. In fact, the dominant trend among progressive groups 
since that year has been a steady, gradual decline in ―sector share.‖ Conservative 
Christian groups, however, have experienced two peaks of equal size – the first in 1984 
and the second in 1994 – suggesting a more resilient resource or cultural foundation 
(―abeyance structures‖) upon which to rely in times of diminishing opportunities.  
Second, whereas the long-term pattern of progressive Christian activism appears to be 
one of slow decline, the data presented in this table suggest just the opposite for 
conservative Christian groups. Traditionalist, right-leaning Christian activists enjoyed a 
100% increase in ―sector share‖ during the sampled timeframe.  
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Figure 15:  Distribution of Ideological Orientation of Christian Activist Groups, 
1961-1969 
Figure 16:  Distribution of Ideological Orientation of Christian Activist Organizations, 
1970-1979 
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Figure 17:  Distribution of Ideological Orientation of Christian Activist Organizations, 
1980-1989 
Figure 18:  Distribution of Ideological Orientation of Christian Activist Organizations, 
1990-2000 
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Examining the distribution of ideological orientation of Christian activist groups 
by decade also reveals telling patterns and confirms similar findings seen in other parts of 
the analysis (Figure 15). During the 1960s, according to this analysis, most Christian 
activist organizations clustered toward the left and left-of-center portion of the 
ideological spectrum. The modal ideology score was .45 during this period, 
corresponding to ―Moderate-Progressive‖ in the fuzzy-set coding scheme.  A decade 
later, Christian activism had lurched decidedly to the left (Figure 16). The modal 
ideology score during the 1970s was .25, a solid ―Progressive‖ categorization. This 
finding roughly corresponds to most mainstream historical accounts of the period, which 
often portray the period as the nadir of American social movement activity. In statistical 
terms, Christian activism in the 1960s and 1970s exhibit a ―unimodal‖ distribution in 
terms of ideological orientation; one peak in the distribution and that peak located 
consistently to the left of the political center.  
Beginning in the 1980s, however, the pattern shifted (Figure 17). Strictly 
speaking, the modal ideology score was still firmly located left of center, but a gradually 
emptying of the ideological middle is observed. This finding is consistent with the 
analysis of Hunter via the ―culture wars‖ thesis, as well as the much-touted ―polarization‖ 
of American politics discussed in the popular press and to a lesser extent, some scholarly 
circles.  This hollowing out of the political middle over time produced a bimodal 
distribution of the ideology orientations of Christian activist groups, which clustering by 
1989 at both the left and right ends of the spectrum.  Polarization naturally also included 
a significant increase in the number of groups located at the far right (extremely 
conservative) pole, a phenomenon not seen in previous decades. Conversely, in the 
1980s, radical left groups – the ideological mirror-images of the surging conservative 
groups – became virtually extinct.  During the 1990s, this twin pattern of extreme 
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conservative increase coupled with the disappearance of moderate voices contributed to 
an overall climate of shrill moral conflict between Christians of opposite socio-political 
vision (Figure 18).  The effect on electoral politics and cultural categories proved to be 
unprecedented and long-lasting.   
Figure 19 presents the relative number of Christian activist groups per year by 
ideological orientation in one panel.  At first glance, this graph appears redundant.  
Figure 19:  Distribution of Christian Activist Group Ideological Orientation, 
1961-2000  
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Careful examination, however, reveals a subtle but potentially significant finding. 
In the late 1970s, progressive Christian organizations surged in number and visibility. 
After a short-term decline, leftist religious groups resurged to a lesser extent, then began 
a gradual decade-long denouement that did not substantially abate. This story of rise and 
fall, however, is not as meaningful nor as significant as the overall ideological dance 
conducted between this cluster of groups and their polar Christian counterparts. The 
pattern for right-wing Christian organizations follows what natural scientists call a ―phase 
shift.‖ In laymen‘s terms, a phase shift refers to two identical frequencies of sound or 
light in which one of the two frequencies has been slightly displaced horizontally from its 
originally position.  Using the current data, this phenomenon is observed in the rise-fall 
pattern seen among progressive groups from 1977-1998, which is phase shifted 
approximately four years to the left (earlier) relative to Christian conservative groups.  
I interpret this finding as evidence of slightly time-lagged attempts by 
conservative Christian organizations to respond to actions perceived as threatening by 
progressive Christian groups. In some cases, this threat may have manifested as the 
transgression of moral boundaries or treasured norms held sacred by right-wing groups.  
In these cases, reactive action would have taken the form of groups founded to off-set the 
actions taken on specific issues; for example, the launching of anti-ERA groups by right-
wing Christians to directly oppose pro-ERA groups founded by left-leaning Christian 
activists in the 1980s.  In other cases, the response may have been far more general and 
inchoate.  Responses of this sort might take the form of political and normative 
entrepreneurs founding social movement organizations to simply ―balance the score‖ and 
prevent the further loss of ideological territory to one‘s opponent; a contemporary version 
of Gramsci‘s ―war of position‖ (Gramsci, 1972).    
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No evidence is found in the current data for a phase shift in the opposite direction 
– a progressive response to conservative advance. A possible reason for this is that
throughout the sampled period, progressive Christian groups maintained a healthy 
advantage over conservative Christian organizations, thus the urgency of recovering lost 
ground or dominating the sector was lower. Another possibility is that the time frame 
itself fails to capture the most historically significant loss of progressive dominance and 
their possible efforts to reclaim.  After the election of Pres. George W. Bush in 2000, 
conservative Christianity enjoyed political access that it had not experienced in at least a 
generation, arguably never before. As a result, many observers of American and religion 
and politics, including sociologists, took note of a distinct panic on the part of progressive 
Christian organizations and denominations, who felt suddenly evicted from their 
positions of influence, and the direction of the nation ―hijacked‖ by their opponents on 
the right. It is probable, therefore, that a phase shift toward the left was seen from 2001-
2008, but simply fell outside the time frame sample of the current study. If such a 
leftward surge did occur during the Bush years, however, it would only provide more 
evidence of the sort of subtle signaling mechanisms described above 
The general pattern of these mechanisms is as follows: 
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Figure 20:  Threat-Response Process in Religious Civil Sphere 
Political sociologists have repeatedly documented the sensitivity of social 
systems, especially the civil sphere, to apprehend at any given time the ―zeitgeist‖ or 
prevailing ideological climate, and respond in kind, depending on one‘s moral or 
ideological commitments (Block, 1977; Sorokin, 1937; Luhmann, 1995). These subtle 
signaling and feedback mechanisms could serve a crucial but heretofore under-examined 
role in gradually generating an unintentional form of socio-political stability over the 
long-term, though certainly the short-term effects will be highly confrontational.  
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Table 21:  Ideological Orientation of Christian Activist Groups by Organizational Type 
Conservative 
Moderate/ 
Conservative Moderate 
Moderate/ 
Progressive Progressive 
Religious Org 23% 15% 3% 27% 32% 
Social Welfare Org 31% 13% 7% 22% 27% 
Public Affairs Org 38% 5% 4% 18% 36% 
When considered in tandem with previous findings on the steady increase in the 
proportion of Public Affairs organizations compared to Religious and Social Welfare 
organizations, this table points to another path by which conservative Christian activist 
groups have subtly but firmly achieved greater shares of influence and penetration in civil 
society. Conservative organizations represented a disproportionate share – relative to 
their numbers in the social movement population -- of the Public Affairs groups 
regardless of the year of observation. This sector of organizations target their activity 
almost exclusively at legislative outcomes achieved through the action of the federal 
government.  In this way, the Christian conservatives could still afford to count fewer 
total organizations on their side of spectrum, yet enjoy important political outcomes as a 
movement cluster due to their greater proximity to state power.   
This somewhat differential comfort level with electoral and institutional politics 
could also be viewed as a difference in tactical preferences.  Data presented below 
specifically addressing tactical repertoires finds additional support for the argument that 
conservative Christian groups displayed – or at least developed – a greater tolerance for 
legislative techniques compared to progressive groups.  
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RELIGIOUS TRADITION 
Generally, denominational affiliations of Christian activist organizations closely 
tracked their distribution in the religious population. This is to be expected to a large 
degree. However, in a minority of cases, unexpected and telling deviations from this 
pattern emerged. Most significant was the large number of activist groups identifying as 
simply ―Christian‖ – no other detailing descriptors offered – relative to Americans who 
self-identify using this generic label (Table 22).  Findings indicate that this type of 
organization was the second most common denominational descriptor used, yet only 
approximately nine percent of respondents use ―Christian‖ – and nothing else – to 
describe their religious tradition.   
Closer reading of these cases finds that most organizations that use the generic 
―Christian‖ label do so for two primary reasons.  First, the organization represents an 
umbrella or federation-type structure, comprised of a network of often-diverse and 
loosely allied smaller groups united around common aims or values. Because of the very 
general structure of the organization, the relatively non-controversial ―Christian‖ moniker 
is adopted to speak to the common – though internally varied – religious values of the 
member groups.  Second, and more significantly, the vast majority of organizations 
featuring the ―Christian‖ generic label in its name or self-description were fiercely 
conservative, both theologically and politically.  Conservative organizations tended to 
adopt and prominently feature the ―Christian‖ part of their identity much more frequently 
than progressive groups. A reasonable surmise, supported by a close reading of the longer 
descriptions provided by the organizations is that conservative religious activists 
highlighted this aspect of their character as part of larger ―authenticity battles‖ at play 
within the American religious sphere.  The implication being, of course, that those groups 
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not featuring ―Christian‖ in their titles were in some sense less authentically Christian, 
less proud of their heritage, or more adrift from the ―true‖ meaning of the label.  The 
choice to include ‗Christian‘ within one‘s title operates as another subtle cue or framing 
mechanism to potential recruits and other organizations as to the agenda, 
Table 22:  Distribution of Christian Activist Organizations by Religious Tradition 
Frequency Valid Percent Percent of 
Population 
(2005)* 
Difference 
Non/Multi-Denominational 122 26.5 15.1 11.4 
Unspecified 'Christian' 107 23.3 8.8 14.5 
Roman Catholic 91 19.8 21.3 -1.5 
Unknown 55 12.0 n/a n/a 
Unitarian-Universalist 12 2.6 1.3 1.3 
Presbyterian 11 2.4 4.1 -1.7 
Methodist 9 2.0 10.1 -8.1 
United Church of Christ 9 2.0 3.3 -1.3 
Other 9 2.0 2.5 -0.5 
Episcopalian 8 1.7 3.5 -1.8 
Society of Friends/Quaker 8 1.7 <1 0.8 
Lutheran 6 1.3 7.1 -5.8 
American Baptist 4 .9 1.1 -0.2 
Mennonite/Church of 
Brethren 
3 .7 <1 
0 
Southern Baptist 3 .7 12 -11.3 
 Latter Day Saints/Mormon 2 .4 3 -2.6 
Pentecostal 1 .2 1.5 -1.3 
Total 460 100.0 94.7 
* Source: Baylor Religion Survey, 2005
Green denotes over-representation.  Red denotes under-representation. 
mission, and identity of the organization, as well as pointing up the conspicuous absence 
of the label among competing groups, particularly on the left. 
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The healthy percentage of religious activist organizations identified here as 
―non/multi-denominational‖ relative to their size in the population is largely explained by 
the large number of groups with ecumenical or cross-boundary missions.  For example, 
frequently the largest or most successful organizations working on issues such as anti-
war, hunger, temperance, or anti-apartheid were those for whom denominational origins 
were irrelevant.  As a result, ecumenism in the social activism sector can safely be 
assumed as exaggerated, and bears only distal connections with actual religious 
ecumenism in the experience of American Christians.  
Finally, the disproportionately low numbers of activist groups originating from 
America‘s second largest denomination, the Southern Baptists, is somewhat surprising. 
However, it is important to note, as observed by many previous scholars, that not all 
sociopolitical activism by religious groups – or even most recently –emanates strictly 
from denominational bodies or authorities (Wuthnow, 1989; Lindsay, 2007; Scheitle, 
2007).  Therefore, though the Southern Baptists exhibit only modest official expressions 
in this dataset, their actual representation through para-church organizations such as the 
National Association of Evangelicals and Focus on the Family is likely very significant, 
though neither group are officially affiliated with any denomination. As a rule, then, these 
denominational affiliation data likely systematically underestimate actual denomination 
activism in the religious sphere; the fact that the relative proportions between this dataset 
and the actual population remain robust is reassuring and even somewhat unexpected.  
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Table 23:  Religious Tradition of Christian Activist Organizations by Ideological 
Orientation (Percent of each) 
Conservative Moderate Moderate-
Conservative 
Moderate-
Progressive 
Progressive 
 Indeterminate/Unknown 58.2 1.8 12.7 7.3 20.0 
Roman Catholic 16.5 4.4 8.8 31.9 38.5 
Lutheran 16.7 0 0 50.0 33.3 
Methodist 11.1 0 0 33.3 55.6 
Presbyterian 9.1 9.1 0 45.5 36.4 
Episcopalian 12.5 12.5 12.5 25.0 37.5 
Latter Day Saints/Mormon 0 0 0 50.0 50.0 
Society of Friends/Quaker 0 0 0 0 100.0 
United Church of Christ 22.2 0 0 33.3 44.4 
Unitarian-Universalist 0 8.3 0 16.7 75.0 
Non/Multi-Denominational 17.2 4.9 10.7 27.9 39.3 
Mennonite/Church of 
Brethren 
0 0 0 33.3 66.7 
Unspecified 'Christian' 62.6 4.7 11.2 9.3 12.1 
American Baptist 0 0 0 25.0 75.0 
Southern Baptist 66.7 0 33.3 0 0 
Pentecostal 0 0 0 0 100.0 
Other 0 11.1 11.1 55.6 22.2 
Table 23 rounds out the analysis of denominational affiliation by examining that 
variable through the lens of ideological orientation.  Again, as mentioned above, most 
organizations that self-identify as generically ―Christian‖ skew strongly toward the right 
end of the ideological spectrum, with nearly two-thirds of such groups coded as 
conservative or moderate-conservative.  Contrary to recent trends and perhaps popular 
perception, findings indicate a strong leftward lean among Roman Catholic activist 
groups, likely due to their several-decade headstart on economic and peace issues. As 
noted in the peace activist literature, Friends/Quakers exhibited uniformly progressive 
stances on social issues, most notably their activism against violence and nuclear 
weapons proliferation.  
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If conservative Christian groups clung proudly to their faith label, as these data 
indicate, a near opposite dynamic is observed on the left: a tendency for progressive 
groups to eschew such exclusive categories in favor of the all-encompassing, ecumenical 
descriptions.  Thus we find nearly two-thirds of organizations with non- or 
multidenominational identities clustered around the progressive and moderate-
progressive ideological orientations.  Closer examination reveals that these organizations 
are often indistinguishable from secular groups at first glance; it is only after careful 
reading of the mission and values of the group that one discerns their religious 
commitments. Also common among this category of organization is the subordination of 
religious identity (varieties of Protestantism, most often) to the issue objectives of the 
group.  For example, Bread for the World is one of the largest and longest-lived Christian 
activist organizations working on food security and anti-poverty solutions in the U.S.  Its 
membership represents the full diversity of American Christianity, and it has no 
denominational affiliation or majority.  With no prior knowledge or without considerable 
research, however, it is difficult to discern that Bread for the World is not one of many 
secular anti-hunger organizations. This difference regarding the degree to which 
Christian activists publicize their faith identity emerges in several locations with 
consequence throughout this study.  
The remainder of the findings from this table generally aligns with conventional 
expectations regarding the sociopolitical orientation of American Christian 
denominations.  
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ISSUES 
Viewed at the highest level of generality and aggregation, the issues which 
Christian activist groups engaged is striking in their diversity, yet simultaneously, their 
divergence.  At this level, we see firm evidence of what Martin Marty many decades 
dubbed the ―two-party system‖ in American Christianity, or what Hunter nearly 20 years 
ago called ―culture wars‖ – the stark bifurcation of the country‘s dominant religious 
tradition into camps clinging to ―orthodoxy‖ versus some variety of ―progressivism.‖ In 
the coding procedure utilized in this research, I consciously reify this dichotomy, but not 
without empirical reinforcement. To a significant degree, it only stands to reason that a 
study of religious activists would display such diametric, strident ideologies. Holding 
such views, either individually or collectively, could be argued as a minimum entry fee to 
the field of social activism altogether. Prospective members or recruits to movements 
self-select on the basis of strongly convicted positions, which often cluster around the 
poles of opinion.   
Table 24:  Ten Most Common Issues Among Christian Activist Groups, 1960-2000 
Issue 
Tota
l 
Approx. 
Orientation 
of Issue 
1. Peace/nonviolence/anti-militarism 469 P 
2. Moral decline/traditional values/family preservation/anti-gay 299 C 
3. Pro-life/anti-abortion/anti-contraception 227 C 
4. General social justice/social action 120 P 
4. Anti-racism/race relations 120 P 
5. Direct service/charity 106 M 
6. Women's rights/gender equality/pro-ERA/feminism 71 P 
7. Gay rights and advocacy 69 P 
8. Temperance/alcoholism 57 C 
9. Ecumenism 37 M 
10. Greater role of religion/theocracy 15 C 
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What is somewhat surprising about this data, however, is that the respective 
―families‖ of issues empirically represented are so divergent.  The familiar pattern 
identified by Marty and Hunter maintains. On the one hand, nearly half of all Christian 
activist organizations examined are to some degree active on issues which have 
historically been categorized as ―conservative,‖ ―traditionalist,‖ or ―orthodox.‖  These 
include preservation of the traditional family and its values, the general decline of 
traditional morality, opposition to homosexuality and sexual freedom of many sorts, so-
called ―life‖ issues, such as anti-abortion, anti-contraception, and anti-euthanasia, the 
preservation of traditional gender roles and the defeat of gender equality policies, and the 
prohibition of intoxicants, particularly alcohol and illegal drugs. If a common thread may 
be woven through these groups it is the idea that morality is primarily a personal, 
individual, or ―lifeworld-centered‖ concern. Sacred values, cherished practices, and 
significant modes of living are seen to emanate mainly from the formative, intimate, and 
primary social institutions of human life: sex, children, home, and family. Their defense, 
through religious activism if necessary, is judged to be essential for the maintenance of 
the civilization.  
By contrast, another 40 percent of Christian activist groups engaged issues with 
very different origins and trajectories in the social milieu. Often termed ―progressive,‖ 
―liberal,‖ or ―modernist,‖ these organizations were involved in social topics which 
clustered around a more ―socialized‖ notion of morality. Issues typically identified with 
such organizations include: civil rights and race relations, anti-war and nonviolence, 
gender equality, gay rights, and what has come to be known as ―social justice,‖ an 
imprecise, catch-all term typically including redistributive social welfare policy, non-
military foreign interventions, and more recently, ecological concern.  Among so-called 
Christian progressive organizations, the truly urgent moral transgressions in the world are 
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those occurring generally remotely, what Boltanski called ―suffering at a distance‖ 
(Boltanski, 2006). The problems considered are large in scope and complexity, have 
persisted for generations if not centuries, and generally involve massive social institutions 
with huge impersonal bureaucracies. Examples include the labor/capital problem, 
reduction of pollution and greenhouse gasses, political enfranchisement of marginalized 
social groups, or the prevention of total nuclear war. The key arena of moral action for 
leftist Christian groups, then, is more ―system-centered.‖   
This distinction, however, should not be overstated. Significantly, and not 
accidentally, the two sets of issues are set up as almost mirror images of each other. This 
is particularly true in the case of gender and homosexuality issues, and becomes more 
obvious in analysis presented below. It is imprecise, therefore, to state categorically that 
the two ―parties‖ of American Christianity simply see the sociopolitical world differently 
and thereby generate very different expressions of social activism based on those 
paradigms.  
A more accurate interpretation of the phenomenon, based on a careful 
examination of the data, is that these two very differently equipped branches of American 
Christianity are in a constant, iterative, and interactive dance. Frequently, organizational 
founding and emergence follows closely a perception of real or imagined threat to core 
values from the external environment, whether they be new laws or rulings, policies, or 
more informally, a feeling of increasing cultural endangerment. However, this data 
indicates that organizations may also emerge when they perceive that civil society, 
typically indicated by its discursive products, is becoming unbalanced by their 
ideological, political, or religious rivals. When confronted by the possibility that one‘s 
values, vision, or way of life might be drowned out by the action or speech of those who 
have already entered civil society – often in very public and influential ways – organized 
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religious action is likely to become more urgent. Seen in this way, ―threats‖ must be 
defined as residing both externally in the general sociopolitical environment, and intra-
organizationally (meso-level) within civil society itself.  
The dance itself, then, emerges as a rather improvised, game-like interaction, 
characterized by organizations intermittently cooperating and competing within and 
across sectors of civil society. The dominant pattern regarding the topic at hand -- issue 
sectors-- is as follows:  
Table 25:  Sector Dynamics Matrix 
Within issue 
sector 
Across issue 
sector 
Cooperation  Rare Common 
Competition     Common Rare 
The findings provide very few instances of Christian activist groups cooperating 
across the ideological chasm that runs through the middle of American political culture, 
and described famously by Marty, Hunter, and others. This divide appears to be a 
durable, and I argue, even necessary feature of society and culture, though its specific 
location and boundaries shift dramatically over time.  
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Table 26:  Change in Issue Dominance Among Christian Activist Organizations, 1960-
2000   (Number of organizations, rank, and change in rank) 
This rather intimidating table (Table 26) requires substantial explanation and 
summation.  It displays the relative prevalence of the top 29 issue niches among Christian 
activist organizations that were active during each of the four decades examined. The 
table permits a longitudinal snapshot of how many religious activist groups engaged each 
ISSUE
# of 
Groups
Rank
# of 
Groups
Rank
Change 
in Rank
# of 
Groups
Rank
Change in 
Rank
# of 
Groups
Rank
Change in 
Rank
# of 
Groups
Rank
Change in 
Rank
  Anti-communism 10 14 42 11 3 58 14 -3 0 21 -7 13 21 0
  Anti-modernism//anti-secular/anti-atheism 9 15 54 7 8 97 5 2 89 10 -5 15 20 -10
  Anti-poverty/urban renewal 0 21 22 20 1 0 21 -1 0 22 -1 10 23 -1
  Anti-racism/race relations 37 2 100 2 0 69 12 -10 76 15 -3 19 11 4
  Civil rights/racial justice 22 6 62 3 3 86 9 -6 82 11 -2 20 10 1
  Conscientious objection/anti-draft 15 9 45 9 0 47 20 -11 0 23 -3 8 24 -1
  Conservative/traditional theology, Anti-WCC 0 29 23 19 10 0 22 -3 0 24 -2 8 25 -1
  Conservative: General/smaller government 0 22 0 21 1 0 23 -2 62 20 3 19 12 8
  Direct service/charity, maternal support, childcare 14 10 45 10 0 75 11 -1 145 3 8 41 3 0
  Economic development//foreign aid 7 19 39 12 7 0 24 -12 82 12 12 21 9 3
  Economic justice/social welfare 12 12 26 16 -4 66 13 3 70 18 -5 16 18 0
  Ecumenism 14 11 59 4 7 58 15 -11 81 13 2 18 14 -1
  Foreign policy/foreign relations/trade 8 17 0 22 -5 49 19 3 92 9 10 17 17 -8
  Gay rights and advocacy 0 23 0 23 0 51 17 6 75 17 0 19 13 4
  Greater role of religion/theocracy 20 7 50 8 -1 93 7 1 105 6 1 29 6 0
  Human rights/anti-torture/POWs/amnesty 0 24 0 24 0 90 8 16 99 7 1 24 8 -1
  Latin America/Central America/land reform 0 25 0 25 0 0 25 0 68 19 6 12 22 -3
  Missions/evangelism 9 16 28 15 1 0 26 -11 0 25 1 8 26 -1
  Moral decline/traditional family preservation/anti-gay 27 3 56 6 -3 121 2 4 183 2 0 52 1 1
  Nuclear arms/disarmament 0 26 0 26 0 56 16 10 81 14 2 16 19 -5
  Obscenity/anti-porn/decency 7 20 0 27 -7 0 27 0 0 26 1 7 28 -2
  Peace/nonviolence/anti-militarism 50 1 126 1 0 157 1 0 191 1 0 44 2 -1
  Pro-life/anti-abortion/anti-contraception 0 27 0 28 -1 116 4 24 141 4 0 40 4 0
  Religious freedom/church-state boundary 11 13 26 17 -4 50 18 -1 76 16 2 18 15 1
  Sabbath protection 8 18 0 29 -11 0 28 1 0 27 1 3 29 -2
  Social action: General/Social Justice 25 4 58 5 -1 121 3 2 127 5 -2 30 5 0
  Social teaching dissemination/CST 24 5 35 13 -8 81 10 3 0 28 -18 18 16 12
  Temperance/alcoholism 19 8 35 14 -6 0 29 -15 0 29 0 8 27 2
  Women’s rights/feminism/ERA 0 28 25 18 10 97 6 12 97 8 -2 28 7 1
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000
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major issue per decade, and how these patterns shifted over time. Rank ordering of 
groups-per-issue was used in order to provide a standardized measure of dominance, as 
group frequencies alone would be unadjusted for the growing overall size of the activist 
population.  
We observe four major trends in issue niche data from 1960-2000.  First, as 
confirmed using other indicators, peace, anti-militarism, and nonviolence was until very 
recently the issue most engaged by Christian activist organizations.  Its prevalence 
remained high, steady, and generally far ahead of the nearest issue niche.  Part of the 
reason for its popularity no doubt stems from the issue‘s ability to syncretically fit in 
rather seamlessly with other similar issues, such as economic justice or race relations.  
Second, several issue niches did not exist for all practical purposes in the activist sector 
until the 1980s, such as anti-nuclear, pro-life, gay rights, and human rights activism. 
After the 1980s, these niches solidified their position and never faded from the top ranks.  
This sudden appearance of these rather large activist sectors roughly corresponds to 
events in the external political environment, but not perfectly. As Goodwin & Jasper 
(1999), Benford & Snow (2000), Sewell (2005), and Becker (1995) have observed, there 
is nothing automatic about the translation of objective historical events, such as the 
increase in stockpiled U.S. nuclear weapons, into social movements. This complex 
cultural process requires the active and often emotional engagement of human actors 
transforming ―happenings‖ into ―outrages‖ and ―transgressions.‖ That is, it is nothing less 
than the artful rendering of subjective meanings around inert objective things, the essence 
of human cultural activity.  
Third, a number of issue niches which began the 1960s atop the activism rankings 
ended the 20
th
 century near the bottom, or heavily compromised.  This pattern was true
for civil rights and race relations, ecumenism, missions, social teaching dissemination, 
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and temperance. The reasons for these declines are diverse; no underlying cause explains 
them all. However, a few major factors appear to account for most of the declines. One of 
the most significant reasons is also one of the most unlikely: success. In the case of civil 
rights, and ecumenism, the achievement of many of the explicit aims of the movements, 
such as the passage of federal laws and the reduction in many forms of intrareligious 
animosity, led to the natural decline in support for related enterprises and groups. 
Another major reason for the gradual erosion of these niches is what is colloquially 
referred to as ―withering on the vine‖ referring to a slow, but willful neglect of the niche 
by resource-suppliers. For example, the dissemination of social teaching, particularly in 
the Roman Catholic Church, was for 30 years a central mainstay feature of the mission of 
the American Christian churches.  After the 1970s, funds, personnel, and facilities were 
removed from social teaching formulation and dissemination per se and rechanneled into 
purposes seen as higher priority. For the Protestant churches, this higher priority was 
frequently membership retention and facilities maintenance. For Catholics, it was often 
support for the incipient right-to-life movement, either through official church or para-
church outlets.  For temperance, the dynamic at play is the polar opposite of that seen in 
the civil rights case. Whereas the work of the SCLC and other Christian groups active on 
race relations had succeeded in gently aligning the moral compass and symbol system of 
the mainstream political culture with their own, slightly newer and more inclusive 
definition of equality and freedom, the anti-intoxicant movements of the 20
th
 century
found few takers for their moral vision. If anything, the profoundly anti-establishment era 
of the 1960s-1970s ushered in an age when experimentation with altered states of 
consciousness was not only commonplace, but welcomed, even expected.  More 
importantly, anti-intoxicant reformers of the 20
th
 century were burdened by the failures of
their Prohibition-era predecessors, and had not substantially innovated their ―ban it‖ 
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approach to the new powerful drugs of the time.  As a result, their overall influence 
within the Christian activist sector of the late 20
th
 century was a mere shadow of their
sway in the 19
th
.
Finally, and contrary to some popular descriptions, activism around moral decline 
and traditional values has been a regular and dominant feature of American Christian 
activism since at least the 1960s.  The main change over the period has been the gradual 
increase in the sector share of this niche, emerging finally as the top ranked issue by the 
year 2000. But there is no evidence that concern about the traditional family, sexuality, 
and a nebulous erosion in moral codes is a product of only the last approximately twenty 
years, when Christian conservatives achieved unprecedented visibility and influence in 
electoral politics.  
Further supports for these findings are provided through the supplemental analysis 
below: 
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Table 27: Five Most Common Issues Among Christian Activist Organizations, By 
Decade 
1960-1969 1970-1979 
Issue Frequency Issue Frequency 
1. Peace/nonviolence/antimilitarism 46 1. Peace/nonviolence/antimilitarism 114 
2. Anti-racism/race relations 37 2. Anti-racism/race relations 83 
3. Temperance/alcoholism 22 3. Moral decline/traditional values/anti-gay 38 
3. Moral decline/traditional values/anti-gay 22 4. Ecumenism 37 
4. Greater role of religion/theocracy 15 5. Temperance/alcoholism 35 
5. General social justice/social action 12 307 
154 
 1980-1989  1990-1999 
Issue Frequency Issue Frequency 
1. Peace/nonviolence/antimilitarism 145 1. Peace/nonviolence/antimilitarism 164 
2. General social justice/social action 108 2. Moral decline/traditional values/anti-gay 160 
3. Pro-life/anti-abortion/anti-contraception 99 3. Pro-life/anti-abortion/anti-contraception 128 
4. Moral decline/traditional values/anti-gay  79 4. Direct service/charity 106 
5. Women's rights/feminism/gender equality/pro-ERA 71 5. Gay rights and advocacy 69 
502 627 
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Table 28:  Proportion of Christian Activist Groups Per Issue Niche by Decade 
Tables 27-28 and Figure 21 are particularly useful in summarizing the relative 
distribution of Christian activist groups among the major issue niches over the four 
decades examined.  Many of the patterns here confirm findings from previous analysis, 
such as the fairly stable presence of peace activism, as well as the precipitous decline of 
civil rights and temperance activism.  Prominent in this table, however, is the fact that the 
two largest issue niches in the 1990s– moral decline and pro-life activism – come from 
the conservative side of ideological spectrum. Thirty years prior, that statement could not 
be made, as the sector was dominated by peace groups, general social justice activists, 
and those struggling for better relations between the races.  The ―public agenda‖ of 
religious social activists changed significantly in these four decades, and with it, the 
1960s* 1970s* 1980s* 1990s* 
  Anti-modernism/fundamentalist/anti-
secular/anti-atheism 
3.7% 4.4% 5.3% 2.9% 
 Anti-racism/race relations 8.2% 7.8% 3.5% 2.0% 
 Civil rights/racial justice 2.9% 5.1% 4.1% 3.4% 
 Gay rights and advocacy 1.9% 3.5% 6.7% 
 Greater role of religion/theocracy 5.6% 4.8% 4.5% 4.9% 
  Moral decline/traditional family 
preservation/anti-gay 
7.6% 5.4% 6.3% 8.3% 
 Peace/nonviolence/anti-militarism 15.2% 16.1% 11.3% 7.0% 
 Pro-life/anti-abortion/anti-contraception 1.7% 4.7% 7.8% 
 Religious freedom/church-state boundary 3.8% 3.6% 4.0% 4.5% 
 Social action: General/Social Justice 11.7% 8.1% 6.2% 4.9% 
 Social teaching dissemination/CST 5.9% 3.5% 3.1% 2.3% 
 Temperance/alcoholism 7.6% 5.4% 3.3% 2.4% 
  Women’s rights/feminism/gender 
equality/ERA 
1.8% 3.2% 5.8% 5.3% 
*Rolling averages
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concomitant relative influence of groups distributed at different points along the 
ideological spectrum.  
Figure 21:  Changes in Issue Niche Among Christian Activist Organizations, 1960-2000 
Also significant, and most obviously displayed in Figure 21, is the trend toward 
issue diversification over time.  Whereas a handful of issue niches such as peace, general 
social justice and moral decline dominated the Christian activist sphere in the 1960s, 
together representing more than 35% of all Christian activism, by the 1990s, a greater 
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diversity of niches was present, the dominance of the Big Three having been diluted 
among several smaller, more focused, and more post-scarcity/lifeworld concerns than in 
prior decades.  
Table 29:  Twenty Most Prevalent Issue Niches Among Christian Activist Groups 
Formed 1975-1985 
Issue Niche Percent 
Moral decline/traditional families/anti-gay 12.7 
Pro-life/anti-abortion 7.7 
Gay rights and advocacy 7.2 
Latin America/Central America 6.6 
Peace/nonviolence/anti-militarism 6.6 
Religious freedom/church-state issues 5.0 
Women’s rights/gender equality 3.9 
Greater role of religion/theocracy 3.3 
Human rights/amnesty/POWs 3.3 
Civil rights/racial justice 2.8 
General conservative/smaller government 2.8 
General social justice 2.8 
Anti-modernism/anti-secular 2.2 
Creationism 2.2 
Hunger/food safety 2.2 
Media reform/media violence 2.2 
Anti-communism 1.7 
Korea/Taiwan/Philippines 1.7 
Nuclear arms/disarmament 1.7 
Prison reform/criminal justice  1.7 
Figure 21, a chart displaying founding dates of organizations by ideological 
orientation shows a significant spike in foundings between 1975 and 1985.  What kind of 
organizations were these? Why so many at this time?   
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 Table 29 assists in answering these questions.  One of the major hypotheses of 
this research was that ideologically-inflected Christian activism – here defined as 
progressive or conservative –would anticipate rather than follow larger trends in 
American politics. The above table also provides one strong piece of evidence to support 
this hypothesis.  
There is wide consensus amongst political scientists and comparative political 
sociologists that the 1980s represents one of most conservative periods in American 
political history, both fiscally and socially.  The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the 
full implementation of neo-liberal economics and aggressive privatization, a full-bore 
attack on obscenity and intoxicants, and an unabashed linking of American destiny with 
Christian themes were central features of this period, which lingered well into the early 
1990s as well.  
The data above indicate that seeds for this epochal transformation in institutional 
politics may have begun in the civil sphere, led by Christian activists.  Thirty-seven 
percent of all Christian activist organizations formed between 1975 and 1985 were either 
active on moral decline/traditional values or pro-life issues.  Given that the Reagan 
administration made both of these issues cornerstones of both rhetoric and policy during 
its tenure, it is reasonable to conclude that the heavy preliminary activism conservative 
Christians in civil society some five to eight years prior was instrumental in cultivating 
the electoral political environment conducive to his victory.  In so doing, they not only 
created tactical political opportunities for their own immediate movement ends, such as 
increasing  awareness about the decline of the traditional family, or protesting abortion 
clinics, but also created longer-term strategic opportunities vis a vis greater access to 
institutional power in the federal government. A political exchange had occurred: 
Christian conservatives mobilized to ensure that the best representative of their political 
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vision was elected president, greatly expanding and improving the efficiency of the 
grassroots political campaign. In exchange, representatives of major conservative 
Christian groups would expect and receive unprecedented access to the halls of power 
once Reagan was elected. Lindsay (2008) describes a similar process occurring preceding 
and during the George W. Bush administration as well, though by that time, two decades 
later, the diversity, size, and durability of religious-political networks had increased 
dramatically.  
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TACTICS 
The analysis of tactical repertoires is essential for any serious investigation of 
social movements. One of the fundamental lessons of 20
th
 century collective action
research was that transitions in the tactics employed by activists represent key moments 
in evolution of the movements involved, but also relate to larger social forces (Tilly, 
1975). As such, these tactical shifts can be seen as markers or shortcuts permitting 
analysts to better contextualize and understand macro-historical conditions of the period.  
The longitudinal design of this research and its careful measurement of tactics employed 
by each organization allows for clear insight into these shifts and what the might indicate 
about the changing political landscapes of each era.  
Table 30:  Frequencies of Tactics Used by Christian Activist Organizations,  Cross-
Sectional 
 TACTIC NAME FREQUENCY 
 Public awareness, consciousness raising 1822 
 Legislation/public policy 943 
 Church outreach 766 
 Research 732 
 Training/leadership training/workshops 684 
 Lobbying 534 
 Seminars/conferences, forums 523 
 Federation/central organization/coordination 506 
 Coalition building 466 
 Speakers 391 
 Media outreach 380 
 Community organizing/grassroots organizing/civic 
engagement 351 
 Publications, clearinghouse 302 
 Litigation/legal defense/legal support 237 
 Political organizing/political action 225 
 Advocacy 217 
 Direct action/boycotts/civil disobedience 184 
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 Youth outreach/youth training/youth ministry 168 
 Protest/rallies/marches 162 
 Media ministry 137 
 Financial support/grantmaking 122 
 Prayer 121 
 Mobilization 84 
 Technical assistance 84 
 Official resolutions 82 
 Retreats 61 
 Parallel institutions 40 
 Vigils 28 
 Divestment 21 
 Fasting 18 
Table 30 shows the overwhelming use of what I termed ―public awareness and 
consciousness-raising‖ tactics by Christian activist groups. The tactical category included 
any effort to educate, inform, alert, or raise visibility of the main issue or causes of the 
organization.  In an important sense, this is the minimum criterion for any social 
movement. No awareness, no activism. As a result, almost every group included this 
tactic within their repertoire.  
Somewhat surprising, though, was the next most used tactic, that of legislative 
and public policy engagement. This tactic includes bill tracking and monitoring, 
legislative analysis, and calls to action directed at constituents.  Such a high level of 
interest in and activism directed toward governmental decision-making supports the 
general arguments of state-centered theorists, and in conjunction with other findings 
below regarding the decline of conventional protest tactics, suggests a fundamental 
transformation in the way American Christians directed their activism during the last four 
decades of the 20
th
 century. The general trend appears to be toward the support and
maintenance of a small, bureaucratized class of professional activists, often located in 
Washington, D.C., who focus their energies on the creation and promotion of public 
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policy that is in line with the moral vision of constituents (Skocpol & Fiorina, 2000). 
Organizationally, the outcome is often groups in which the obligations of membership are 
little more than making annual donations to support the expert legislative analysis 
conducted by a handful of professionals. These experts may or may not share the 
religious views of the sponsoring organization. More significantly, the emphasis on direct 
action, grassroots mobilization, and local involvement is gradually if not radically 
vanished. Social-structurally, the final result is a high degree of isomorphism between the 
federal state and civil society (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983).  Further analysis reveals that 
these processes did not happen uniformly, however, and the internal tactical variations 
within the sector correlated with greater or lesser success in the larger political sphere.  
Another significant feature in Table 30 is the rather frequent use of church 
outreach, which I defined as efforts by Christian activist groups to deliver their 
sociopolitical messages to individual houses of worship, with the intent of winning their 
support either as a church or as individual members. Church outreach may be seen as a 
uniquely religious form of grassroots mobilization in which persuasive and recruitment 
oriented messages must be framed in resonant Christian symbols and values. Typically 
church outreach occurs within fairly homophilous religious families; Roman Catholics, 
for example, are not likely to conduct outreach to Southern Baptists because of numerous 
theological and sociological barriers made more impassable by history. Church outreach 
may also be viewed as a religious mode of social networking. In the last ten to 15 years, 
social movement scholars have recognized the central role of network structures as the 
very nerve fibers that give rise to and animate collective action.  In the field of religious 
social activism, the nodes (or neurons, keeping with the organism metaphor) are 
churches. Interconnected churches sharing information, personnel, values, and a utopian 
vision appear at the core of each instance of successful religious activism, such as the 
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Civil Rights movement and the New Christian Right. Such church networks are also 
often in the midst of successful activism of any sort, such as the triumphs of the Industrial 
Areas Foundation and the United Farm Workers of America in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Table 31:  Ranked Frequency of Tactics with Changes in Rankings, 1961-2000 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000 Variance Pattern 
ISSUE NAME Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
 Legislation/public policy 2 2 2 3 3 0.3 
 Public awareness, consciousness 
raising 
1 1 1 1 1 0 
 Research 13 9 3 2 2 24.7 + 
 Speakers 20 18 12 8 7 34 + 
 Seminars/conferences, forums 5 11 6 6 6 5.7 
 Training/leadership training/workshops 6 5 5 5 5 0.2 
 Media outreach 18 6 8 13 14 23.2 + 
 Media ministry 19 19 19 21 19 0.8 
 Publications, clearinghouse 9 15 14 11 11 6 
 Coalition building 4 4 10 10 10 10.8 - 
 Church outreach 3 3 7 4 4 2.7 
 Community organizing/grassroots 
organizing/civic engagement 
8 7 11 12 13 6.7 - 
 Political organizing/political action 16 17 13 15 17 2.8 
 Financial support/grantmaking 7 22 23 17 21 43 - 
 Federation/central 
organization/coordination 
10 8 9 9 9 0.5 
 Protest/rallies/marches 22 20 15 18 23 10.3 +/- 
 Direct action/boycotts/civil disobedience 11 13 18 20 20 17.3 - 
 Advocacy 14 14 20 14 12 9.2 -/+ 
 Litigation/legal defense/legal support 15 12 16 16 16 3 
 Youth outreach/youth training/youth 
ministry 
17 16 17 19 18 1.3 
 Lobbying 12 10 4 7 8 9.2 + 
 Mobilization 24 24 21 25 22 2.7 
 Divestment 26 29 26 29 30 3.5 - 
 Official resolutions 21 25 22 26 27 6.7 - 
 Prayer 25 21 24 22 15 15.3 + 
 Vigils 27 27 28 27 28 0.3 
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 Fasting 28 30 29 30 29 0.7 
 Technical assistance 23 23 27 23 24 3 
 Retreats 29 28 25 24 25 4.7 + 
 Parallel institutions 30 26 30 28 26 4 + 
Using a slightly different technique, Table 31 shows the change in aggregate 
tactical preferences over the four decades examined. It also reports a measure of variance 
across the years, and an indication of general pattern, if one was observed. Outstanding in 
this table is the extraordinary growth in popularity of research and media outreach as 
activist tactics.  Why might these have increased?  One reasonable hypothesis is that the 
overall level of societal penetration by mass media increased dramatically during this 
period, particularly by broadcast media, thus necessitating that Christian activist groups 
adapt their repertoires by adding press relations departments, developing media kits and 
press releases, and incorporating media framing as part of their everyday routines. Failing 
to accommodate to such changes as cable television, 24-hour broadcasting, and the 
Internet would result in certain decline in influence relative to those organizations which 
did adapt.  The explanation for the expansion in research as a tactic fits hand in hand with 
this hypothesis.  In addition to providing the raw material needed for the first and most 
important tactic of Christian activist groups – public awareness – research conducted by 
the organization provides it with enhanced access to media outlets through the provision 
of objective information. Reports, books, fact sheets, ―report cards,‖ raw data, and 
surveys may be released to news organizations as background for communications 
designed to also enhance the public visibility and influence of the activist group.  Such 
information may also be used as direct communication or premiums to members, 
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constituents, and potential recruits. Through the rise of tactics such as media outreach and 
in-house research, and the decline of civil disobedience and direct action (which 
plummeted nine points in the ranks from 1960-2000), many Christian activist 
organizations took on the character of think-tanks rather than protesters in the years after 
1985. 
Finally, what of the specifically religious character of these organizations?  
Included in the list of tactics are approaches and techniques that a social movement 
analyst would not find in the repertoire of a garden-variety protest group. These include: 
prayer, fasting, retreats, vigils, media ministry1, and youth ministry2.  With the exception 
of church outreach, none of these uniquely religious tactics registered in the top half of 
frequency of use among all Christian activist groups.  Conventional, tried-and-true tactics 
commonly found amongst similar secular activists, such workshops, community 
organizing, and lobbying dominated the repertoires of this population of religious 
activists as well. Unmeasured through the methodology of this study, however, is the 
high probability of the religious inflection of otherwise secular tactics. For example, the 
specific content of leadership training sponsored by a Christian activist group such as Pax 
Christi may take on a ―discipleship‖ motif, which would entail different emotional and 
symbolic resonances than a similar training held by Amnesty International, which does 
not as easily elicit feelings of sacred duty, even though many secular activists may also 
be privately religious. My preliminary analysis of organizational descriptions provided by 
the Encyclopedia of Associations suggests that the fusion of religious language and 
1 A ―media ministry‖ is defined as mass media outlets owned and operated solely by the Christian activist 
group, such as television and radio stations, or Christian-oriented film and audio-cassette manufacturing 
facilities.  
2 ―Youth ministry‖ is defined as Christian-oriented outreach to people under the age of 18, usually with an 
explicit purpose of influencing their moral and ethical values.  Subtle sociopolitical messages are often 
included as well.  
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symbolism with tactics shared with secular activists is widespread, if not pervasive. Thus, 
the actual level of ―religiousness‖ of tactics used by Christian activists is likely under-
estimated when measured though raw frequency counts of manifest tactics.  
Table 32:  Tactical Preferences of Christian Activist Groups by Ideological Orientation, 
Cross-Sectional 
Conservative 
Moderate-
Conservative 
Moderate 
Moderate-
Progressive 
Progressive 
Legislation/public policy 10% 13% 0% 8% 11% 
Public awareness/consciousness 
raising 
24% 19% 24% 20% 22% 
Research 6% 10% 10% 6% 10% 
Speakers 1% 8% 0% 3% 3% 
Seminars/conferences 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 
Training/workshops 4% 6% 10% 9% 5% 
Media outreach 8% 4% 10% 3% 1% 
Media ministry 1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 
Publications/clearinghouse 3% 0% 5% 2% 0% 
Coalition-building 1% 0% 10% 5% 5% 
Church outreach 1% 10% 5% 8% 4% 
Community/grassroots organizing 3% 0% 5% 3% 4% 
Political organizing/political action 5% 0% 5% 2% 1% 
Financial support/grantmaking 0% 0% 5% 2% 3% 
Federation/coordination 7% 2% 5% 11% 4% 
Protest/rallies/marches 2% 0% 0% 2% 3% 
Direct action//civil disobedience 2% 2% 0% 1% 6% 
Advocacy 0% 2% 0% 2% 3% 
Litigation/legal defense 1% 8% 0% 2% 1% 
Youth outreach/youth training 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 
Lobbying 8% 4% 0% 0% 6% 
Mobilization 3% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Official resolutions 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 
Prayer 2% 4% 0% 3% 1% 
Technical assistance 0% 0% 5% 2% 1% 
Retreats 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Perhaps the most telling findings relate to the distribution of tactics across the 
ideological spectrum, displayed in Table 32.  Supporting the findings of Diamond (1995) 
and scholars from the resource mobilization school is the significant investment in 
communications-related tactics by conservative Christian activists, especially when 
examined in comparison to their ideological counterparts.  Right-leaning groups had a 
ten-fold advantage over progressive activists in media outreach, while media ministry 
was unknown amongst left-leaning Christian organizations.  Part of this cluster of 
findings can be explained by the long tradition of effective use of mass communications 
by traditionalist and evangelical Christian groups, be they political or merely religious.  
Evangelism is a ―ministry of the Word,‖ and the word cannot be conveyed without an 
adequate medium. Over the course of the 20
th
 century, this medium has taken the form of
prevailing technologies of the period: leaflets, tracts, radio, record albums, and more 
recently, television and digital media.  The considerable communications infrastructure 
set in place for evangelistic purposes was readily adapted for sociopolitical activism as 
the need presented itself during moments of mobilization.  
Also apparent from this table is the significant preference for political organizing 
among conservative Christian groups compared to progressive groups.  Such a 
willingness to engage in traditional institutional political methods – voter registration, 
candidate forums, and even the occasional risky endorsement – is a relatively recent 
phase in the relationship between traditionalist Christians and the state. More 
significantly, this bolder posture toward the political process greatly facilitated the efforts 
of parties and candidates to cultivate this large and attractive voting bloc, a strategy 
which began in earnest in the late 1970s, and to great effect.  
In contrast to this more electoral-focus of political action, progressive Christian 
groups displayed much higher use of conventional direct action tactics, including civil 
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disobedience, boycotts, and strikes. As noted above, the general trend toward a 
―professional lobbyist‖ model in Christian activism affected both ends of the ideological 
spectrum fairly equally. However, these additional findings taken as a whole indicate that 
progressive groups maintained more of a connection to conventional street-level, public 
tactics than their conservative rivals, while conservatives continued their established 
commitment to mass communication and outreach, though repurposed for partially 
political ends. In summary, both trajectories point to a type of path-dependent process in 
which present and future tactical repertoires are constrained to some degree by their own 
idiosyncratic yet explicable past incarnations.  
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EXOGENOUS FACTORS 
Social movements, including those motivated by religious conviction, do not 
occur in a hermetic environment, sealed off from forces and influences at play in the 
general social system. Quite the opposite, in fact; social movements could be argued to be 
among the most reactive and quickly responsive of social phenomena. In fact, the entire 
perspective that has come to be known as ―structuralism‖ in political sociology is based 
on the premise that causes of collective action are rarely found within the mechanisms 
and dynamics of civil society per se, but rather naturally emerge as the consequence of 
forces of much larger scope and longer duration. These are usually found in demographic 
patterns, long-term economic changes, international relationships, or dramatic shifts in 
elite political arrangements.  
In order to determine if the changes in Christian activism described above could 
be related to such ―structuralist‖ factors, I obtained data measuring the more common 
exogenous explanations. These include such general demographic changes such as 
educational attainment in the society; macroeconomic conditions such as recession, 
political environment variables such as voter turnout; political party of the President, 
state factors such as amount of spending by and personnel employed by government, and 
religious factors such as changes in Christian denominational membership over time.  
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Figure 22: Proportion of Americans with College Degree, 1960-2000 
(Source: American National Election Study cumulative file, 1948-2004) 
EDUCATION 
Educational attainment is one of the few exogenous variables that appears to 
correspond well with the general linear increase in the Christian activist organization 
population from 1960-2000, as depicted in the first table in this section. Specifically, 
social movement scholars, particularly those from the resource mobilization school, have 
emphasized the importance of college education in the emergence of social movements in 
the modern era (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Melucci, 1980).  Universities, they argue, 
provide both the intellectual fodder, tight-knit, easily-mobilized social networks and 
concentrated physical environments which have time and again been instrumental in the 
127 
formation of large-scale activism around the world.  The Paris uprisings in 1968, Prague 
Spring, and the U.S. anti-war movements are but a few significant examples of this 
process in action.  
Even with education, however, the match is only approximate.  The percentage of 
Americans with a college degree doubled quickly in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, no 
doubt partially a lagged consequence of the draft for the Vietnam War. However, at the 
dawn of the 1980s, the proportion of American with a bachelor‘s degree fell again and 
did not rise dramatically again until the early 1990s. In contrast, the 1980s was a period 
of explosive growth in the population of Christian activist groups. Overall, therefore the 
patterns between the two phenomena are roughly congruous, the educational attainment 
pattern is more discontinuous, showing more frequent volatility.  
EXTERNAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES 
Factors related to the institutional political environment have also frequently been 
theorized as important in the emergence and character of social movements, particularly 
from those stressing political opportunity structures (Tarrow, 2011; McAdam, McCarthy, 
& Zald, 1996; Skocpol, 1979).  The general thrust of these arguments is that popular 
discontent alone is relatively constant and nonetheless insufficient to bring about 
collective action. Favorable configurations of the national government, civil society as a 
whole, or the global political arena, among other entities, provide movements the 
structural opportunities they require to achieve any measureable degree of success and 
sustained influence. Frequently mentioned in this list of political institutional factors are 
party control of the federal legislature or presidency, voter turnout, and state capacity and 
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reach, measured in employed personnel and spending.  Findings related to these factors 
are summarized in the tables and paragraphs below.  
Figure 23:  Voter Turnout, 1960-2000 
(Source: Current Population Survey Historical Time Series Tables, 2008) 
As Figure 23 illustrates, voter turnout over the period examined has steadily 
declined, though for the two general elections since 2000, it has increased to over 60% 
among the voting-eligible population.  Nevertheless this pattern is directly opposite that 
of the Christian activist population, which saw linear, if not meteoric growth during the 
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period. During the years when most Christian activist groups were founded and expanded 
– the late 1970s to early 1980s – voter turnout was unremarkable and even in slow
decline.  These findings find no support for any positive linkage between willingness to 
participate in the electoral process through voting and the emergence of Christian activist 
groups in civil society. In fact, more support is found for the reverse hypothesis, whereby 
general dissatisfaction with the mainstream political process results both in low voter 
participation and willingness to found or join social movements, including those with a 
religious orientation.  In this way, activism could truly be described as ―politics by other 
means.‖ 
One of the more precise measures of political opportunity structures is 
ascertaining which political party holds the office of the Presidency (Amenta, 2000; 
Meyer, 2004).  The background hypothesis here is that political opportunities will 
increase for social movements whose agendas, ideologies, and visions most closely align 
with this party, despite considerable variation between individual presidents of the same 
party. Thus, generally in the United States, conservative or traditionalist social 
movements would be expected to prosper under Republican presidents, while liberal or 
radical movements should experience expanding opportunities under Democrats. 
Figures 24-25 display the percentage of progressive and conservative Christian 
activist organizations over time (green line) in relation to the political party of the sitting 
president (red or blue bars).  The vertical dimension of the bar is merely an artifact of the 
dichotomous coding system, and has no quantitative meaning.  
Overall, progressive Christian activist organizations showed a steady share, 
approximately 33% of the total religious activist sector, regardless of the party of the 
president.  Findings indicate slight peaks of about 5 percentage points in the early 1960s, 
coinciding with the Kennedy administration, and in the mid-1970s during the Nixon 
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administration.  The apex of left-Christian activism occurred during the Carter-Ford years 
of the late 1970s. Beginning with Reagan and through George H. W. Bush, progressive 
Christians experienced a gradual decline in share. Somewhat surprisingly, the lowest 
percent of progressive Christian groups since 1961 was in 1998, during the sympathetic 
President Clinton‘s administration. As a result, it is difficult to identify clear, consistent 
evidence for the party of the president assisting or hindering the relative prevalence of 
progressive Christian activists.  A more defensible hypothesis is that a third variable, the 
overall political mood of the electorate/mass public during given periods, was influencing 
both religious activist fortunes and presidential choices.  However, there is some  
Figure 24:  Proportion of Progressive Christian Groups by Party of President 
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 evidence that sustained periods of presidency control by one party affects religious 
activist mobilization in predictable patterns, as seen during the Democratic party 
dominance of the 1960s corresponding to progressive Christian growth, and the 
Republican control during the 1980s correlating with a slow decrease in left-leaning 
Christian activism.  
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Figure 25:  Proportion of Conservative Christian Activist Groups by Party of President 
Conservative Christian activists, on the other hand, displayed greater levels of 
volatility in sector share with respect to party of the president.  Whereas the general 
pattern among progressive Christian groups has been stability, the pattern for their 
counterparts on the right has been linear growth.  This overall and consistent increase 
among conservative groups held true regardless of party of the president. The most 
remarkable feature of this data is the explosive increase in sector share corresponding 
with the ―Reagan Revolution.‖  It is crucial to notice that the growth began well before 
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the actual election of Reagan in 1980, in the 1978-1979 period.  This finding is in concert 
without the results of previous scholars who have argued that the Reagan election would 
have been impossible with the unprecedented grassroots political mobilization of millions 
of conservative Christians beginning in the late 1970s (Johnson, 1982; Diamond, 1989).  
The contribution of this present study to that line of analysis is to specify exactly which 
groups were instrumental in this mobilization, what tactics were deployed to affect the 
successful outcome, and to suggest a general theory that religious activist action may 
frequently precede and assist in large scale political transformations such as this one. 
Interestingly, the second most dramatic upsurge in conservative Christian activism 
occurred with the election of Democrat Bill Clinton in 1992.  This phenomenon, in 
contrast to the previous upsurge corresponding to a sympathetic political party, appears to 
point to political or ideological threat being equally as important in mobilizing religious 
activism. In this instance, however, there is no evidence that conservative Christian 
groups began to mobilize at a greater level of intensity prior to Clinton‘s election, as 
observed prior to Reagan‘s election. As a result, the late 1970s mobilization can best be 
interpreted as not mainly an effort to create a groundswell voting bloc sufficient to elect 
Reagan, but instead as a cultural and religious counter-movement to what traditionalist 
Christians perceived to be a 20 year assault on their most cherished moral values and 
institutions.  The effects in electoral politics were significant and enduring, but I argue, 
quite incidental to the original aims of the mobilization.  In this way, then, both the 
Clinton-era peak and the pre-Reagan peak are best interpreted as threat-motivated 
responses, I argue,  rather than opportunity-motivated responses, as claimed by 
mainstream structuralist theory (Tilly, 2001).   
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SIZE OF THE STATE 
Political sociologists have also maintained that movements within civil society 
may be a reflection of forces and processes occurring within the state itself.  These ―state-
centered‖ theorists argue, in a manner similar to structuralists generally, that the 
opportunities for movements to emerge and  
Figure 26:  Government Employment by Sector, 1960-2000 
 
Source: 1940-2002, Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, 
Historical Tables, annual. 
succeed will depend on the capacity, size, and character of political structures at any 
given moment (Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, 1985; Skowronek, 1982; Tilly, 1978 
Furthermore, it is maintained that the relative strength or reach of the state itself contains 
―structural biases‖ for certain brands of movements. For example, we would expect 
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conservative movements of any strain --including Christian activists-- to emerge and 
prosper during times of state shrinkage, and progressive activists to flourish when state 
capacities or expenditures are growing.   
Figure 27:  Government Spending as Percent of Gross Domestic Product, 1960-2000 
Source: 1940-2002, Office of Management and Budget 
,Budget of the United States Government, Historical Tables, annual 
Figures 26-27 above illustrate two measures of state size and capacity from 1960-
2000: number of government employees (civilian and military) and government spending 
per year as a percent of gross domestic product.  Putting aside linkages to religious 
activism briefly, both display a surprising degree of stability in the size of the state over 
the four decades examined.  Though the 1960s and 1970s have a reputation of being 
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highly progressive, ―spend-thrift‖ periods, the data indicate their levels of spending and 
employment were roughly equivalent – adjusted for inflation -- to that of 2000, the 
beginning of the conservative-themed Bush II administration.  It is also surprising to note 
that the most sustained and significant declines in state size occurred during the 
supposedly ―liberal‖ Clinton administration.  
Only two rough and imprecise correspondences between Christian activism and 
state size may be inferred from these data. First, the stability of progressive Christian 
organizations in the sector approximates the pattern in government employment over 
time, with peaks in the early 1970s and slow declines during the mid-1990s. Again, given 
the divergent agendas of state-interventionists per se and left-leaning Christians, it is 
difficult to conclude direct connections between the two patterns.  However, one 
reasonable surmise would be that the overall high and even level of progressive Christian 
activism throughout the period acted as a civil society ―buffer‖ against forces both within 
the state and amongst counter-activists to shrink government to levels regarded by these 
Christians as immoral, inhumane, or unjust.  
Second, another approximate match can be observed between the generally linear 
but volatile increase in government spending and the sector share of conservative 
Christian activism at any point in time.  The most notable exception to this pattern is the 
tapering down of government spending during the 1990s while right-wing Christian 
groups flourished.  As a result, only hesitant support can be offered for this 
correspondence.  However, to the degree that traditionalist Christian groups perceived 
that increased size of government in the form of more spending also threatened their way 
of life and core values, as it did amongst their secular, fiscally-oriented brethren, a 
stronger case may be made that two patterns are linked in a more causally significant 
way.  
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On the whole, however, the longitudinal patterns regarding state capacity and the 
fortunes of Christian activism are excessively distant, both on conceptual and empirical 
grounds, to be able to assert strong causal links between the two. Further study examining 
the specific bidirectional mechanisms connecting Christian movement activity – such as 
the emergence of pro- or anti-government issue groups and their efficacy, as well as state 
dynamics influencing the opportunities for Christian groups – is necessary to establish 
less ambiguous explanations.  Such research is beyond the scope of the current work, but 
would be a valuable and salutary future enterprise.  
RELIGIOUS FACTORS 
Central to any exploration of exogenous factors responsible for the dynamics 
observed in the Christian activist sector must be a consideration of activity within the 
religious sphere per se.  One compelling hypothesis offered by scholars is that religious 
activism is primarily a function of the variable fortunes of Christian denominational 
membership. That is, the rise, fall, success, disintegration, and other outcomes observed 
in the lifespans of religious activist groups follow the more general ups and downs of 
related denominations. The operative logic in this hypothesis precedes from the premises 
that 1) a sizable proportion of Christian activism is connected to or sponsored by 
traditional denominations (e.g. Roman Catholics, NCC-member churches), and 2) as 
these denominations gain or lose relative strength in terms of members or resources, 
connected SMOs will also.   
Figure 28 depicts changes in denominational membership since 1973.  Consistent 
data for 1960-1972 is not available, so direct year-to-year comparisons to religious 
activist dynamics is not possible.  However, the three decades visible here still provide a 
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basis for insightful trends and comparisons.  First, a brief look at Figures 28-29 indicate 
that, in the main, Christian activist dynamics do not closely track denominational 
membership trends.  For example, while Roman Catholic membership has hovered 
somewhat erratically around the 30% mark for 40 years, the number of Roman Catholic 
activist groups increased dramatically over the period, particularly after the 1975 Roe vs. 
Wade abortion decision. Second, as discussed in Chapter 5, a significant portion of  
Christian activism was sponsored by non- or multi-denominational organizations, a fact 
which is corroborated by findings presented in Figure 29. The share of non/multi-
denominational groups doubled between 1960 and 2000, though the growth was 
discontinuous.   
Figure 28:  Christian Denominational Affiliation, 1972-2000 
Source:  General Social Survey Cumulative Data file, 1972-2008 (Abridged) 
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Meanwhile, the number of Christian activist groups sponsored by mainline 
denominational families such as the Lutherans or Methodists started low and remained 
thus for the majority of the four decade period.  A slight burst of organizational 
emergence from mainline Protestant churches did occur in the mid-1990s, primarily in 
response to programs and opportunities created during the Clinton administration.  
Finally, it becomes clear through these findings that the importance of ―para-church‖ 
organizations working outside the auspices of denominational structures are absolutely 
central to the vitality and even presence of most Christian activist groups (Scheitle, 2007; 
Green, 1993). We do not observe strong correlations between changes (mostly declines) 
in denominational membership and changes in Christian activism originating from those 
denominations.  The much touted and real declines in membership do not appear to lead 
to declines in sociopolitical activism.   
Figure 29:   Change in Number of Christian Activist Groups by Religious Tradition, 
1960-2000 
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However, certainly the most startling finding emerging from these data is the 
explosive growth of ―unspecified Christian‖ organizations over the time-frame, a group 
which is not represented equivalently in the denominational membership data. The 
―Other‖ designation is the closest proxy. For the ―Other‖ designation, we observe robust 
growth from 1960- to the mid-1990s, followed by a noticeable decline thereafter, which 
appears to be the result of gains among Baptists and Roman Catholics.  Nonetheless, the 
―Other‖ group remains a distant third in terms of overall membership by 2000.  In 
contrast, the number of groups identified as ―unspecified Christian‖ far outpaces the 
―Others,‖ being the source of the most Christian sociopolitical activist organizations 
beginning in 1981 and leading until the terminal year of 2000.   
Given previous findings that the vast majority of these ―unspecified Christian‖ 
organizations were conservative overall in ideological orientation, and given the dramatic 
surge in their prominence in the early 1980s, it is reasonable to conclude that these 
patterns, too, corroborate the general increase in dominance by traditionalist Christian 
activist organizations beginning in the late 1970s-early 1980s and persisting without large 
interruptions until the early 21
st
 century. This finding is now confirmed via multiple
measures and indicators throughout this study including Chapters 4, 5, and 6, as well as 
minor instances in the remainder of chapters.  
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PART 5:  SYNTHESIS 
Chapter 6:  Discussion of Major Descriptive Findings 
“Many good people, in their own spiritual cycles, have moved beyond concern for 
„institutional sin‟ and into the charismatic of Jesus movements which often lack a 
„social passion.‟” 
--- National Catholic Reporter, January 31, 1972, p. 10 
In the introduction, I indicated that the research questions motivating this project 
were descriptive, theoretical, and mechanism-focused, respectively.  The first of these, 
the descriptive task, aimed to surface valid narratives for the dramatic rises, falls, and 
transformations witnessed among Christian activists in the last half century. Another 
major objective was the testing of various ―armchair‖ declarations, hypotheses, and 
explanations of these religio-political changes offered by observers both within and 
without academia. This task is crucial for properly understanding the basic empirical 
landscape of the phenomenon, which serves as the foundation for plausible explanations 
of these processes. The findings from the previous section fortunately answer with new 
clarity and validity a substantial number of these initial questions of ―what happened?,‖ 
―who did it?,‖ and ―how did it happen?‖  As is often the case, these results 
simultaneously introduce new questions that also bear speculation and further study.  In 
this chapter, I summarize and elaborate in detail the major clusters of new knowledge 
gained through the diverse empirical investigations conducted, and suggest their 
significance for larger questions regarding the fluid nature of social movements, civil 
society, and American Christianity.  Broadly, the major descriptive clusters are: 1) 
dynamics at the population ecosystem level; 2) strong evidence of conservative Christian 
ascendancy and probable causes; 3) ―elitization‖ of Christian activism; and 4) 
 142 
miscellaneous sector-wide transformations, such as polarization, causes of group decline, 
and factors unique to religious groups.  
 
POPULATION ECOLOGY  
Viewing the sector of Christian activism from the most macro-level perspective 
and across time, a number of intriguing patterns emerge. These patterns basically confirm 
predictions from the field of population ecology, the academic sub-discipline most 
concerned with examining the interaction, internal dynamics, external forces, and 
mechanisms governing large numbers of social organizations with a bounded space 
(social or physical) (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Abbott, 1988).  Population ecology 
assumes an essentially Darwinian, survival-driven environment modeled explicitly after 
the natural world.  In this realm, social organizations are born, nurtured, seek resources 
for survival, compete against other entities for sustenance (including rival and in-group 
organizations), have a life cycle, and may die. A central tenet of population ecology, as in 
natural ecology, is that of carrying capacity.  Carrying capacity refers to the total ability 
of a given environment to support a number of dependent organisms before exhaustion.  
The entire organizational sector in a given society has a certain carrying capacity, 
according to population ecology, but sub-sectors or issue-specific sectors have their own 
unique carrying capacities as well, all of which vary and are generally unknown in 
advance.  
Specifically, I found that the Christian activist sector displayed at least two 
features suggesting the effects of a carrying capacity-type natural limit. First, at any given 
point in time, approximately 20 percent of Christian activist groups were inactive, 
irrespective of organizational characteristics. This fact suggests that processes internal to 
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the sector, including differential resource acquisition strategies, niche fit or saturation, or 
inter-sector competition (among others) operated to limit in a consistent and uniform 
manner the total number of active organizations in the sector, regardless of year. It was 
rare that more than 85% of total organizations listed were active at any point in time.  
Despite sometimes rapid and explosive growth in certain periods, such potential 
expansions in the sector were invariably offset by organizational disbandings, thus 
maintaining a sector-wide population limit, governed by forces which seem to emanate 
emergently from the population level, rather than from the self-conscious activity of 
member organizations.  
An example of this process in action was found during the 1990s among pro-life 
groups.  The total number of pro-life groups grew consistently through the 1980s, driven 
by historical events such as the Roe v. Wade decision, and the receptive audiences found 
among Christians disenchanted with a perceived general decline in mainstream morality, 
particularly on issues related to life and traditional values. However, beginning in the 
1990s, data indicate a sudden and dramatic decline in this population sub-sector.  Given 
the limited supply of organizational resources available for pro-life organizations, 
alongside the emergence of a few dominant players skilled at resource-acquisition and 
hoarding, opportunities for relatively redundant or poorly adapted pro-life groups shrank 
abruptly. In a phrase, the carrying capacity for this organizational niche had been 
exhausted, and the process of selecting those groups with the (temporarily) most adapted 
traits for survival had begun. Alternatively, smaller organizations on the precipice of 
extinction often sought or accepted mergers with larger, more established organizations 
in order to survive in some form. These merger and/or schism events were tracked in the 
data collection process as well.  
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Second, as is often discovered in population ecological studies, I found strong 
evidence of inter- and intra-sectoral dynamics which support the fundamental principles 
of organizational ecology. Competition and cooperative dynamics are the two key 
processes at play in these contexts, according to the literature.  My findings indicate, as 
mentioned above, a durable process of competition within issue sectors (such as struggles 
among multiple anti-poverty organizations within a relatively tightly bound sub-sector 
wherein mutual monitoring is quite feasible); and processes of cooperation across issue 
sectors (such as anti-pornography groups forming alliances with anti-gay organizations, 
even regardless of religious or theological differences).  Strategic advantage and 
advancement in the context of scarcity is the operative logic here.  Few exceptions to this 
pattern were observed. Within similar issue sectors, Christian activist groups, like most 
other social organizations, repeatedly exemplified instances of imitation of form, content, 
name, mission, or tactics in attempts to attain greater niche dominance and eliminate 
rivals.  Conversely, organizations with sufficiently dissimilar missions and agendas 
frequently forged strategic relationships in order to complement respective strengths or 
weaknesses, thereby broadening their overall appeal to Christian constituencies.  In both 
situations, the objective is organizational survival, even if this means reluctant 
reformulation of one‘s agenda, tactics, or internal structure, which occurred dozens of 
times to Christian activist groups of all ideological stripes and backgrounds.  
EVIDENCE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN SURGE 
For decades, sociologists of religion, political scientists, and lay observers have 
asserted, with scant or dubious evidence, the ascendancy of conservative or traditionalist 
Christian activists.  Under closer examination, much of this rhetoric is found to pertain to 
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the undoubtedly more influential role of conservative Christian groups in electoral 
politics, evidenced primarily by their success in propelling into visible high office 
politicians promoting an agenda focused on ―life-world‖ concerns – sexuality, 
intoxicants, abortion, etc. -- considered threatened by encroaching post-modern values 
and institutions.  What has been less clear throughout this period, however, are 
systematic, empirical measurements of their actual relative population in the civil sphere, 
a composite sketch of their internal variation, their general modes of operation, and 
overall, an attempt to establish the validity of the many unquestioned assumptions about 
conservative Christian activism in the last half century.   
In general, my findings suggest that not only was there a real, measureable 
increase in conservative Christian activism since 1975, but also point to how and why 
this transformation occurred. First, simple population-level counts of conservative versus 
progressive groups since 1960 indicates a steady and significant increase in the real 
number of conservative Christian organizations in the population over time, such that the 
two groups were nearly equal in size by 2000, an event unprecedented in 40 years of 
observation.  Second, as indicated in Chapter 5, the fastest period of organizational 
growth for Christian groups was seen between 1981 and 1991, during the Reagan 
presidency and a favorable political environment for conservative Christian 
organizations. Finer-level analysis shows that most groups formed just prior to this 
period, from 1975-1985, and were either pro-life or traditional values/moral decline-
oriented groups, suggesting that the most decisive mechanism for the political 
advancement of Conservative Christian agendas did not begin in institutional politics, but 
in civil society through grassroots and local organizing.  Furthermore, conservative 
organizations surpassed progressive organizations in terms of total members in 1975, just 
after the Roe vs. Wade decision and a flurry of vigorous grassroots mobilization by pro-
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life and traditional values organizations. The conservative membership surge is even 
more remarkable in light of the fact that, throughout this entire period, the number of 
progressive Christian organizations was still significantly greater than the number of 
traditionalist organizations. This organizational-membership divergence is one of the 
more fascinating results of the data analysis portion of the study. Nonetheless, the 
conservative membership advantage held steady until the early l990s when it appears the 
total carrying capacity for pro-life and traditional morality groups began to buckle. 
Additionally, the election of President Bill Clinton, certainly the most polarizing 
executive to appear in the period of data collection, appears to improved the political 
environmental conditions for progressive Christian groups organizing on agendas 
sympathetic to that of the president, thus balancing, at least temporarily, the membership 
disparity.  
Despite the boost offered to progressive Christian organizations by the Clinton 
presidency, these data show that, throughout the 1990s, the two issues most frequently 
worked on by any Christian organization—irrespective of ideological orientation – were 
moral decline and pro-life.  In all likelihood, this fact speaks to the significant threat 
posed by Pres. Clinton‘s agenda, widely perceived by conservative Christians as an 
attempt to impose values from the errant 1960s on families of the 1990s, in addition to a 
tarnished personal history, which included both real and fabricated sexual and financial 
scandals.  In an paradoxical way, Clinton‘s biography and political objectives could be 
seen as the force that launched a thousand movements – though in two opposite 
directions.  
Finally, as further evidence for the reality of the surge in conservative Christian 
activism, on the ―denominational/religious affiliation variable,‖ the population-level data 
show a huge increase in ―unspecified Christian‖ groups since 1975. Closer examination 
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of the self-descriptions offered by these groups in the Encyclopedia of Associations 
established that the vast majority of them scored extremely high on the ideological 
conservatism scale. In itself, this finding is merely a novelty, and corroborates other 
findings in the sociology of religion regarding the decline of denominations broadly.  In 
the context of the other Christian activist findings, however, this result provides one more 
plank of support to buttress the overall argument for the empirical validity of a 
significant, unprecedented, and highly influential increase in conservative Christian 
activism, both at the organizational population and the membership level.  
WHY CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN ACTIVISTS SURGED 
In addition to the historical events acting as exogenous triggers for the rapid and 
dramatic increase in conservative Christian activism demonstrated in this study, it is also 
necessary to determine as much as possible the organizational level peculiarities and 
specific mechanisms whereby these groups were able to achieve such historical levels of 
influence.  Put another way, what tactics, orientations, assumptions, or structural 
advantages did conservative Christians enjoy that other Christian groups did not?   
The findings strongly suggest fundamentally different basic approaches to activist 
organizing between conservative and particularly progressive Christian groups.  First, as 
stated briefly above, while the total number of progressive organizations in the 
population was larger at any point of observation, the number of members per 
progressive group was fewer than among conservative Christian groups. Several reasons 
may explain this divergence. Key among them is that, consistent with the increasingly 
complex nature of post-modern life, the total ―population of grievances‖ of a social order, 
if you will, is constantly increasing. Injustice, unfortunately, is in no short supply, and its 
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manifestations continue to diversify and mutate across history. Progressive Christian 
activists operate by moral schema which sensitize them to a wide panoply of issues 
generally related to varied incarnations of injustice (ecological, military, criminal, 
economic, gender, children, health, etc.).  My findings show that since 1960, the agenda 
of issues engaged by Christian activists of all ideological backgrounds has expanded both 
in number and variety.  The overwhelming majority of this growth has been through the 
gradual – and generally pro-social— redefinition and subsequent enlargement of what is 
considered ―unjust,‖ ―unacceptable,‖ ―immoral,‖ ―outrageous,‖ and ―sinful‖ – typically 
by progressive activists.  As a result, citizens with orientations attuned to such concerns 
were compelled to mobilize their moral outrage, often through the founding of activist 
organizations rooted in forms of Christian morality. However, these organizations were 
often tiny, composed of a handful of steadfast moral soldiers, each of whom performed 
multiple roles within the organization. The end result is the proliferation of flourishing 
justice-oriented progressive Christian groups each with a modest number of members or 
constituents. The overall character of this sub-sector naturally became disjointed, 
uncoordinated, over-broad, and occasionally fractious.  
In contrast, these same findings indicate that conservative Christian groups 
enjoyed the largest memberships, and were even able to recruit equivalent or larger 
memberships than progressives with fewer numbers of activist groups. A substantial 
reason for this is derived from a related finding:  conservative Christian groups had far 
more local branches of their federated organizations than any other ideological 
orientation cluster. Through the use of state, regional, and local branches, activist 
organizations may make use of the well-known efficiency advantages of economies of 
scale and bureaucracy, greatly reducing ―costs‖ – both material and ideational – related to 
organizational founding.  By founding one central organization near a metropolitan area, 
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for example, and ―planting‖ (akin to church planting in the neo-evangelical tradition) 
subsidiaries in smaller cities, strategic state capitals, or cultural hubs, activist 
organizations not only increase the overall geographic reach of a single organization, but 
dramatically increase the likelihood of higher membership numbers accruing to the 
original central association.  Perhaps most importantly, organizational planting of this 
sort also cultivate seeds for future success in mainstream electoral political organizing.  
As a significant number of scholars of the Religious Right have observed, the careful 
fertilization of tiny grassroots groups throughout the South and Midwest, often led by 
churches and clergy, served as the ―ground forces‖ for the several instances of 
conservative Christian electoral success witnessed since the late 1970s.  This method was 
in stark contrast to that embraced (at least unconsciously) by progressive Christian 
groups, which was characterized by marked inter-organizational independence and 
almost total absence of local organizational branching, motivated in part by the 
(perceived) priority placed on identifying, publicizing, and countering through direct 
action the ever-mounting supply of diverse injustices demanding response in civil 
society.   
Resource-mobilization scholars and the Tilly-school of social movement analysis 
would demand that we likewise examine the specific material, personnel, organizational, 
and tactical characteristics of conservative Christian activist groups that might explain 
their rise to power in the last three decades.  These findings show that with respect to 
financial assets, conservative groups enjoyed significant resource advantages over 
competitors.  Regardless of group size or duration, the average conservative Christian 
activist group had larger organizational budgets than moderates, progressives, or other 
types.  Such greater resources empowered them not only to persist in the activist sector 
with greater security, but also to diversify their organizational and tactical repertoires, 
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hire professional, permanent staff, including paid lobbyists and researchers, locate in 
strategically valuable (yet often pricey) headquarters, and most importantly, develop 
sophisticated multi-media communications networks to extend and deepen their reach.  
Uniquely religious and cultural factors may also play a role in the greater financial assets 
available to conservative Christian groups.  The evangelical fervor channeled into socio-
political activism, with its emphasis on conversion and interpersonal contacts, is a 
powerful cultural schema easily transmuted into secular tasks such as fundraising, 
forming networks, and other needs related to persuasion. A century ago, Weber 
recognized the elective affinity between temporal work, the Christian calling, and 
ultimate salvation. This potent mixture continues to find ample applications in post-
modern contexts, including religious activism, and bolstering the resource bases which 
support it  (Diamond, 1995; Lindsay, 2007; Young 2006; Smith, 2000; McLaren, 2007).  
Another reason for the surge in conservative Christian activism in recent decades 
is the ease with which they have engaged mainstream electoral politics since the 1975.  
Unlike their progressive counterparts, findings from this analysis strongly indicate that 
traditionalist Christian activists, likely spurred by the unacceptable life-world threats 
posed by the Roe v. Wade decision, mobilized forces aimed directly at political offices.  
These findings have been corroborated by a number of previous scholars, and the real-
world effects quite obvious (Wilcox, 2010; Diamond, 1989; Liebman, 1983).  However, 
this analysis is the first to isolate with clarity the precise historical moments of this 
tactical shift, as well as significant gap between this change in tactics by conservative 
Christians and the virtual absence of such a shift among progressive Christians. This 
transformation is especially noteworthy given the previous attitude of conservative 
Christian groups toward overt political action, which ranged from apathy or futility to a 
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convicted sense of contamination as a result of mixing too intimately with temporal 
forces.   
The reason for this recent tactical shift toward electoral engagement and political 
organizing relates directly to the institutional origins of the sacred value threats perceived 
by conservative Christians.  The Supreme Court decision in Roe vs. Wade awakened in 
traditionalist activists the urgency of ―changing the wind‖ in Wallis‘ terms; instigating 
local, grassroots mobilization -- often led by churches and para-church groups --  to 
gradually transform the hearts of minds of individual citizens regarding the pro-life issue.  
No longer, they believed, could the political sphere be ignored or eschewed as simply 
―unredeemable territory.‖  Threats from the state had to be countered by mobilization 
aimed squarely at the foundations of state power. The end result of this new approach, it 
was hoped, would be a fundamental cultural and ideological shift, measurable in terms of 
public opinion, which would then force political leaders ostensibly accountable to such 
shifts, to change their voting and rhetorical stances.  Led and inspired by veteran political 
operatives such as Paul Weyrich, Ralph Reed, and Richard Viguerie, conservative 
Christian activists began to find common cause with essentially secular conservatives 
motivated by concerns over the growth of the interventionist state, particularly with 
regard to tax policy (Williams, 2010; Noll, 1989; Diamond, 1995).  In other instances, 
conservative Christian political organizing manifested in activists themselves becoming 
political entrepreneurs, contesting local offices, particularly in school board, city council, 
and similar posts with better odds of election.  Throughout the late 1970s and early 
1980s, conservative Christian activists adopted grassroots electoral engagement and 
political organizing with great zeal, stealthily building an effective political network. This 
network was further buttressed by submerged networks of unelected activists, perpetually 
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primed to respond to emergent threats and initiate rhetorical, organizational, and 
religiously-based mobilization efforts without hesitation.  
Progressive Christian activists, on other hand, exhibited no such tactical shift 
toward electoral engagement and direct political organizing during this period.  Findings 
indicate that instead, progressive activists continued to expand their collective though 
uncoordinated agendas of substantive concerns, expanding into areas such as apartheid in 
South Africa, anti-nuclear proliferation, homelessness, and homosexual rights.  As 
mentioned above, the progressive Christian response to the emergence (and indeed active 
moral-based identification) of new and urgent societal challenges appeared to be one of 
frenetic organizational and moral hyperactivity, generating an ever-growing catalog of 
hyper-focused associations with little or no interconnection or coordination. This is in 
sharp contrast to the behavior of their traditionalist counterparts, who began to 
strategically constrain their issue agenda to essentially three interrelated concerns:  
abortion, defense of the traditional family unit, and declining moral values.  As a result, a 
kind of tactical, substantive, and strategic discipline emerged on the Christian right, 
ultimately creating a formidable unitary political force. To outside observers, 
conservative Christians by the mid-1980s resembled a sub-political party, with enviable 
geographic reach, deep moral-ideological commitment, ample financial resources, and a 
remarkable yet unofficial hierarchical structure which worked efficiently to order and 
strategically oversee political and cultural engagement efforts. Tactically speaking, the 
religious left exhibited no similar grassroots political organizing effort aimed at electoral 
victories or national cultural value shifts led by local moral entrepreneurs.  To the extent 
that moral and political outcomes were increasingly being determined by state political 
actors vis-à-vis conventional electoral processes -- as postulated by state-centered 
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theorists --(as opposed to the conventional social movement tactics of the 1950s and 
1960s), progressive Christian organizations found themselves unknowingly at a 
significant disadvantage, not only in terms of realizing sociopolitical goals, but also with 
respect to losing cultural and ideological visibility in the civil sphere conversation.   
 
“ELITIZATION:” THE DECLINE OF MASS MEMBERSHIP ACTIVISM? 
 
Since the 1990s, sociologists and political scientists have postulated the decline of 
various forms of associational life in the United States.  Notable among these are 
Skocpol‘s Diminished Democracy (2003), wherein the author observes a shift from 
active, embodied membership in civic associations to a mere token ―checkbook 
advocacy,‖ in which ―members‖ largely outsource their activism to professional staff, 
such as lobbyists, researchers, or spokespersons.  Robert Putnam (2000) likewise notes 
similar declines in an array of voluntary associations, though his analysis is decidedly 
less political in tone and purported consequences.  More recently, Kretschmer & Meyer 
(2007) have identified another variant of the ―de-membership‖ phenomenon: ―platform 
leadership,‖ in which often a single individual serves as organizational leader, 
spokesperson, and fundraiser for a social movement organization, with no effort at 
grassroots mobilization.  They argue that this type of structure is only possible through 
the dramatically enhanced role of mass media in social activism, with television and radio 
now identified as the sole and sufficient target of some movement organizations with 
limited material resources, but near boundless moral fervor.  
The analysis of Christian activist organizations since 1960 basically confirms 
these general observations, which I have termed ―elitization.‖ Population level findings 
indicate increases in non-membership groups overall, regardless of issue type, ideological 
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orientation, or religious affiliation.  We also observe a general transformation in the 
sector from a relatively few number of large organizations in the early years to the 
proliferation of a greater number of smaller activist groups in the later years. This finding 
may be interpreted in several ways. First, the civil sphere could be operating by a process 
parallel to that observed in modern societies generally:  differentiation and specialization.  
This is not only logical, but probable given the already established increased number and 
range of social problems confronting the civil sphere over the four decades observed.  
Specialization and division of democratic labor, so to speak, is a rational and efficient 
method of managing such emergent complexity.  Second, and more specific to the 
internal processes of the civil sphere, it appears likely that activist organizations made use 
of ―feedback‖ and isomorphic mechanisms which over time selected smaller and more 
adapted non-membership, advocacy oriented groups over larger, conventional 
membership organizations for the successful achievement of movement goals.  Such a 
process would especially be true in a changing socio-political environment in which 
highly specialized legal, political, and technical knowledge would be essential for the 
passage of certain legislation, for example. My analysis of the geographic shifts in 
movement organization headquarters also corroborates the basic outlines of the elitization 
phenomenon, demonstrating a steady move away from headquarters of convenience, such 
as the home cities of moral entrepreneurs or religious centers, toward centers of political 
and cultural influence, such as New York City, Los Angeles, and, most importantly, 
Washington, DC. As Skocpol, Fiorina, Putnam, and Meyer point out, as a result of these 
organizational and environmental transformations, ―members‖ largely become 
synonymous with ―patrons‖ or ―supporters,‖ whose obligations rarely exceed making 
donations or contacting elected officials.  Active, embodied, participation in local or 
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national movement activities of the sort common in prior decades is decreasingly 
demanded.   
Further support for the process of elitization is found in results showing 
significant increases over time in the number of organizations classified by the 
Encyclopedia of Associations as ―Public Affairs Organizations.‖ Closer analysis shows 
that most of these organizations were located in Washington, D.C., and focused their 
efforts on changing policy through advocacy and lobbying. Interestingly, most of the 
growth in this public affairs sector occurred after 1981 with the election of President 
Reagan, and cross-tabulation analysis reveals that the vast majority of these organizations 
were conservative in ideological orientation. These findings provide additional 
corroboration for the aforementioned tactical preferences of conservative Christian 
activists, but more importantly suggest that the elitization process, though general in its 
sector-wide application, was not strictly uniform in empirical observation.  It appears 
conservative Christian organizations responded first and most aggressively to this new 
mode of organization, and were clearly the first to reap its rewards through legislative 
and policy victories throughout the 1980s.   
 
SECTOR-SPECIFIC DYNAMICS:  POLARIZATION, CAUSES OF DECLINE, AND RELIGIOUS 
FACTORS 
Beyond strong, diverse empirical evidence of a real surge in conservative 
Christian activism, and equally strong and varied evidence for the phenomenon of 
elitization, another cluster of important though harder to categorize findings deserve 
elaboration as well. These include ideological polarization, causes of organizational 
decline, and phenomena unique to religion itself which had intriguing effects.  
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Polarization 
This analysis shows that by the 1980s, the number of Christian activist groups 
representing the political middle – moderates, moderate-conservative, and moderate-
progressives, had virtually disappeared. Instead, groups on the extreme Christian right 
increased dramatically, while their rivals on the extreme left had become virtually extinct. 
In previous decades, representation from each ideological group had been far more even, 
with healthy numbers from groups with moderate orientations. By the 1980s, a noticeable 
―hollowing out‖ of the middle had occurred, producing a much more polarized 
ideological civil sphere, analytically if not in actuality.  In addition, this uneven 
polarization resulting from a loss of Christian groups on the extreme left, effectively 
shifting the entire ideological center of gravity to the right. Moderate-progressive groups 
now served as the new Christian left, a position they were prepared for neither 
ideologically or strategically. Additional evidence of this general polarization process is 
observed in the fact that, over time, most issues engaged by Christian activist groups 
were found at the poles of the ideological spectrum (gay rights, anti-militarism, abortion, 
for example) rather than issues located nearer the middle (hunger, foreign aid, etc.).  As a 
group, these findings support the general outlines of a widespread process of political and 
discursive polarization noted by a number of scholars of the civil sphere, mass media, and 
electoral politics since the early 1990s (Hunter, 1991; 1994; 2006; Baum and Groeling, 
2008; Baldassarri and Gelman (2008).  
 
Causes of Christian Activist Group Decline 
As Gamson observed in his classic The Strategy of Social Protest, it is often 
equally instructive to know when, how, and why social movements disintegrate (or at 
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least disband) as how they emerge. The latter topic permeates the literature on collective 
action, but much less is known about the other end of the ―life course‖ of social 
movement organizations.  Findings from the Christian activist sector partially illuminate 
these dark areas of knowledge. Most importantly, and yet also most surprisingly perhaps, 
is the fact that many activist groups fade or disband due to success. This is especially true 
of groups formed to achieve very specific, often measureable goals, such as the passage 
of legislation, the repeal of amendments, or the granting of new rights.  Two prominent 
though imperfect examples of this process include the civil rights movement and the 
ecumenism movement. Though certainly the legacy and momentum of the civil rights 
movement born in the late 1950s lives on through a number of important SMOs, most 
scholars concede that the movement receded in national visibility and energy after the 
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  After this landmark achievement, many civil rights 
SMOs declined in membership, dramatically reconfigured their mission and agenda, or 
disbanded entirely.  My findings indicate that by the year 2000, the number of 
organizations dedicated to civil rights and race relations had declined from nearly 150 to 
less than 40.   
During the 1960s and 1970s, many Christian activists, particularly of moderate to 
progressive orientation, were engaged in a variety of programs designed to increase 
ecumenism and improve interfaith relations.  In the decade 1970-1979, ecumenism was 
the fourth most common issue engaged by Christian activists, and the ninth most 
common issue engaged across the entire time period.  By 2000, however, only 18 activist 
organizations were working on ecumenism, and the issue had slipped to eighteenth in 
overall frequency. Without the aid of historical narrative, it would be easy to assume that 
interest in ecumenism had simply been the victim of natural decline, or perhaps that it 
had proven impossible to achieve. In fact, the very opposite is accurate.  Due to the 
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consistent efforts of Christian activists such as those identified through this research, 
relations between denominations, clergy, and parishioners improved enormously.  This 
steady effort ultimately made the explicit project of ecumenism appear commonplace and 
a regular, integrated feature of much church activity. Such efforts also made possible the 
now-highly influential and fascinating Catholic-Protestant alliances around issues of 
common moral concern, which would have been nigh unthinkable just a few decades 
prior. Akin to civil rights, the widespread acceptance of ecumenism led to its diminished 
visibility as a discrete focus of activist engagement.  
Some activist groups, however, do not have the good fortune of such peaceful 
deaths. Two other causes of organizational decline or disbanding appear in the findings as 
well. First, given the constantly competitive and crowded ecosystem of organizations 
even within one sub-sector, it is inevitable that groups that either fail to adequately 
replenish or wisely use resources will decline.  Conventional social movement theory is 
on solid ground with this axiom. However, my findings also suggest a more dynamic and 
agentic process occasionally underlying such resource-acquisition problems, originating 
in the active withdrawal of support from sponsoring or parent organizations. This ―wither 
on the vine‖ phenomenon occurs primarily when parent organizations with finite 
resources must make strategic re-allocations based on the perceived priority and efficacy 
of subsidiary groups. A version of the same process may also occur when parent 
organizations fundamentally shift their own mission and activist approach, occasionally 
rendering some sub-projects irrelevant or anachronistic.  The clearest example of this 
process in these data is found in the remarkable decline in the dissemination of social 
teaching, primarily by Roman Catholics but also by Presbyterians, Methodists, and other 
mainline Protestants groups, over the time period.  In the 1960s, for example, nearly six 
percent of all Christian activist groups were engaged in dissemination of social teaching, 
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three times the proportion working on civil rights at that time, and ranking as the fifth 
most common issue engaged.  By 2000, less than three percent of organizations reported 
the dissemination of social teaching. Previous related analysis of the 2004 budget and 
organizational plan for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops indicated a 
disproportionate allotment of funds to policy-related ―respect life‖ activities relative to 
traditional official social teaching dissemination.  For example, the budget of the Office 
of Pro-Life Activities was twice the size of the budget for the Office of Social 
Development and World Peace. Without explicitly terminating social teaching efforts, 
parent organizations with limited resources presented with new, urgent priorities were 
often forced to reallocate those supplies, in effect allowing such projects to wither so that 
other projects or organizations deemed central might thrive.  
The other major category of organizational decline is more familiar, 
straightforward, and consistent with political process theory. Every social movement 
arises (or fails to, as the case may be) in the context of a political opportunity structure, 
an arrangement of institutional and historical facts that favor or constrain collective 
action emergence. An appropriate metaphor for the political opportunity structure of a 
given period is that of a window.  Particular concatenations of historical events, 
prevailing cultural schemas, or state structures may produce conditions propitious for the 
emergence of movements previously in dormancy, or may similarly prevent other types 
of movements. Although opportunity structures are typically recognized as objective and 
static, their realized effect on actual movements is highly dynamic, depending on the 
proximity of the movement to the state as its target, the objectives of the movement, and 
the ideological character of the opportunity structure, among other factors.  Findings from 
the Christian activist sector establish the validity of this general process stressing 
favorable external conditions. For example, early in the time sample, a number of 
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organizations existed oriented around the goals of temperance, protection of the Sabbath, 
and the defeat of communism.  With the passage of time, shifting cultural values such as 
the greater acceptance of alcohol in mainstream social situations, often themselves the 
outcomes of other social and cultural movements; macro-historical processes such as 
widening secularization; and discrete historical events such as the demise of the USSR in 
the 1990s, combined to present unique and insurmountable exogenous challenges to these 
Christian organizations. Together with cumulative failures such as the inability to pass 
and stabilize key legislation (as with blue laws), or the lasting sting of the repeal of 
Prohibition, Christian activists from groups such as these found themselves unable to 
secure niches or constituencies large enough to justify continued activity.  Oddly then, 
both failure and success were just as likely to spell the end for Christian activist 
organizations 
Religious Factors 
Apart from original descriptive results relating strictly to sector-wide dynamics, 
organizational characteristics, and outcomes; that is,  findings relevant to social 
movement analysis generally, the analysis also produced a number of surprising findings 
primarily relevant to the sociology of religion.  For example, in the previous chapter in 
the discussion of denominational factors, I identified the unusually high number of 
activist groups coded as ―unspecified Christian,‖ a term applied when the group name or 
self-description offered no alternative denominational cue, but still indicated clear 
Christian heritage and identity.  Further analysis revealed that the vast majority of 
―unspecified Christian‖ groups were also ideologically very conservative.  More 
importantly, progressive Christian groups almost systematically avoided group names or 
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self-descriptions that foregrounded their Christian identity in explicit ways.  A few 
examples from the 2000 Encyclopedia of Associations illustrate this point well:  
Conservative Organizations 
―Christian Crusade (CC): Christian educational ministry whose purpose is 
to safeguard and defend the conservative Christian ideals upon which America 
was founded, to protect our cherished freedoms, heritage of every American; to 
oppose any person or organization whose words or actions and doors or parallel 
the philosophies of leftists, socialists, communists, intentionally or otherwise; to 
expose publicly the infiltration of such influences into American life, and to 
defend the gospel of Jesus Christ.‖  
―Christian Research (CR): Works to serve those who do not trust the 
media or the US educational system, both of which the organization believes are 
"controlled." Distributes Christian literature, produces tracts, conducts and 
encourages Bible research and study. Emphasizes obedience to God and His 
Word; upholds the Constitution as it was originally written but advocates 
subjugation to God's law, not man's, if the two should conflict. Opposes Zionism, 
communism, income taxation, and the UN; supports historical revisionism 
regarding the Holocaust. Maintains library of 900 books and booklets; bestows 
awards.‖ 
―Christians United for Responsible Entertainment (CURE): Grassroots org 
to give a united voice of protest to the violence on TV and the showing of adult 
films to children. Main concern is for children who are taught few values at home 
and have no church affiliation, maintains that their attitudes are largely provided 
by TV. Sends petitions to networks requesting decrease in violence and showing 
of more character building programs, and elimination of adult movies from TV. 
Boycotts.‖ 
Progressive Organizations 
―Unity Fellowship Church Movement: Christian gay and lesbian 
individuals interested in the teachings of liberation theology from the King James 
version of the Bible.  Conducts special programs for imprisoned people and 
youth.‖ 
―The Other Side: Individuals committed to peace and justice through 
Christian discipleship.  Seeks to link Third World people and North Americans in 
a common struggle for a social and spiritual transformation to alleviate the 
oppression of hunger, war, and injustice throughout the world.  Provides support, 
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encouragement, and assistance to the oppressed worldwide.  Educates Americans 
on oppression in foreign countries and operates overseas ministries for justice. 
Grant-making; anti-militarism; International development; nonviolence; human 
rights; support to Filipino demonstrators.‖ 
―Coordination in Development (CODEL): Protestant and Roman Catholic 
churches, Christian-related organizations and mission-sending societies 
committed to providing assistance to development activities among the 
socioeconomically disadvantaged in primarily Third World countries. Offers 
consultative services, network building, and resources for the planning and 
implementation of community based project. Does not seek not out projects, but 
responds to requests for assistance with the view that people have the ability to 
find their own solutions but often lack the resources needed to achieve their goals. 
Encourages cooperation between private and public sectors in development work. 
Negotiates with project holders regarding the frequency and format of progress, 
financial, and audit reports; encourages self-monitoring. Requires project 
presenters to specify the degree of participation in a project's identification, 
implementation, and resultant benefits. Conducts Development Education and 
Ecumenical Relations Program to encourage global development education and 
ecumenical cooperation in development programs; sponsors Environment and 
Development Program to assist and conduct workshops in implementation of 
agricultural and environmental projects; operates seminar program to provide a 
forum for discussion of issues concerning development activities of members. 
Maintains liaison with the United Nations and the US government.  
 
I argue that these differences derive from two primary motivations. First, 
strategically, the use of the term ―Christian‖ in an organizational name has a polarizing 
effect on recruitment efforts, depending on the aims of the organization.  Groups with 
strong ideological or religious commitments to the ―Christian‖ label and identity, as 
many conservative organizations have, may insist on using the term to convey their 
loyalty to that heritage, and to attract members who self-identify as Christian and 
similarly value the distinctiveness and special meaning of the Christian tradition. 
Conservative groups may also proudly use the term in their name to highlight their 
difference from secular or even progressive Christian organizations which do not feature 
―Christian‖ in the name as a way of furthering ―witnessing‖ to a world in need of 
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salvation. Similarly, progressive Christian groups, who rarely used the term in their 
organizational names, likely avoid it because of the same polarization effect as their 
conservative counterpart, only for the opposite reason. Progressive Christian activists, as 
demonstrated in Ch. 5, displayed a significant tendency toward coalition-building, even 
across religious and denominational lines. Many progressive groups, in fact, regularly 
partnered with secular organizations in common cause.  From their point of view, 
therefore, drawing attention to the group‘s Christian origins may have negative effects on 
the ability to attract recruits, make alliances, and achieve shared objectives.   
 
When progressive organizations become more secular, they necessarily must cater 
to and attract a numerically smaller group as the number of Americans who are strictly 
secular is much smaller than those who hold some sort of religious orientation. They are 
in a sense ceding this religious activist group to the religious right or to no one in 
particular; that is, this group of religiously-identified citizens, who already express some 
interest and involvement in civic matters, has few or no religious outlets to help voice 
their perspectives in the public square. They then appear invisible when in fact they are 
arguably as large or larger than the religious right.  
The other possibility of course is that as some religious SMOs secularize they 
actually bring their constituents with them, so there is no abandonment of religious 
progressives or moderates. What actually happens can be ascertained empirically, of 
course.  
What is clear, however, is that progressive religious SMOs had a much higher 
probability of secularizing than did their conservative counterparts. Could it be that for 
religious progressives political positions and ideologies are more important than the fact 
that they are religiously oriented?  In other words, are they more willing to sacrifice 
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religious identification for political/activist effectiveness? Could it be that their attitude 
toward religion and spirituality – ecumenism, inclusion, openness, etc. – also extends to 
their political and activist memberships, in the sense that they are willing to make 
coalitions with those of different and even no religious background, even if that means 
the gradual dilution of that religious orientation? 
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Chapter 7:  Theoretical Implications 
“Everywhere society‟s health depends on the simultaneous pursuit of mutually opposed 
activities or aims.” 
-- E.F. Schumacher, A Guide for the Perplexed, 1977, p. 127 
 
―No man ever believes that the Bible means what it says: He is always convinced that it 
says what he means.‖ 
 --George Bernard Shaw 
 
The accumulation of such a rich and diverse set of empirical findings creates 
challenges for theory-building and the identification of durable mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, along this exploratory, fact-finding mission, a number of plausible 
explanations for the transformations seen in the sector of Christian activism have been 
uncovered and validated in multiple instances. In this chapter, I advance a set of middle-
range theories that provide at least tentative answers to the questions posed at the outset 
of this research.  As a reminder, they are:  
 What are the prevailing macro-level patterns and transformations in 
U.S. Christian activism in the second half of the 20
th
 century? 
 
 What explains these patterns? Are extant theories from social 
movement analysis, the sociology of religion, or political sociology 
generally adequate for making sense of the dynamics observed over 
the period?   
 
 What recurrent mechanisms and processes, if any, govern the 
outcomes and forms of religious activism across the historical and 
social contexts considered? 
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The answers to the first question, which is descriptive in mission, are provided 
concisely in Ch. 6 and in detail in Ch. 5.  These patterns and transformations prompt and 
provide the empirical foundation for the construction of answers relevant to the second 
and third questions, which are explanatory in mission.  
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Civil Society: 
Throughout this study, I have argued that religious activism is a valid approach to  
―sample‖ civil society as a whole due to the fact that most social issues at play in 20 th
century America was touched by religious activists.  As a result, many of the empirical 
findings and theoretical claims may approximate similar patterns in civil society 
generally, though with differing scopes of exceptions made for religion-specific elements.  
Nevertheless, viewing Christian activism as a representative subset of civil society at 
large featuring functional equivalents of the general level processes.  In this chapter, I 
will present a number of arguments based on the empirical findings that I believe have 
significant implications for theories of civil society, social movements, and religion.  
However, in order to recognize the contribution of these implications for broader 
theoretical concerns, we must first modify our image of what civil society is.  I propose 
two preliminary paths in this direction.  First, representations and theories of the civil 
sphere must align with the actual internal dynamics and long-term patterns of the civil 
sphere observed in representative empirical contexts.  Second, models of the civil sphere 
which postulate static features or normative ideals must be augmented with models that 
illustrate how the sphere changes over time and explain why it must.   
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The most significant work on the realm of social life found between markets and 
the state --where these Christian movements appear, engage each other, and attempt 
influence the other two spheres – is The Civic Sphere by Jeffrey Alexander.  Alexander’s 
tome is encyclopedic and theoretically pioneering. Grounding his approach 
unapologetically in the Durhkeimian tradition of binary social categorization, Alexander 
teases out the subtle and myriad manifestations of cultural boundary issues in American 
civil society.  The metaphor employed by Alexander in this elegant work is that of a stage 
or forum, wherein cultural contestants (social movements, public figures, political 
entrepreneurs, intellectuals, citizens, mass media, etc.) enter, arguments and discursive 
techniques in hand, to rationally deliberate the concerns of the day. This civic 
engagement serves to both produce a robust intellectual climate, and create a platform 
from which sound social and political solutions may be generated and applied in the other 
two spheres of social life, or beyond.  
This model, while valuable and doubtless accurate in many respects, remains 
inadequate in terms of accounting for many of the processes and phenomena observed in 
the present study of Christian activism in recent U.S. history.  Alexander's highly 
ordered, sanitized, and normative view of the civil sphere is at great variance with the 
portrait painted by the last 50 years of Christian engagement in public affairs.  Instead, I  
contend that the civil sphere, far from resembling a safe cultural space within which 
sensible citizens may work to shape their democracy, is more akin to a battlefield, 
particularly in late-20th century US political culture.  
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The Cybernetic Civil Sphere 
When viewed from a sufficient analytical distance, the pattern that emerges from 
this enduring conflict is the accidental but significant creation of a kind of ideological 
balance in the civil sphere.  Christian groups certainly did not enter the public sphere to 
produce compromise, tranquility, or détente.  In truth, their primary motivation was quite 
the opposite:  they wished to weaken or annihilate their moral contraries.  Nevertheless, 
the aggregated result of this recurrent action has been the production of an approximate 
political equilibrium within and across time periods.  
A summary of key results from the analysis provide insight into the mechanisms 
responsible for this outcome.  The longitudinal dynamics between conservative and 
progressive Christian activist groups presented in Chs. 5 and 6 indicate that in most years, 
the number of members in progressive and conservative groups were roughly equivalent. 
Similarly, the number of progressive Christian activist groups was virtually identical to 
the number of conservative Christian activist groups across time. Given that there is no 
natural or expected cause for this finding, a plausible explanation must be offered.  To 
better ascertain possible causal factors, a focus on time order and reflexive processes is 
required.  Temporally speaking, each case points to a lagged increase in the number of 
conservative groups. That is, surges in conservative membership and number of activist 
groups followed prior increases in groups or members by progressive Christian activists.  
Previously, I referred to this phenomenon as a type of ―phase shift,‖ a term borrowed 
from physics to describe the relative frequency of two waves of equal amplitude.  If 
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number of organizations and members is substituted for amplitude, with higher values 
being equivalent to higher amplitude and vice versa, and time substituted for frequency, 
then a classic phase shift pattern is observed (see example below).  Using the image 
below, the red line would correspond to progressive Christian activity and the blue line 
with conservative Christian activity.   
This ―lagged surge‖ among conservative Christian activists suggests responsive 
attempts to follow or unseat progressive Christian groups experiencing higher levels of 
these quantitative  
 
Figure 30: ―Phase Shift‖ as An Illustration of Religious Civil Sphere Response 
Mechanism 
 
 
indicators of success.  Such a pattern found consistently over a four-decade period points 
to sensitive and rapidly responding interactive forces between the two Christian factions. 
In systems and cybernetic theory, such dynamics are referred to as feedback mechanisms.  
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Feedback mechanisms are not only responsive and rational, but are generally self-
regulating and generate homeostasis.  
Further evidence of the existence of cybernetic processes at work in this portion 
of the civil sphere is the persistent display and indeed deepening over time of bifurcation 
and polarization among nearly all issues engaged by Christian activists. More precisely, 
polarization of issues is a natural result of ongoing moral boundary battles resulting from 
threats to sacred values and the inevitable response from the rival faction.  Over time, this 
threat-response-equilibrium dialectic tends to force marginal, apolitical, and moderate 
Christians to the poles through negative feedback, effectively hollowing out the middle.  
Findings presented in Figures 13 and 14 are further evidence of this cybernetic process.  
Finally, taking all of these facts and reformulations together, I assert that, ―what 
begins in religion, often ends in politics.‖  Put more formally, this evidence corroborates 
the hypothesis that changes in religious belief, institutions, and practice often have 
important and traceable effects on secular political developments.  Although not designed 
as a study in American politics per se, or an attempt to reduce explanations in larger 
political trends to religious developments, a number of patterns emerged from the data 
that point to partial explanations for phenomena and forces observed in the general 
context of American political activity.     
In the spirit of the American idiom, ―the brightest flame burns the quickest,‖ this 
study clearly establishes that groups with a moderate ideological orientation enjoyed the 
longest organization lifespans.  More extreme ideological Christian groups often had 
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significant short-run impact, but had stunted lifespans.  Over time, the moderate 
advantage in lifespan translates to greater probabilities of recruiting members and for 
longer periods of time.    
Ironically, even though moderate Christian groups persisted in the population 
longer than their more extreme counterparts, the total number and proportion of moderate 
groups in the population declined dramatically from 1960-2000.  A theory advanced by 
Berger, Hunter, and Smith – and with which I agree—helps establish, though indirectly, a 
plausible explanation for this phenomenon.  According to this perspective, the relative 
weakening of the left/liberal/progressive political ideology in the US is due to the 
widespread perception of it being effectively secularized.  By this I mean the public 
belief that the left is political realm hostile to religion, relativistic on moral values, 
permissive on individual behavior, and inclined instead to a thoroughgoing 
Enlightenment, rationalistic ethos. Part of this perception is no doubt due, with ample 
justification, to the legacy of the 1960s. However, a significant, if not primary, cause is 
the rise of the Religious Right, which itself was largely a counter-movement to the 
perceived excesses of the student movement, counter-culture, and ―hippie‖ lifestyle.  The 
result is a greatly delimited range of political options for moderate Christians to navigate.  
On the one hand is the political left, which has thoroughly and effectively portrayed as 
the group unfriendly toward, uninterested in, and occasionally actively resisting people of 
faith and their sectarian morality.  On the other hand, is the party which actively 
welcomes and even seeks out people of faith and proudly proclaims its Christian identity, 
values, and constituency.  The result is a menu of political/moral choices which 
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represents only the extremes of American religious and social values, leaving moderate 
Christians with no obvious good option.  This polar-dialectic dynamic over time has only 
accentuated and deepened the extremity of each side to the point of caricature.  
The unfortunate (but sociologically interesting) side effect of this process is the 
nearly total abandonment of the vast middle distribution of American opinion, practice, 
and preferences, where most citizens live; culturally, politically, ideologically, and 
religiously.  Because of the absence of a viable moderate representation, a party or 
political organization that ―looks like them,‖ moderates have largely been forced to pick 
awkwardly from those tiny pieces of each extreme that best approximate their values, 
lifestyles, preferences, and practices.  
Another strictly religious hypothesis also offers a plausible explanation for the 
decline of the religious left, as well as the depolitization of religious moderates. As 
denominations and religious groups struggled to survive through the 1960s and 1970s, 
their primary intent and focus became attracting and retaining members. Like any 
marginal organization, accommodation to the needs, wants, and preferences of majorities 
become paramount, if not necessary. In many cases, this need resulted in the moderation 
of prophetic stances and a de facto privatization of the religious group. In the US, 
particularly among nondenominational and evangelical free traditions, this tendency 
culminated in a kind of spiritual narcissism focused on self-help, psychological 
counseling, financial advice, and family support. An important secondary feature of these 
communities is the emphasis on entertainment, particularly music and video, modeled on 
mainstream secular mass media. To the extent that these religious groups center their 
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attention on the individual and his or her psychology, they necessarily exclude the 
possibility of community, social and global awareness. Such individualistic values also 
dovetail fortuitously with the utilitarian, libertarian worldview of modern global 
capitalism and its attendant consumerism. Thus, the likelihood of meaningful critique of 
the socio-economic structure by such religious groups is decreased dramatically.   
PROPHETS: THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS MORAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
 
Social movement theory is generally pitched at a macro-structural level of 
analysis, describing rather impersonal large-scale forces such as mobilization of 
resources, relational networks, organizational framing, and historical political 
opportunities. These are clearly crucial and valuable perspectives, validated by hundreds 
of studies and immeasurably useful in movement analysis at the macro level. A growing 
body of literature, however, argues that a focus solely on so-called ―structural‖ causal 
factors will ultimately prove inadequate for producing a theoretical picture of social 
movements that truly approximates their manifestations in actual, lived experience.  In 
contrast to Skocpol’s famous summation that revolutions ―are not made; they happen,‖ I 
assert, in concert with many sociologists of culture, phenomenologists, ethnographers 
that attention to the individual, micro-mechanisms of movement-building is essential, and 
heretofore under-valued. Alongside these respected structural frameworks, these scholars 
contend that a focus on exactly who, why, and how movements are built fills out blind-
spots and actively ignored aspects of theories of contentious politics.  Such approaches 
locate themselves doggedly at the personal, even biographical level, and provide much 
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needed theoretical specification upon which macro-level theories are built, and indeed 
depend. 
Consequently, I argue here that actors within religious organizations attempting to 
gradually redefine, relocate, or revive the boundaries of morality in civil society 
constitute the primary micro-level catalysts by which religious (and many secular) 
movement organizations work in everyday life.  In the tradition of Walzer, Melucci, and 
West, I term these actors "prophets," invoking both their location within religious 
traditions and moral schemas, and its use to describe individuals articulating alternative, 
often radical visions of a new social order (Walzer, 1982; Melucci, 1996; West, 1993).  
Prophets in this sense have played pivotal though often overlooked roles in most 
instances of sociopolitical change in US history.  Most originate in activist organizations, 
many of them religious.  Prophets may be seen as a species of the ―moral entrepreneur‖ 
genus elaborated by Becker (1995), Adut (2004), and Goode (1994).  The unique 
characteristics of prophets, however, complicate traditional models of collective action. 
These traits demonstrate the unusual and disproportionate power and durability of religio-
political activism.  Prophets generally operate according to trans-rational logic and 
motives, are unattached to the outcomes of movements, and frequently put the movement 
before their personal well-being. Since they are so often unconstrained by limitations 
normally seen among conventional activists, their ―per unit‖ value to movements may be 
disproportionate to their numbers, and when compared to typical rank and file 
participants. 
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To put it in a phrase, religious activism works by harmonizing a moral habitus 
(set of abstract personally-held values, practices, and identities) with a set of empirical 
actualities found in the external social world, particularly politics, economic, and cultural 
events.  It is the task of religious activists, both individually and organizationally, to 
demonstrate why ―the world out there‖ should be of interest to the identities and values of 
religious people.  This is chiefly accomplished by linking the moral schemas of the 
religious group to instances of moral transgression on the part of society or a social 
group.  Put simply this is the task – and expertise – of the prophet.  
 
As shown throughout this study, prophets, particularly those in religious contexts, 
translate objective facts into subjective meanings through strategic manipulations of 
cultural categories and moral schemas. In the case of political effects, religion and 
religious groups influence social transformation most often by modifying the prevailing 
definitions of right and wrong – moral schema – which undergird political action and 
indeed many arenas of social life.  Practices, beliefs, policies, and groups which were 
formerly seen as morally indifferent – or not problematized normatively at all -- are re-
categorized as good or evil, evil may be transformed into good, or vice versa.  These are 
the elementary mechanics of social change.  
Evidence of this process can be found in the sudden birth of new social issues for 
religious activism in the 1980s, as demonstrated in Ch. 5. These include the anti-nuclear 
movement, pro-life mobilization, gay rights activism, and an enormous embrace of 
human rights as a target of collective action. Each of these cases, emerged virtually de 
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novo during this period as a direct result of religiously inspired prophets translating 
objective external happenings into subjectively meaning, relevant, and morally-grounded 
outrage.  Further evidence of this process is observed in the significant spike in the 
number of conservative Christian activist groups between 1975 and 1985 on issues of 
moral decline and opposition to legal abortion, which prefigured later large-scale changes 
in electoral political activity, leading eventually by 2000 to conservative Christians 
capturing the presidency via George W. Bush. It is difficult to plausibly imagine how this 
political achievement could have been attained without the sustained cultural activism by 
these Christian groups.  This case is a particularly clear illustration of how significant 
transformations in the political and historical realm often have their origins in the 
religious civil sphere. In this particular case, religious activists ―seeded‘ the electoral 
ground at the local level several years prior to major electoral shifts favorable to their 
work. 
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Chapter 8:  Future Projections 
 
Humans have an absolute need for an interpretation of life.” 
---Arthur Schopenhauer, On Religion: A Dialogue, 1871, p. 96 
 
 
Religion is important for a great number of sociological topics because it is one of 
the most enduring of cultural forms.  It is a cultural system, a reservoir of values, ultimate 
meanings, ethics, and authority.  For nearly as long as humans have walked the earth, 
religion has walked alongside them. Therefore, in situations of certainty, when guidance 
with respect to ethics, morality, or ultimate ends are considered, religion is frequently 
called upon, even in the modern, developed and highly educated United States.  This 
dissertation has argued that not only has religion been an essential player in the history of 
American civil society, but also that it has had large-scale and consequential effects on 
the general political landscape, which often manifests as strictly secular outcomes.  
The future, however, is not as clear.  Not only are a variety of religious activist 
groups in abeyance, with uncertain trajectories, but the traditional religious communities 
and denominations from which they emerged are in decline.  Sociologists of religion have 
recently observed the growing proportion of Americans who describe themselves as 
having ―no religious affiliation,‖ informally referred to as the ―nones.‖  At present, 
approximately 14% of Americans identify themselves with this label.  A large proportion 
of this group are not atheist, agnostic, or strictly secular, but ―SBNR‖ –―spiritual but not 
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religious.‖  This new term was introduced by adherents to further specify and qualify 
their religious beliefs and practices.  
 Given the seemingly unbounded ascendancy of this group alongside the decline 
or depolitization of mainline denominations, I anticipate that the future of American 
religious activism will belong to the ―nones.‖  In the short term,  denominational 
Christianity may play middling roles, but the major social movements of the 21
st
 century 
–to the extent that they are populated by people of faith and their values – will be led by 
the spiritual, all encompassing, universal yet transcendent vision of non-exclusive 
religion.   
If this comes to pass, it will not simply be because extant religious organizations 
have failed to connect with young people, the middle class, the disenfranchised, racial 
minorities, or because they have failed to modify their theology or political expressions to 
make them more relevant to the unchurched of the day.  Neither will it be because 
religious organizations cannot get along or overcome serious disagreements either 
internally or with rival churches.  The problem with religion is not differences and 
internal fragmentation based on ideology but the fact that the groups in question fail to 
engage in meaningful, respectful, and constructive communication with one another.  The 
field is bereft of sharing of concerns, dialogue, even confrontation -- except at a distance 
through battle.  The result is more separation, mistrust, ignorance and silence, a kind of 
religio-political apartheid.    
This fact would be disturbing on its own, but is compounded by the fact that these 
rows map nearly exactly processes playing out in the political realm generally.  A 
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convincing case that the latter is a result of the form cannot be made.  But given that, as I 
have demonstrated in this dissertation,  religion is the most important source of moral 
schemas in the U.S., that these moral schemas have been locked in bitter warfare at least 
since the 1960s, that moral schemas undergird political values and ideologies, and that 
the American political landscape is riven with seemingly intractable ideological combat, 
it is not farfetched to conclude that ―what begins in religion, ends in politics‖ is not only 
corroborated, but being played out daily before our very eyes.   
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Appendix A.  
Numerical Codes for Issues in Religious Activism Database 
 
1. Africa 
2. Aging 
3. Agriculture 
4. Animal rights 
5. Anti-Catholic 
6. Anti-communism 
7. Anti-death penalty 
8. Anti-drugs 
9. Anti-ERA/anti-feminism 
10. Anti-gun control 
11. Anti-modernism/fundamentalist/anti-secular/anti-atheism 
12. Anti-poverty/urban renewal 
13. Anti-racism/race relations 
14. Anti-Religious Right/Anti-New Right 
15. Anti-Vietnam War/S.E. Asia 
16. Arts 
17. Black nationalism 
18. Civil liberties 
19. Civil rights/racial justice 
20. Community development 
21. Conscientious objection/anti-draft/conscription 
22. Conservative: General/smaller government 
23. Corporate responsibility/investments/divestment 
24. Creationism 
25. Direct service/charity, maternal support, childcare 
26. Economic development/International development/foreign aid 
27. Economic justice/social security/welfare rights/redistribution/basic needs 
28. Ecumenism 
29. Education/education reform 
30. Energy 
31. Environment/ecology 
32. Farm workers/migrants 
33. Federal budget/military budget/taxes 
34. Foreign policy/foreign relations/trade 
35. Gay rights and advocacy 
36. Internal church reform, rational funeral practices 
37. Greater role of religion/theocracy 
38. Health/health care 
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39. Housing 
40. Human rights/human trafficking/anti-torture/POWs/amnesty 
41. Hunger/food safety 
42. Immigration 
43. Korea/Asia/Taiwan/Philippines 
44. Labor/(un)employment 
45. Latin America/Central America/land reform 
46. Liberal/liberation/black theology 
47. Literacy 
48. Media reform/media violence 
49. Middle East 
50. Missions/evangelism 
51. Moral decline/traditional values/traditional family preservation/anti-sex 
education/anti-gay 
52. Nuclear arms/disarmament 
53. Obscenity/anti-porn/decency 
54. Patriotism/pro-military/militarism/anti-UN 
55. Peace/nonviolence/anti-militarism 
56. Political corruption 
57. Prison reform/prisoner support/criminal justice/juvenile justice 
58. Private schools/parental rights 
59. Pro-business/free enterprise 
60. Pro-choice 
61. Pro-democracy 
62. Progressive: General 
63. Pro-life/anti-abortion/anti-contraception 
64. Pro-UN/United Nations advocacy 
65. Refugees 
66. Religious freedom/church-state boundary 
67. Sabbath protection 
68. Safety 
69. School prayer 
70. Sex education 
71. Social action: General/Social Justice 
72. Social teaching dissemination/CST 
73. Socialism 
74. South Africa/Anti-apartheid 
75. Temperance/alcoholism 
76. Voter registration/citizenship 
77. Women‘s rights/feminism/gender equality/ERA 
78. Conservative/traditional theology, Anti-WCC, Anti-mobilization, Anti-social 
action 
79. Anti-gambling 
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80. Anti-immigration 
81. White supremacy/racial purity 
82. Ireland 
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Appendix B.   
Numerical Codes for Tactics in Religious Activism Database  
 
1. Legislation/public policy 
2. Public awareness, consciousness raising 
3. Research  
4. Speakers 
5. Seminars/conferences, forums 
6. Training/leadership training/workshops 
7. Media outreach 
8. Media ministry 
9. Publications, clearinghouse 
10. Coalition building 
11. Church outreach 
12. Community organizing/grassroots organizing/civic engagement 
13. Political organizing/political action 
14. Financial support/grantmaking 
15. Federation/central organization/coordination 
16. Protest/rallies/marches 
17. Direct action/boycotts/civil disobedience 
18. Advocacy 
19. Litigation/legal defense/legal support 
20. Youth outreach/youth training/youth ministry 
21. Lobbying 
22. Mobilization 
23. Divestment 
24. Official resolutions 
25. Prayer 
26. Vigils 
27. Fasting 
28. Technical assistance 
29. Retreats 
30. Parallel institutions 
 
  
 184 
Appendix C.  
Alphabetical List of U.S. Christian Activist Organizations Analyzed 
                     
ABW Ministries    
Academic Freedom Legal Defense Fund 
Action for Interracial Understanding        
Affirmation/Gay & Lesbian Mormons 
Affirmation: United Methodists for Lesbian/Gay Concerns      
Africa Faith & Justice Network  
African People's Christian Organization 
Agape: Gospel of Life Disciples         
AIDS National Interfaith Network        
Alcohol Education for Youth and Community 
Alliance Defense Fund         
Alliance to End Repression        
American Baptist Peace Fellowship        
American Baptists Concerned        
American Catholic Committee         
American Center for Law and Justice       
American Christian Action Council        
American Christians for the Abolition of Torture 
American Citizens Concerned for Life 
American Coalition for Traditional Values 
American Coalition of Unregistered Churches 
American Collegians for Life        
American Constitutional Rights Association 
American Council of Christian Churches 
American Council of Christian Laymen 
American Council on Alcohol Problems 
American Family Association        
American Family Communiversity        
American Forum for Jewish-Christian Cooperation 
American Friends Service Committee 
American Health and Temperance Society       
American TFP 
Americanism Foundation 
Americans Against Abortion 
Americans for Decency 
Americans for God 
Americans United for God and Country 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State 
 185 
Anglo-Saxon Christian Patriot 
Appeal of Conscience Foundation 
Archbishop Romero Relief Fund 
Armageddon Project 
Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace 
Association for Public Justice 
Association for Religion and Intellectual Life 
Association for the Advancement of Family Stability 
Association of Black Catholics Against Abortion 
Association of Urban Sisters 
Axios USA 
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs 
Baptist Peace Fellowship 
Baptist Students Concerned 
Baptists for Life 
Benedictines for Peace 
Bible Holiness Movement 
Bible-Science Association 
Biblical Institute for Social Change 
Biblical Witness Fellowship 
Black Methodists for Church Renewal 
Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church 
Bread for the World 
Brethren Peace Fellowship 
Brethren/Mennonite Council for Gay Concerns 
Campaign Against Investment in South Africa 
Campaign Against US Bases in the Philippines 
Campaign for Human Development 
Canon Law Society of America 
Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation 
Care Net 
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs 
Catholic Association for International Peace 
Catholic Campaign for Human Development 
Catholic Central Verein of America 
Catholic Central Youth Union of America 
Catholic Charities USA 
Catholic Committee of Appalachia 
Catholic Committee on Urban Ministry 
Catholic Council on Civil Liberties 
Catholic Council on Working Life 
Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights 
Catholic Parents Network 
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Catholic Peace Fellowship 
Catholic Relief Services 
Catholic Total Abstinence Union of America 
Catholic Women for the ERA 
Catholic Worker 
Catholics for a Free Choice 
Catholics for Christian Political Action 
Catholics Speak Out 
Catholics United for Life 
Catholics United for the Faith 
CAUSA USA 
CCCO, An Agency for Military Draft Counseling 
Center for Community Change 
Center for New Creation 
Center for Religion, Ethics, & Social Policy 
Center of Concern 
Center on Conscience and War/NISBCO 
Center on Law & Pacifism 
Center on Religion and Society 
Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors 
Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America 
Children of War 
Children's Legal Foundation 
Christian Action Council 
Christian AIDS Service Alliance 
Christian Amendment Movement 
Christian Americans for Life 
Christian Anti-Communism Crusade 
Christian Anti-Narcotic Association 
Christian Citizens' Crusade 
Christian Coalition 
Christian Communications, Inc. 
Christian Crusade 
Christian Defense League 
Christian Family Life 
Christian Family Movement 
Christian Family Renewal 
Christian Feminists 
Christian Focus on Government 
Christian Forum Research Foundation 
Christian Freedom Foundation 
Christian Government Movement 
Christian Heritage Center 
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Christian Ireland Ministries 
Christian Law Association 
Christian Law Institute 
Christian Liberty Association 
Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention 
Christian Patriots Defense League/Citizens Emergency Defense System 
Christian Research 
Christian Response International 
Christian Solidarity International, U.S.A. 
Christian Urgent Action Network for Emergency Support Philippines 
Christian Voice 
Christian Women's National Concerns 
Christians Associated for Relationships with Eastern Europe 
Christians for Socialism in the U.S. 
Christians in Crisis 
Christians' Israel Public Action Campaign 
Christians United for Responsible Entertainment 
Christians, Inc. 
Church Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines 
Church Committee on Human Rights in Asia 
Church League of America 
Church of God Peace Fellowship 
Church Peace Union 
Church Women United 
Churches Center for Theology & Public Policy 
Churches' Committee for Voter Registration Education 
Churchmen's Commission for Decent Publications 
Citizens Council of America for Segregation 
Citizen's Crusade Against Poverty 
Citizens for a Better America 
Citizens for Decency Through Law 
Citizens for Decent Literature 
Clean Up TV Campaign 
Clergy and Laity Concerned 
Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy 
Coalition for Better Television 
Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras 
Coalition on Southern Africa 
Coalition on Women and Religion 
Coalitions for America 
COAR Peace Mission 
Commission for Racial Justice 
Commission of the Churches on International Affairs 
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Commission on Family Ministries and Human Sexuality of the NCC 
Commission on Marriage and Family Life of the NCC 
Commission on Religion in Appalachia 
Committee for Nonviolent Action 
Committee in Solidarity with Latin American Nonviolent Movements 
Committee of Concern 
Committee of Concerned Catholics 
Committee of Religious Concern for Peace 
Committee of Southern Churchmen 
Committee on Social Development & World Peace of the USCC 
Community Creativity, Inc. 
Concerned Women for America 
Conference for Catholic Lesbians 
Congress of National Black Churches 
Congress of Racial Equality 
Conservative Majority for Citizen's Rights 
Coordination in Development 
Corpus Christi Campaign 
Council of Bible Believing Churches 
Council on Christian Unity 
Council on Religion and International Affairs 
Council on Religion and the Homosexual 
Courage 
Creation Health Foundation 
Creation Research Society 
Creation Social Science and Humanities Society 
CREED 
Crusade Against Corruption 
Crusade for Decency 
Debt Crisis Network 
Defenders of the Christian Faith 
Denominational Ministry Strategy 
Department of Family Life of the NCC 
Dignity/USA 
Disciples Peace Fellowship 
Division of Christian Social Concern of the American Baptist Convention 
Eagle Forum 
East-West Bridges for Peace 
Eco-Justice Working Group 
Ecumenical Committee on the Andes 
Ecumenical Program for International Communication and Action 
Ecumenical Program on Central America and the Caribbean 
Eleventh Commandment Fellowship 
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Episcopal Churchpeople for a Free Southern Africa 
Episcopal Pacifist Fellowship 
Episcopal Peace Fellowship 
Episcopal Society for Cultural and Racial Unity 
Episcopal Women's Caucus 
Episcopalians and Others for Responsible Social Action 
ESA 
Eternal Life 
Ethics & Public Policy Center 
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention 
Evangelical Women's Caucus 
Evangelicals Concerned 
Evangelicals for Social Action 
Exodus International - N. America 
Family America 
Family Cause 
Family Defense Council 
Family Life Bureau 
Family Life Division 
Family Protection League 
Family Research Council 
Family Research Institute 
Family Rosary 
Fellowship of Concern 
Fellowship of Reconciliation 
Fellowship of Reconciliation Task Force on Latin America and Caribbean 
Feminists for Life 
Focus on Micronesia Coalition 
Focus on the Family 
ForLIFE 
Foundation for a Christian Civilization 
Foundation for Moral Restoration 
Foundation for Religious Action in Social and Civil Order 
Free Congress Research and Education Foundation 
Free the Fathers 
Freedom Fellowship Foundation 
Freedom of Faith: A Christian Committee for Religious Rights 
Friends Committee on National Legislation 
Friends Committee on War Tax Concerns 
Friends Coordinating Committee on Peace 
Friends for Lesbian & Gay Concerns 
Friends of Families 
Friendship House 
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General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Methodist Church 
General Commission on the Status and Role of Women 
Genesis Institute 
Gloria Dei Press 
Golden Rule Society 
Grail Movement 
Grailville 
Grey Nuns 
Groundwork for a Just World 
Happiness of Womanhood 
Helpers of God's Precious Infants 
Holy Innocents Reparation Committee 
Homosexuals Anonymous Fellowship Services 
Human Life Center 
Human Life International 
Humanitarian Law Project-International Education Development 
Impact 
Infact 
Institute for Creation Research 
Institute for Peace and Justice 
Institute of Women Today 
Institute on Religion and Democracy 
Institute on the Church in Urban-Industrial Society 
Integrity 
Intercessors for America 
Interfaith Action for Economic Justice 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility 
Interfaith Center to Reverse the Arms Race 
Interfaith Commission on Marriage and Family 
Interfaith Committee on Social Responsibility in Investments 
Interfaith Council for Human Rights 
Interfaith Hunger Appeal 
Interfaith Impact for Justice and Peace 
Interfaith Impact Foundation 
Interfaith Movement 
Interfaith Office on Accompaniment 
International Association for Religious Freedom 
International Christian Youth 
International Christians for Unity in Social Action 
International Council for Christian Leadership 
International Council of Christian Churches 
International Grail Movement 
International Health and Temperance Association 
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International Human Rights Program of the Christian Church 
International Justice Network 
International Life Services 
International Network for Religion and Animals 
International Relief Friendship Foundation 
International Religious Liberty Association 
International Society for Animal Rights 
International Temperance Association 
Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization 
Inter-Religious Task Force on Central America 
Interreligious Taskforce on US Food Policy 
Interweave 
Jesuit Refugee Service/U.S.A. 
John Calvin Society for Racial Theology 
John T. Conner Center for East/West Reconciliation 
Jubilee 
Justice Fellowship 
Justice for Women 
JustLife 
Keston USA 
Korea Church Coalition for Peace, Justice, and Reunification 
Korean American Peace Institute 
Las Hermanas 
Last Harvest 
Laymen's Commission of the American Council of Christian Churches 
Laymen's League 
Laymen's National Bible Association 
League of Housewives/Happiness of Womanhood 
League of Pace Amendment Advocates 
League to Uphold Congregational Principles 
Legatus 
Liberty Federation 
LIFE 
Life Action Ministries 
Lord's Day Alliance of the United States 
LOS PADRES 
Love in Action 
Lutheran Coalition on Latin America 
Lutheran Human Relations Association of America 
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services 
Lutheran Peace Fellowship 
Lutherans Concerned/North America 
Lutherans for Life 
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Media Action Research Center 
Mennonite Economic Development Associates 
Metanoia Ministries 
Methodist Federation for Social Action 
Methodist Peace Fellowship 
Methodists for Life 
Micronesia Coalition 
Midwest Migrant Health Information Office 
Migrant Health Promotion 
Migration and Refugee Services 
Moms in Touch International 
Moral Alternatives 
Moral Majority 
Moral Re-Armament 
Morality in Media 
More Light Presbyterians for Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Concerns 
Mormons for ERA 
Movement for a Better World 
Mt. Diablo Peace Center 
NARMIC/American Friends Service Committee 
National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression 
National Association of Evangelicals 
National Association of Laity 
National Association to Keep and Bear Arms 
National Bible Association 
National Black Catholic Clergy Caucus 
National Catholic Action Coalition 
National Catholic Coalition for Responsible Investment 
National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice 
National Catholic Rural Life Conference 
National Catholic Social Action Conference 
National Catholic Society for Animal Welfare 
National Catholic Welfare Conference 
National Catholic Women's Union 
National Christian Action Coalition 
National Christian Leadership Conference for Israel 
National Citizens Action Network 
National Coalition Against Pornography 
National Coalition for the Protection of Children and Families 
National Coalition of American Nuns 
National Committee for a Human Life Amendment 
National Committee for the Prevention of Alcoholism 
National Committee of Black Churchmen 
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National Committee of Religious Leaders for Safety 
National Conference of Catholic Charities 
National Conference of Christians and Jews 
National Council of Bible Believing Churches 
National Council of Catholic Men 
National Council of Catholic Women 
National Council of Churches 
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. 
National Ecumenical Coalition 
National Education Program 
National Episcopal Coalition on Alcohol and Drugs 
National Farm Worker Ministry 
National Federation for Decency 
National Federation of Laymen 
National Forum Foundation 
National Impact 
National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors 
National League for Separation of Church and State 
National Liberal League 
National Migrant Workers Council 
National Namibia/Southern Africa Concerns 
National Office for Black Catholics 
National Office for Decent Literature 
National Organization of Episcopalians for Life 
National Pro-Family Coalition 
National Pro-Life Religious Council 
National Reform Association 
National Right to Life Committee 
National Safety Council's Conference for Religious Leaders 
National Service Board for Conscientious Objectors 
National Temperance and Prohibition Council 
National Temperance League 
National Traditionalist Caucus 
National Women's Christian Temperance Union 
National Youth Pro-Life Coalition 
Nationalist Observer 
Network 
Nevada Desert Experience 
New Call to Peacemaking 
New Ways Ministry 
New York CIRCUS 
Nicaragua Interfaith Committee for Action 
North American Christian Peace Conference 
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North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea 
North Conway Institute 
Now Christian Freedom International 
Office for Church in Society- UCC 
Office of Family Ministries & Human Sexuality: NCC 
Operation PUSH 
Operation Rescue 
Order of Seville 
Order of the Cross Society 
Outpost 
Panel of American Women 
Parents' Alliance to Protect Our Children 
Pax Christi-USA 
Peacebuilder Movement 
Pentecostal Coalition for Human Rights 
People for Life 
People's Christian Coalition 
Plowshares Institute 
Presbyterian Hunger Program 
Presbyterian Interracial Council 
Presbyterian Women 
Presbyterians for Democracy and Religious Freedom 
Presbyterians for Lesbian/Gay Concerns 
Presbyterians Pro-Life 
Priests for Equality 
Prison Fellowship International 
Pro Media Foundation 
Pro-Family Forum 
Professionals-Nicaragua 
Project Equality 
ProLife Direct Action League 
Protect America's Children 
Protect Life in All Nations 
Protestants and other Americans United for Separation of Church and State 
Public Advocate of the United States 
Puebla Institute 
Quest for Peace 
Quixote Center 
Reasons to Believe 
Recovery Ministries 
Refugee Voices 
Regeneration 
Regional Conflicts Program 
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Religion and Ethics Network 
Religion and Labor Council of America 
Religion and Socialism Commission of the Democratic Socialists of America 
Religion in American Life 
Religious Activities Committee, National Safety Council 
Religious Coalition for a Moral Drug Policy 
Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice 
Religious Committee for the ERA 
Religious Heritage of America 
Religious Leaders Division, National Safety Council 
Religious Network for Equality for Women 
Religious Roundtable 
Religious Task Force 
Religious Task Force on Central America and Mexico 
Rock is Stoning Kids 
Rockford Institute Center on Religion and Society 
Rosary for Life Organization 
Rutherford Institute 
Seamless Garment Network 
Servants in Faith and Technology 
Set the Date Now 
Seventh Day Adventists Kinship International 
Shepherd's Fold Ministries 
Society for Animal Rights 
Society for the Family of Man 
Society of St. Stephen 
Sojourners 
Southern Africa Network 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Southern Mutual Help Association 
St. Joan's International Alliance 
St. Martin de Porres Guild 
Starthrowers 
Stop ERA 
Students for America 
Summer Community Organization and Political Education Program 
Sunday League 
The Committee -- Witness to Reconciliation 
The Conservative Caucus 
The Freedom Council 
The Nationalist Movement 
The Other Side 
Third Continental Congress 
 196 
U.S. Catholic Conference Migration and Refugee Services 
UCC Coordinating Center for Women in Church & Society 
Unitarian Laymen's League 
Unitarian Universalist Association Black Concerns Working Group 
Unitarian Universalist Fellowship for Social Justice 
Unitarian Universalist Jubilee Working Group for Anti-Racism 
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee 
Unitarian Universalist Society for Alcohol and Drug Education 
Unitarian Universalist Women's Federation 
Unitarian Universalists for Black and White Action 
Unitarian Universalists for Lesbian/Gay Concerns 
United American and Captive Nations Patriotic Movement 
United Black Christians 
United Black Church Appeal 
United Church of Christ Coalition for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Concerns 
United Church of Christ Coordinating Center for Women in Church and Society 
United Church of Christ Ministers for Racial and Social Justice 
United Church Peace  Fellowship 
United Church Women of the NCC 
United Families of America 
United Lesbian and Gay Christian Scientists 
United Parents Under God 
United Presbyterian Peace Fellowship 
United Presbyterian Women 
United States Catholic Conference 
Unity Fellowship Church Movement 
Universal Fellowship of Metropolitian Community Churches 
US Interreligious Committee on Peace 
US-USSR Bridges for Peace 
UU Association of Congregations -- Washington Office for Faith in Action 
Value of Life Committee 
Voice of Liberty Association 
Wanderer Forum Foundaiton 
We the People, United 
Witness for Peace 
Women Affirming Life 
Women Church Convergence 
Women Exploited by Abortion 
Women for Faith and Family 
Women of Color Partnership Program 
Women of the Church Coalition 
Women's Advocacy Office 
Women's Alliance for Theology, Ethics, and Ritual 
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Working Group on Domestic Hunger & Poverty 
World Concern 
World Conference on Religion and Peace, US Section 
World Federation of Methodist Women, North America 
Young Christian Movement 
Young Christian Workers 
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